GAMBARI ACHIEVES LITTLE IN BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001096 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM SUBJECT: GAMBARI ACHIEVES LITTLE IN BURMA RANGOON 00001096 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: We consider Gambari's most recent visit a failure, and most of the diplomatic and UN community based here agrees with us. He allowed himself to be held captive in the isolated capital, he only met with people the regime approved, and he obtained nothing but vague indications of future action. In our experience, most the action the regime does take are token gestures to get the international community off their backs. We see no evidence that Than Shwe has any intention of moving towards genuine dialogue or political reform. End Summary ¶2. (C) Gambari met with diplomats in Nay Pyi Taw on November 7 to discuss the meetings he had to date in Nay Pyi Taw with assorted Ministers, and ethnic, business, USDA, and womens leaders. He expected to meet today in Rangoon with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),and we saw a UN car go to her home this afternoon. The most senior official he met with was the new PM Thein Sein, along with the new Secretary 1, who Gambari claimed expressed full confidence in him, pledged their continuing cooperation, and invited him back "again and again," but with no specifics as to dates. It does not appear that he will meet with Senior General Than Shwe, unlike his previous three visits. The other ministers told Gambari they had full authority, and that they did not need to trouble Than Shwe. He admitted when questioned by Charge that everyone with whom he had met were selected by the regime. He also admitted during questioning that his request to meet Generation 88 Students and monks had not been granted, but said that he had received "indications that something will happen regarding the release of Generation 88 Students, except those who would be charged with crimes." The NLD Central Executive Committee was flown up first thing this morning to meet with Gambari in Nay Pyi Taw. Gambari's Advice to the Regime -------------- ¶3. (C) Gambari noted the Ministers expressed disappointment that their "cooperation" with the UN had not prevented further UN Security Council (UNSC) action. Gambari explained that the PRST was unanimous and the best way to avoid further UNSC attention was more cooperation and tangible progress by the regime. He advised the various ministers that they need to "broaden and enrich" the next steps of the roadmap, but admitted during questioning that they rejected Gambari's idea of a broad based constitutional review commission. So then he offered to meet the recently announced Drafting Committee to explain to them about constitution drafting processes in other countries. ¶4. (C) Gambari told the diplomats that he had emphasized to his various interlocutors that his good offices mission had the full support of ASEAN, China and India and warned the authorities that a return to the status quo ante was unacceptable. He also told them that his UN good offices mission must yield tangible results or it would be a waste of everyone's time. He claimed to be ready to return to his home country of Nigeria. He cited the key issues where concrete progress was required: the release of all political prisoners; ICRC access; "broadening and enriching" the outcome of the National Convention through the drafting committee; a timeline for the Seven Step Roadmap; and the establishment of a Poverty Alleviation Commission, which he said the Norwegians were prepared to support. He warned the authorities that this was their best opportunity to restore democracy through meaningful dialogue leading to national reconciliation. ¶5. (C) The diplomats sought more details on getting a genuine political dialogue going. Gambari said that he emphasized that the dialogue must start without delay and discussions with ASSK should begin "as soon as possible." He urged that the restrictions on her be eased and she be treated like a partner by the regime regarding timelines, "broadening participation and enriching the constitution." Aung Kyi, the designated liaison to ASSK, told Gambari that he would be RANGOON 00001096 002.3 OF 003 meeting with her regularly. Thus far, he has met her once, two weeks ago. ¶6. (C) The Singaporean Ambassador offered the usual effusive support of ASEAN for the UN and Gambari. Gambari had a good comeback: thanks for your support, but what is ASEAN actually prepared to do? He urged the ASEAN nations to demand tangible results and improvements in the capacity of the Special Envoy. He pointed out that Lee Kuan Yew had recommended Gambari have his own person in Rangoon to assist his good offices mission. Emphasize the Positive -------------- ¶7. (C) Gambari said that he would have to first report the substance of his meetings to SYG Ban, but provided the assembled diplomats a description of what he considered the positive accomplishments of his mission: the lifting of the curfew, the reduced military presence in Rangoon and Mandalay, the release of over 2000 detainees, the appointment of a liaison to ASSK. Although acknowledging that he must discuss the positive and negative to retain credibility, he did not describe any negatives. The Australian Ambassador later informed Gambari that the military presence remained significant in Rangoon and arrests were continuing. ¶8. (C) During questioning he offered further developments, which if they happen, could be considered positive. He said that "he believed ICRC access will happen," but it required logistical arrangements with the Home Affairs Ministry (which halted the previous access ICRC enjoyed). He stated that ASSK would be allowed to meet with the NLD Central Executive Committee (aka the uncles),but with no timetable. He also said that Pinheiro would be allowed to visit on Nov. 11, but did not know whether Pinheiro would be limited to Nay Pyi Taw like Gambari or permitted to visit Insein Prison and freely visit other places as he did in the past. Gambari admitted that he only pushed for a date. Charge asked if he had received agreement to have someone posted in Rangoon as his representative. He said yes. When asked for the response, he replied "it was not rejected." Downplay the Negative -------------- ¶9. (C) The November 7 issue of the government mouthpiece, New Light of Myanmar, was read by the diplomats on their way to Nay Pyi Taw. They interpreted it as a rejection of almost everything the international community sought. It noted that the people still detained would be charged with crimes involving explosives, violence and terrorism. The diplomats know these detainees in fact to be peaceful protestors. It claimed that Gambari was satisfied with his meetings with the representatives of the national races and civil society, that he did not reject the Seven Step Roadmap (nor did the countries in the region),and "wished to see Myanmar as a peaceful, developed, and democracy-flourishing nation." It also reported that Gambari's suggestion of a tripartite meeting among him, ASSK and Aung Kyi would not be possible. If he wanted to meet with the Constitution Drafting Commission, the newspaper reported he could meet with the Culture and Information Ministers, who are on the committee (and well-known hardliners). The report dismissed Gambari's suggested Poverty Alleviation Commission on the grounds that, if sanctions were removed, Burma needed no Commission. Gambari downplayed this dismissal claiming the Planning Minister remained interested. ¶10. (C) During the question period, the Charge pressed him several times on his claims of continuing cooperation from the regime, even thought it expelled the UN resrep on the eve of Gambari's visit, and he was essentially being held captive in Nay Pyi Taw. Charge noted that increasing restrictions had been imposed on him during his subsequent visits, which further appeared to contradict his claims of cooperation. He acknowledged that that was one way of viewing it. He repeated several times that he could only visit with the RANGOON 00001096 003.3 OF 003 consent of the regime, expressed gratitude that they permitted him to come sooner than they preferred, and required the consent of the regime to any meetings. The German Ambassador asked why he planned to leave November 8, even though Gambari had earlier stated that he would stay as long as it took to accomplish his goals. Again Gambari replied that he was here at the invitation of the government and the dates had been carefully negotiated. Charge requested another opportunity to talk with him before he departed, which the others also seconded. Gambari replied that he would put in the request, but could not promise anything. Reaction: Negative -------------- ¶11. (C) The assembled diplomats reacted uniformly negatively to Gambari's briefing. We expected that from European and Australian colleagues. The Chinese Ambassador privately told the Charge Gambari's report was not good. The Singaporean Ambassador said this would be a major topic of discussion at the upcoming ASEAN Summit with tough questions for PM Thein Sein. The Indian Ambassador did not offer an opinion about Gambari, but told the Charge that the US should concentrate on Afghanistan and Pakistan and not worry about Burma. The others took extensive notes and privately indicated to Charge their disappointment. The countries which do not usually make waves view Gambari's treatment by Than Shwe as a public humiliation and disrespectful towards the UN. UN officials also view this visit as a disaster, particularly Gambari's unwillingness to protest against his confinement. And ordinary Burmese, increasingly reluctant to talk politics with Embassy personnel, approach us on the street telling us that Gambari has failed and done nothing for the Burmese people. They also charge him with accepting gemstones and women from the regime during his visit, which we cannot verify, but indicates how low Gambari's reputation has fallen. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) We do not see any significant concrete results from Gambari's latest visit. Gambari has an ego and will no doubt try to paint as rosy a picture as he can. Permitting ASSK to meet the uncles is something, but given their age and declining popular reputation, she needs to see a wider range of people, if she is to be an effective participant in a genuine dialogue. Gambari has disappointed Rangoon diplomats and UN staff beginning with his second visit because he appeared so easily manipulated by the regime. This visit has shown to all how easily he has been led by the nose by the regime. He parroted information to us fed him by the regime, forgetting we live here and know the truth. He met with far more regime flunkies than during his previous visits. Basically Than Shwe has demoted Gambari as unworthy of his time leaving him to the Prime Minister, who is considered number three in the hierarchy with no independent authority. Effectively this torpedoes the chances of some sort of understanding between ASSK and Than Shwe. Gambari has failed, and Than Shwe is betting that he can handle the international community's demands with token gestures only. He has no intention of opening up or reforming. VILLAROSA