Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RABAT994
2007-06-13 10:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

DAS CARPENTER DISCUSSES OUTLOOK FOR ELECTIONS WITH

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM MO 
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VZCZCXRO3772
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #0994/01 1641046
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131046Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6703
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3127
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000994 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM MO
SUBJECT: DAS CARPENTER DISCUSSES OUTLOOK FOR ELECTIONS WITH
BROAD RANGE OF MOROCCANS, PRESSES FOR INT'L OBSERVERS

Classified By: Classified by DCM Wayne Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000994 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM MO SUBJECT: DAS CARPENTER DISCUSSES OUTLOOK FOR ELECTIONS WITH BROAD RANGE OF MOROCCANS, PRESSES FOR INT'L OBSERVERS Classified By: Classified by DCM Wayne Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During his June 4-6 visit, NEA DAS Scott Carpenter discussed the outlook for Morocco's September legislative elections a range of GOM and non-governmental contacts. There was broad consensus that the elections will be generally transparent and free of systematic fraud. Most civil society interlocutors were open to the idea of international observation, although the GOM appears not to want them. DAS Carpenter urged senior GOM officials to reconsider, stressing that having the elections without any international observation would be a lost opportunity for Morocco. Many interlocutors predicted low voter participation rates, reflecting low public confidence in the political system, despite concerted efforts by both the GOM and civil society to bring out the vote. Moreover, gerrymandered electoral districts and a "balkanized" political party spectrum made the September outcomes fairly predictable, most agreed. Some claimed there were signs that the country's sclerotic political parties were beginning to "awaken from their long comas" but most non-governmental interlocutors pointed to constitutional reform as the only way to realize a substantive democratic transition in Morocco. End summary. -------------- Consulting a Cross-section of Moroccans -------------- ¶2. (C) NEA DAS J. Scott Carpenter visited Morocco June 4-6. His meetings focused primarily on Morocco's upcoming legislative elections and on pending revisions to the state's Press Code (septel). He discussed the outlook for the elections with a broad range of contacts including senior GOM officials (Minister of Communications Benabdellah and MFA Director-General Amrani),prominent female parliamentarians Nozha Skalli and Milouda Hazeb, a group of underprivileged youth at a community center in Rabat, leading journalists Abdelatif Dilami (of the daily L'Economiste) and Ahmed Benchamsi (of Morocco's leading weekly Telquel). Carpenter also met, in Casablanca, with the leadership of Daba 2007, the USAID grantee which is conducting an ambitious voter mobilization campaign. A lunch for Carpenter hosted by the Consul-General in Casablanca included leading civil society advocates Abdelmalek Kattani, Sabah Chraibi, and youth
leader Younes Naoumi. -------------- -------------- Elections: Transparency and a "Safe" Outcome Forecast -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) There was general agreement among DAS Carpenter's Moroccan interlocutors that the September legislative elections will be generally transparent and free of widespread fraud or abuse. Several non-governmental interlocutors opined that the absence of tactics employed in other countries, such as ballot box stuffing and mass busing of "loyal" voters, reflected the Palace's confidence that the election has already been "engineered" to ensure a "safe" and fairly predictable outcome. The redrawing of electoral districts earlier this year (reftels),and the diffusion of public support among a plethora of political parties (over 30 are expected to compete),will preserve the system of coalition government - with changes largely on the margins, most agreed. -------------- To Observe or Not to Observe -------------- ¶4. (C) In their discussions with DAS Carpenter, both GOM interlocutors and NGO leaders pointed to domestic monitors as key actors in the upcoming elections. Approximately 3000 volunteers, organized by a coalition of NGOs led by the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH),will fan out on September 7 to observe the polling. (Note: AMDH leads a coalition of Moroccan NGOs "boycotting" the U.S. Embassy and shunning USG funding in protest of U.S. policy in the Near East. However, the domestic monitors are receiving approximately 600,000 Euros in support from the E.U., and USG funds are being used to train monitors from various political parties. End note.) Prime Minister Jettou received a delegation of Moroccan civil society election observers on the evening of June 6. ¶5. (C) Many non-governmental interlocutors appeared open to the concept of international observation and took the point that their presence could be indicative of a maturing political process rather than a sign of weakness. At the same time, several observed, there was no precedent for such observation in Morocco and the GOM would be difficult to RABAT 00000994 002 OF 003 convince. ¶6. (C) In his 70 minute meeting with MFA Director-General Youssef Amrani, DAS Carpenter urged the GOM to reconsider its position on international election observers. If there are no international observers "Morocco will lose a great opportunity," to enhance its stature and confidence in its political system, Carpenter stressed. Amrani indicated that he was not persuaded. "We are not a banana republic" in need of this sort of oversight, he responded. Carpenter underscored that the presence international observers were an indication that a country's political system is taken seriously, noting that they are the norm in many countries, including western democracies like the U.S. The fact that observers want to come is a good sign. In Syria's recent parliamentary elections, no one even bothered to send observers. -------------- Apathy is the Enemy -------------- ¶7. (C) Both GOM and non-governmental observers agreed that combating public apathy and realizing a large turnout on election day was a major priority for Morocco. The leadership team of Daba 2007, a Casablanca-based NGO and USAID grantee, briefed Carpenter on their ambitious set of activities designed to raise public awareness and promote participation in the elections. The activities ranged from the publication of a series of booklets to brief the public on the various political parties and their programs, to the production of a multi-episode situation comedy depicting a family's awakening to civic life, to deployment of a 13 member caravan of activists and musicians traveling all across Morocco over a four month period to encourage citizens, particularly youth, to take an interest in politics and exercise their right to vote. Assessing their impact so far, the group expressed both optimism and frustration, allowing that they were not satisfied with the rate of registration (there were 1.5 million new and modified registrations during the spring open season). ¶8. (C) During a visit to a Youth Center in an underprivileged neighborhood in Rabat, DAS Carpenter discussed political participation with a group of about 16 Moroccan youth ranging between 13-24 years old. First asked if they knew what was happening in September, the group was generally stumped - none cited the elections. Asked if they planned to vote, most indicated that they had registered, but of these, a number said they planned to submit blank ballots. When asked why they would not vote for a particular candidate, one noted that a parade of politicians had visited the Youth Center in the past, and all promised to fix up their dilapidated soccer field. After they were elected, none had ever given another thought to the center. Prominent journalist Ahmed Benchamsi said he was not surprised by the comments of the youth. He predicted that turnout rates will be low, because the average Moroccan does not understand what members of parliament do or how their actions, positive or negative, affect their lives. -------------- Political Parties: Waking Up (?) -------------- ¶9. (C) Almost all of DAS Carpenter's interlocutors agreed that Morocco's political parties were in a poor state of development. The King's vision for reform and transformation was beyond the comprehension of the political parties, MFA DG Amrani opined, most seem to act as though this was still the era of King Hassan II. The leadership of Daba 2007 also pointed to the state of political parties as a key obstacle to democratic development. Engaging political parties and promoting their own development has been one of Daba's focus areas. "There are signs that the parties are waking up from their long comas," said Daba Chairman Noureddine Ayouche. ¶10. (C) Ayouche pointed to changes in the leadership of several significant parties through internally democratic elections mandated by the 2006 political party law, and an infusion of "brilliant" young professionals into a number key parties. (Note: IRI and NDI Chiefs of party also briefed DAS Carpenter on their respective efforts to train party cadres on campaign management, message and platform development, and internal governance. They noted both progress and enduring challenges in their efforts. End note.) Leading journalist Ahmed Benchamsi, meanwhile, was dismissive of Moroccan political parties and their capacity to change. He claimed most parties were incapable of producing a coherent political program and even those that were guarded their programs like state secrets, out of concern that they will be plagiarized by other parties (as has happened in the past, he claimed). RABAT 00000994 003 OF 003 -------------- Constitutional Reform Key to Real Change -------------- ¶11. (C) An overarching issue that repeatedly emerged from DAS Carpenter's conversations on the elections was the weakness of the parliament as an institution in a political system where the constitution preserved for the monarch the final say on almost everything. Moroccan society is generally conscious that the Palace, not the parliament, runs their government and ultimately controls their destiny. Until constitutional reform redistributes power toward parliament and the prime minister, the legislative elections will retain a certain irrelevance, many agreed. ¶12. (C) MFA DG Amrani insisted that the King has taken an irreversible strategic decision to move the country toward democracy and implied that constitutional reform fits into this strategy. Incredible liberalization has occurred in the first seven years of the King's reign, Amrani asserted, but underlined that change in Morocco will have to be orderly and "organized," at a pace determined by the King and his advisors. Leading journalist Benchamsi, a strong advocate of constitutional reform, opined that the King will not be motivated to devolve his powers unless there is sustained pressure on him to do so he maintained. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** RILEY

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