REFORM MESSAGE FOR GOM DELEGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000266 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010 TAGS: MO PGOV SUBJECT: REFORM MESSAGE FOR GOM DELEGATION Classified By: Charge Wayne Bush for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Although focused on the Western Sahara, the February 12-13 GOM visit led by Interior Minister Benmoussa also gives us an opportunity to promote democratic reform. In recent months, press freedom and freedom of expression have become increasingly sensitive issues. The date for the elections has not yet been set, but preparations suggest the GOM will dilute the Islamists' electoral potential through redistricting and other tweaks to a system designed to prevent any single party from gaining a majority. We see these as indicators of insecurity within the Moroccan establishment as the country prepares for elections later this summer. We should take advantage of the senior Moroccans' presence to: -- Remind them of their (unfulfilled) commitment to liberalize the press code, and reiterate concerns about controls on polling; -- Urge that electoral redistricting not stray too far from the "one-man, one-vote" principle; -- Offer technical assistance in elections administration and encourage the GOM to invite international election observers; End summary. -------------- Countdown to the 2007 Elections -------------- ¶2. (C) Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa and MFA Minister-delegate Fassi Fihri are coming with MOI minister-delegate Fouad Ali El Himmah, perhaps the King's closest advisor, and Yusuf Mansuri, another royal intimate whose domestic role has been underscored by his recent naming to head coordinatiion of all counterterrorism efforts. They are therefore an ideal group with which to raise our concerns on domestic reforms. ¶3. (C) The GOM has yet to fix the date for the 2007 elections of the lower house of parliament. Most government coalition parties (the left and Istiqlal) have come out in favor of a vote in July, while the rural-based MP, another coalition partner and the opposition PJD are holding out for early September. The Constitution requires elections be held before parliament convenes by 15 October, and the advent of Ramadan makes any date later than mid-September highly unlikely. A key provision in a bill revising the electoral code, that would have kept small parties off the ballot, was ruled unconstitutional in late January, in an apparent set- ;back to the King's efforts to reduce "Balkanization" of Morocco's political landscape. ¶4. (C) In early February, the Ministry of Interior began to shop around its plans to reallocate seats and modify the boundaries of Morocco's electoral districts. The current system provides for proportional allocation of seats in districts ranging from two to five seats, a highly subjective exercise designed long ago to prevent a majority by any single party. In the past, seat allocations have been weighted toward rural areas, stronghold of pro-throne parties. ¶5. (C) Details of the MOI's current plan remain under discussion, but preliminary analysis suggests that the drawing of new lines and shifting of seats will be calculated to limit the gains of the Islamist PJD. While gerrymandering may be part of the democratic process, further departure from the one person-one vote ideal could tarnish Morocco's nascent democratic credentials. For the government, however, it could have the advantage of legitimately ensuring a friendly Parliament. ¶6. (C) We have already discussed the possibility of electoral assistance with the MOI, but have not received a positive response. One area of major concern to observers is the post-election tabulation of results and aggregating them in regional and national centers. Another area of interest is electoral monitoring. In 2002 we supported a robust non-partisan electoral monitoring by local NGO's and a similar process is underway this year, although not yet formally approved. International monitoring, however, would be the capstone and best way to internationally publicize a free and fair election. We understand the EU may be interested in sponsoring its own monitoring effort, although nothing is yet on the table. -------------- -------------- RABAT 00000266 002 OF 002 Press Freedom: Strong but Can't be Taken For Granted -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Morocco has one of the freest press environments in the Arab World. A host of daily papers, in both Arabic and French, reflect a broad range of viewpoints, from secular-Royalist to liberal modernist to conservative Islamist. Numerous glossy weeklies compete with provocative cover stories that often push the envelope with sharp criticism of the government and frank treatment of touchy societal issues, including the monarchy. Still, red lines exist, and Moroccan journalists continue to trip over them from time to time. In the past month alone, Boubkir Jama'i, one of the country's most prominent journalists, announced his resignation and self-imposed exile after a court imposed a draconian (and record) civil judgement, along with a fine in a dubious libel case. An Arabic weekly, after printing jokes about Islam and the monarchy, was banned for two months, and the court granted the prosecution's request for a prison term, but suspended it. It is generally believed this was a slap on the wrist, and the mildest reaction the government could take, given the King's role as religious leader. However, these cases tended to reinforce pressures for self-censorship. ¶8. (C) Also within the past two months, the GOM circulated draft legislation that would impose significant restrictions on public opinion research - a field previously unregulated in Morocco. Apparently in response to robust lobbying by the Embassy, the GOM has since told us it is reconsidering its approach on this law. Progress on a new Press Code, revised to decriminalize libel, appears stalled in the Ministry of Communication. -------------- Message to the GOM -------------- ¶9. (C) There are no outrageously regressive steps to complain about, but we do sense that as the elections approach, the Moroccan establishment is circling its wagons and losing its zeal for bold steps forward on the democracy front. These apprehensions are driven in part by the continuing signs of a greater vote count for the PJD. We should use the February visit to impress upon the Moroccan delegation our continuing attention to their very real progress on reforms and encourage them to view the 2007 elections as an opportunity to bolster their international credibility as a model for reform and democratization in the Arab World. Specifically, we suggest Washington interlocutors: -- Urge movement on proposed revisions to the Press Code, that would decriminalize libel and encourage the responsible but free practice of journalism. Foreign Minister Benaissa committed to progress on this issue in his October 2006 meeting with the Secretary, but as of February 2007, no apparent progress has been made; -- Express appreciation for Morocco's decision to rethink its draft polling law, which would have impacted negatively on freedom of expression. -- Ask about the GOM's plans for electoral redistricting and urge that they not stray too far from the one-man, one-vote principle by disproportional allocations of seats or overly creative district boundaries; -- Offer USG-funded technical assistance to the MOI, to be defined in consultation with MOI, in helping Morocco modernize election administration; -- Encourage the GOM to invite international observers to watch its 2007 elections. This could greatly enhance Morocco's reputation for transparency and build its international credibility as an emerging democracy. ¶10. (C) Comment: Based on experience, we would not expect an especially positive reaction from MOI Benmoussa. Nonetheless, a brief high-level mention in the context of this visit, which will be focused on their highest priority issue, could help us in our efforts here to promote the democracy agenda. End comment. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Bush