REFORM MESSAGE FOR GOM DELEGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000266

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010
TAGS: MO PGOV
SUBJECT: REFORM MESSAGE FOR GOM DELEGATION


Classified By: Charge Wayne Bush for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Although focused on the Western Sahara, the
February 12-13 GOM visit led by Interior Minister Benmoussa
also gives us an opportunity to promote democratic reform.
In recent months, press freedom and freedom of expression
have become increasingly sensitive issues. The date for the
elections has not yet been set, but preparations suggest the
GOM will dilute the Islamists' electoral potential through
redistricting and other tweaks to a system designed to
prevent any single party from gaining a majority. We see
these as indicators of insecurity within the Moroccan
establishment as the country prepares for elections later
this summer. We should take advantage of the senior
Moroccans' presence to:

-- Remind them of their (unfulfilled) commitment to
liberalize the press code, and reiterate concerns about
controls on polling;

-- Urge that electoral redistricting not stray too far from
the "one-man, one-vote" principle;

-- Offer technical assistance in elections administration and
encourage the GOM to invite international election observers;

End summary.

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Countdown to the 2007 Elections
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2. (C) Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa and MFA
Minister-delegate Fassi Fihri are coming with MOI
minister-delegate Fouad Ali El Himmah, perhaps the King's
closest advisor, and Yusuf Mansuri, another royal intimate
whose domestic role has been underscored by his recent naming
to head coordinatiion of all counterterrorism efforts. They
are therefore an ideal group with which to raise our concerns
on domestic reforms.


3. (C) The GOM has yet to fix the date for the 2007 elections
of the lower house of parliament. Most government coalition
parties (the left and Istiqlal) have come out in favor of a
vote in July, while the rural-based MP, another coalition
partner and the opposition PJD are holding out for early
September. The Constitution requires elections be held
before parliament convenes by 15 October, and the advent of
Ramadan makes any date later than mid-September highly
unlikely. A key provision in a bill revising the electoral
code, that would have kept small parties off the ballot, was
ruled unconstitutional in late January, in an apparent set-
back to the King's efforts to reduce "Balkanization" of
Morocco's political landscape.


4. (C) In early February, the Ministry of Interior began to
shop around its plans to reallocate seats and modify the
boundaries of Morocco's electoral districts. The current
system provides for proportional allocation of seats in
districts ranging from two to five seats, a highly subjective
exercise designed long ago to prevent a majority by any
single party. In the past, seat allocations have been
weighted toward rural areas, stronghold of pro-throne
parties.


5. (C) Details of the MOI's current plan remain under
discussion, but preliminary analysis suggests that the
drawing of new lines and shifting of seats will be calculated
to limit the gains of the Islamist PJD. While gerrymandering
may be part of the democratic process, further departure from
the one person-one vote ideal could tarnish Morocco's nascent
democratic credentials. For the government, however, it
could have the advantage of legitimately ensuring a friendly
Parliament.


6. (C) We have already discussed the possibility of electoral
assistance with the MOI, but have not received a positive
response. One area of major concern to observers is the
post-election tabulation of results and aggregating them in
regional and national centers. Another area of interest is
electoral monitoring. In 2002 we supported a robust
non-partisan electoral monitoring by local NGO's and a
similar process is underway this year, although not yet
formally approved. International monitoring, however, would
be the capstone and best way to internationally publicize a
free and fair election. We understand the EU may be
interested in sponsoring its own monitoring effort, although
nothing is yet on the table.

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RABAT 00000266 002 OF 002


Press Freedom: Strong but Can't be Taken For Granted
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7. (C) Morocco has one of the freest press environments in
the Arab World. A host of daily papers, in both Arabic and
French, reflect a broad range of viewpoints, from
secular-Royalist to liberal modernist to conservative
Islamist. Numerous glossy weeklies compete with provocative
cover stories that often push the envelope with sharp
criticism of the government and frank treatment of touchy
societal issues, including the monarchy. Still, red lines
exist, and Moroccan journalists continue to trip over them
from time to time. In the past month alone, Boubkir Jama'i,
one of the country's most prominent journalists, announced
his resignation and self-imposed exile after a court imposed
a draconian (and record) civil judgement, along with a fine
in a dubious libel case. An Arabic weekly, after printing
jokes about Islam and the monarchy, was banned for two
months, and the court granted the prosecution's request for a
prison term, but suspended it. It is generally believed this
was a slap on the wrist, and the mildest reaction the
government could take, given the King's role as religious
leader. However, these cases tended to reinforce pressures
for self-censorship.


8. (C) Also within the past two months, the GOM circulated
draft legislation that would impose significant restrictions
on public opinion research - a field previously unregulated
in Morocco. Apparently in response to robust lobbying by the
Embassy, the GOM has since told us it is reconsidering its
approach on this law. Progress on a new Press Code, revised
to decriminalize libel, appears stalled in the Ministry of
Communication.

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Message to the GOM
--------------


9. (C) There are no outrageously regressive steps to complain
about, but we do sense that as the elections approach, the
Moroccan establishment is circling its wagons and losing its
zeal for bold steps forward on the democracy front. These
apprehensions are driven in part by the continuing signs of a
greater vote count for the PJD. We should use the February
visit to impress upon the Moroccan delegation our continuing
attention to their very real progress on reforms and
encourage them to view the 2007 elections as an opportunity
to bolster their international credibility as a model for
reform and democratization in the Arab World.

Specifically, we suggest Washington interlocutors:

-- Urge movement on proposed revisions to the Press Code,
that would decriminalize libel and encourage the responsible
but free practice of journalism. Foreign Minister Benaissa
committed to progress on this issue in his October 2006
meeting with the Secretary, but as of February 2007, no
apparent progress has been made;

-- Express appreciation for Morocco's decision to rethink its
draft polling law, which would have impacted negatively on
freedom of expression.

-- Ask about the GOM's plans for electoral redistricting and
urge that they not stray too far from the one-man, one-vote
principle by disproportional allocations of seats or overly
creative district boundaries;

-- Offer USG-funded technical assistance to the MOI, to be
defined in consultation with MOI, in helping Morocco
modernize election administration;

-- Encourage the GOM to invite international observers to
watch its 2007 elections. This could greatly enhance
Morocco's reputation for transparency and build its
international credibility as an emerging democracy.


10. (C) Comment: Based on experience, we would not expect an
especially positive reaction from MOI Benmoussa.
Nonetheless, a brief high-level mention in the context of
this visit, which will be focused on their highest priority
issue, could help us in our efforts here to promote the
democracy agenda. End comment.

******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************

Bush