WESTERN SAHARA: TOUGH APPROACH TO NEXT ROUND,

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001814 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, EUR/WE AND DRL/NESCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PBTS MO WI SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: TOUGH APPROACH TO NEXT ROUND, POSSIBLE CHANGE ON THE GROUND REF: RABAT 1807 Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Moroccan MFA Chief of Staff Bourita projected that the impending third round of negotiations for the Western Sahara with the POLISARIO would be a real challenge. The GOM believes it should focus on substance, but not at all on independence. While appreciating USG support, he hoped from more backing from the other "Friends." At the same time, the GOM is frustrated with the current UN-appointed arbiter in the conflict, who appeared unduly deferential to the POLISARIO and Algeria. While accusing Algeria and the POLISARIO of a smear campaign to malign the GOM,s human rights record in Western Sahara, Bourita suggested the GOM would work to limit abuses, a changed approach apparently substantiated by an MOI contact. We will look carefully for any improvement on the ground. End Summary. Third Round of Negotiations Pivotal -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 27, PolCouns, visiting Morocco Desk Officer Randall Kaailau, and PolOff met with GOM MFA Chief of Staff and I/O Director Nasser Bourita. Bourita said the tough questions of substance must to be addressed in the third round of negotiations with the POLISARIO round lest critical momentum and the credibility of the negotiations be lost. He complained that countries such as Spain, Russia, and the UK, in contrast with the U.S., were not pushing hard for "concrete" results during the third round as they were satisfied with the status quo. Morocco believed the Sahara question cannot be resolved by a referendum including an independence option, self-determination is part of the solution but must be defined and must be short of independence. UN Secretary General and Personal Representative for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum must accept existing UN Security Council resolutions. Bourita insisted that they give more favorable treatment to the Moroccan proposal as the basis of negotiations, vice the POLISARIO proposal, which he characterized as nothing new. ¶3. (C) At the same time, Bourita said the GOM believed: the Sahara question must be resolved peacefully; &self-determination8 of the Sahrawi people is an integral part of any solution; and, despite the fact that decisions are made in Algiers, Morocco accepts the POLISARO as its recognized negotiating partner, with which a &win-win8 solution must be found. Bourita called Morocco,s arrival at this position as the fruition of a sixteen-year &psychological evolution,8 representing difficult and hard won compromises within the GOM. Frustration with UN Arbiter -------------- ¶4. (C) Bourita criticized Van Walsum as being a "prisoner of his own logic" and for imposing peace process recipes from other regions (Note: likely a reference to the Balkans) that do not account for the uniqueness and evolution of the Sahara negotiations since fighting stopped in 1991. Specifically, Bourita said that Van Walsum continues to insist that the parties enter into negotiations with no existing pre-conditions, an orientation that would essentially nullify the recent UN Security Council resolutions, endorsement of Morocco,s latest peace proposal. Bourita speculated that Van Walsum was insisting on "no preconditions," in order to gain the trust of the POLISARIO, given its inherently weaker negotiating position. Algeria Still the Main Obstacle to Peace -------------- ¶5. (C) Bourita said that Algeria (GOA) continues to lack the political will to support a negotiated solution between Morocco and the POLISARIO and appears to be making efforts to retard future progress. According to Bourita, given the recent GOM progress in the UN on the Sahara issue, the GOA has reverted to a policy of UN "containment." This strategy calls for blocking further GOM advantages in the UN negotiations, while executing a public relations campaign, both at home and abroad, especially in Europe, designed to undercut Morocco,s international support by highlighting and exaggerating its human rights transgressions in the Western Sahara. Bourita called the GOA,s strategy &active and well thought out,8 and, to underscore the point, he said that the GOA was facilitating the travel of Sahrawis to Europe in order to publicize alleged GOM human rights abuses. Bourita complained that these activists are abusing their right to a Moroccan passport by traveling to Europe only to smear the government that had issued their travel documents. ¶6. (C) Nonetheless, Bourita admitted that the GOM has had human rights transgressions in Western Sahara, particularly incidents of beating and intimidation of pro-separatist demonstrators, but underscored the relatively small number and reduction of these incidents in recent years. He also cited recent progress on prosecuting offenders of these abuses and the training of security forces to guard against future transgressions. At the same time, Bourita indicated that the GOM would be willing to do more to improve safeguards against future human rights transgressions. "The Gentler Gamer is a Sooner Winner" -------------- ¶7. (C) PolCouns spoke favorably of GOM progress so far on the reduction of human rights abuses in the Western Sahara, and he acknowledged Bourita's assertion that some of the activists use the issue to promote their pro-separatist agenda. He appreciated the ongoing dialogue with the GOM that was feeding into the preparation of the State Departments annual human rights report. PolCouns urged the GOM to move even, citing that a lighter GOM hand in Western Sahara will win more adherents to the peace process in Laayoune and add to the momentum of the autonomy proposal. This, in turn, could create pressures on the POLISARIO leadership in Tindouf to be more conciliatory at the negotiating table. Appreciative of Bourita's suggestion of additional the GOM openness on the issue, PolCouns urged that the GOM continue to issue passports and allow Sahrawis to travel, and above all seek to halt abuses. That would speak loudly of Morocco,s toleration and respect. MOI Too Sensitive-- At Least in Words -------------- ¶8. (C) During a subsequent PolCouns/DeskOff meeting November 30 at the Interior Ministry, Governor Rachid Rguibi, the MOI International Relations Chief, displayed an unusually, for him, more open attitude to the human rights/hearts and minds question. (Note: Rguibi, traditionally the spokesperson for the MOI's hard line, himself hails from a notable Sahrawi family.) From the perspective of MOI, which heads the negotiations for the GOM, goals are twofold -- humanitarian, to rescue the poor Sahrawis confined to the camps and exploited by their "revolutionary leadership," and geopolitical and anti-terrorist considerations. Citing "proof," although without any specifics, he charged that "elements" of the POLISARIO had supported extremists in the heart of the Sahara. He could not substantiate reports in local media on Tuareg separatist involvement in the recent rocketing at the Algerian airbase at Djanet. Moroccan information was that it was AQIM aided by someone inside the Algerian military. ¶9. (C) We pressed hard on reports of abuses by security forces in Sahara. We noted the importance for the negotiations of wining hearts and minds of those who are not activists, but may share their leanings against Moroccan role for practical reasons. He complained that the pro-separatists have full individual rights, even though they are acting as agents for the POLISARIO, citing free issuance of passports (note: the lifting of all restrictions is quite recent.). They go around the world insulting our country and we let them return without any bother. He repeated the long-standing position that Morocco cannot permit the existence of separatist organizations, even if totally non-violent. "We refuse to open discussions with the separatists of the interior." ¶10. (C) Rguibi indicated, however, that the Government has begun to review this approach. Recently, instructions have been given to security forces to exercise restraint. The authorities cannot permit demonstrations, which might lead to civil war. However, when police intervene there is always a risk of overreaction, by individual officers. Morocco has demonstrated that it would punish abuses by the jailing of the officers in the beating death of Hamid Lambarki. They are currently awaiting trial in the Laayoune prison. This has had a deterrent result, but he indicated that now the Government is trying to broaden its prohibitions against abuse. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Based on Bourita's assessment, other interlocutors, and commentary we have seen in the press, the Moroccan approach to the just-confirmed round 3 (reftel) will be tough and inflexible regarding discussion of the POLISARIO proposal. In contrast, we are struck by indications of changing thinking about treatment of the Sahrawis in the territories, particularly from long-time hard-liner Rguibi. Possible GOM evolution from using sticks to carrots in dealing with the Sahrawi population and political dissidents, may reflect Embassy and USG representations, and increasingly those of other countries here. It may also stem from the recent engagement in the Sahara of the CCDH (Royal Human Rights Council, which has a direct line into the Palace). Other embassies have told us they also detect a change in MFA tone, including an increased openness to have foreign visitors in the territory. It remains to be seen, however, if this change in tone is just for our benefit or whether it translates into actual improvement of conditions on the ground. End Comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley