MOROCCO - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001672 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/CT - KEN MCKUNE, NEA/MAG, AND CA/VO STATE PLEASE PASS TO NCTC E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 TAGS: ASEC CVIS KVPR PGOV PINR PTER KHLS MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING REF: SECSTATE 133921 Classified By: Econ Counselor Stuart Smith. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) The U.S. mission in Morocco continues to pursue the expansion and enhancement of counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with the GOM. The GOM has been an active partner in combating international terrorism and routinely provides biometric data on persons of interest to us. Post's CT working group coordinates numerous CT related programs managed by the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, INL, S/CT, DOD, FBI, and GRPO (among others). All seek to strengthen Morocco's ability to monitor and enforce its borders. The following are responses to questions posed reftel regarding Moroccan collection, screening and dissemination of information at its ports of entry. -------------- ¶A. Watchlisting -------------- ¶2. (C) Morocco maintains a consolidated, national database of persons of interest that fuses information from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ),Ministry of Interior (MOI),and INTERPOL. The information is disseminated electronically and is accessible at all ports of entry. The number of persons included in the database is unknown, as is the split between terrorist, criminal, and family-based persons of interest. The list is maintained and disseminated through coordination of the offices of Intelligence and Criminal Records in the Direction Generale de la Surete Nationale (DGSN),controlled by the MOI. The INTERPOL database is the only international database used as an input, with INTERPOL notices "entered" into the Moroccan system. The level and degree of Interpol data disseminated remains an issue, as it is unknown if Morocco disseminates all INTERPOL notices (Green, Yellow, Blue),or merely Red. Morocco has no bilateral watchlist/database agreements. -------------- ¶B. Traveler Information Collection -------------- ¶3. (C) Traveler information is collected by the Ministry of Interior through the Immigration Service (Service d'Etranger),with all travelers required to fill out an arrival/departure card. In theory, the GOM immigration system tracks all entries and exits at all ports of entry/exit, with every foreigner assigned an identification number upon their first entry. This number is placed in the traveler's passport and thereafter used to trace all future movements into and out of Morocco. The process is supposed to apply to each traveler on every occurrence, however, the process is sometimes overwhelmed or bypassed during peak periods. For Moroccans, their National Identity Card number is placed in their passports and used for these purposes. Moroccans with dual nationality may enter on their non-Moroccan passport, but must also present their National Identity Card. The database is constantly updated as travelers' movements occur. Morocco does not maintain or use a Passenger Name Record (PNR) or Advance Passenger Information System (APIS),and does not have an agreement or formal policy to share traveler information with foreign governments. A significant drawback to the system is that all data is entered by hand, as Morocco does not use any machine-readable passport devices at its ports of entry. Other shortcomings to the system include insufficiently trained personnel and a shortage of computer workstations at many locations. -------------- ¶C. Border Control and Screening -------------- ¶4. (C) Morocco does not employ traveler screening software other than that described above. Post has no objective basis for estimating the number of travelers waived through the system without being entered, but guesses the number to be less than 20 percent. All persons of interest are entered and tracked as described in para 2. The questioning or RABAT 00001672 002 OF 003 detention of travelers falls under the responsibility of the MOI, as does all border enforcement authority. The person(s) actually conducting an interrogation could be either a member of the DGSN or of the Service d'Etranger, depending upon the level of interest for the suspect. According to Morocco's anti-terrorism law (Number 03-03),suspects can be detained for up to 48 hours before appearing before a magistrate. The level of information sharing within the agencies and bureaus of the MOI is assessed to be good to excellent. -------------- ¶D. Biometric Collection -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Morocco does not have an operational biometric or fingerprint collection system at its ports of entry, and fingerprinting is not normally carried out. Morocco has completed Phase III of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Moroccan Fingerprint Sharing and Training Initiative. Phase IV will commence in early 2008, emphasizing palm print and advanced latent fingerprint training. Phase IV will also introduce the newly developed FBI-Moroccan fingerprint card, which will translate to Arabic and French. The Moroccans use a state-of-the-art Cogent-based automated fingerprint system that is NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) compliant and is of EFTS (Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification) quality, thereby meeting the required compatibility standards for international sharing. Although the Moroccans have received training in both the rolled and flat methods of taking prints, the rolled method is the one currently employed, but the flat method will be used on the new fingerprint cards. Our sources at the MOI tell us Morocco will initiate biometric chip technology in its new National ID Card, scheduled to be implemented in January ¶2008. Biometric chip passports are scheduled to be issued by the end of 2008. Biometric scanners/readers are to be installed at ports of entry beginning in 2010. -------------- ¶E. Passports -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Morocco issues four types of passports, none of which are machine-readable. Diplomatic passports are red, official passports are brown, service passports are blue, and regular passports are green. Normal validity for all passports is five years, which can normally be extended (page annotation) for an additional five years. Minors' passports cannot be extended and expire at the end of five years or on the applicant's 18th birthday, whichever comes first. Passport application, investigation, and adjudication is performed at the local (district) level. Normal passport processing time is approximately 1-2 months, but emergency passports have been issued within 24 hours. Morocco maintains a comprehensive travel history database (see para 3 above) that is checked/verified during passport application adjudication. Lost or stolen passports are entered into the database and "flagged" as hits in the system. Adjudication for replacement of lost or stolen passports includes a police investigation of the applicant's travel history and "statement of loss," and can take over six months. There is not a difference in the physical appearance, numbering series, validity, or biometric fields between a normal and replacement passport. Moroccan passport accountability is assessed to be good, but the passports themselves are susceptible to tampering, such as photo substitution and bio field manipulation. Morocco is aware of these shortcomings and is working to introduce a machine-readable, bio-chip passport by the end of 2008. -------------- ¶F. Fraud Detection -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Following the May 2003 Casablanca bombings, Morocco passed a comprehensive anti-terrorism law (Number 03-03) that entered into force on 5 June 2003. The law criminalized terrorism and significantly increased the penalties for forgeries and the fraudulent production of government and private documents. Moroccan authorities take identification RABAT 00001672 003 OF 003 fraud very seriously, with fraudulent production of government documents (passports, birth records, National ID Cards) carrying a sentence of up to five years. Due to the sometimes lengthy passport processing time, bribery of local officials to place one's passport application at the front of the queue is common. However, to our knowledge, bribery related to altering identities (such as in a passport) is rare due to the severe legal ramifications. ¶8. (SBU) While Moroccan authorities screen all documents, individual travel companies bear additional responsibility for detecting travel document fraud. Companies screen passengers carefully to avoid the USD 3,300 penalty fee for boarding passengers who are denied entry at their final destination. Royal Air Maroc (RAM),the Moroccan national airline, has a four-person team responsible for detecting false or altered travel documents at the Casablanca airport, which on average, discovers four cases of document fraud per day. Most instances of travel document fraud are for travelers from African countries attempting to travel to North America or Europe. All potential fraud discovered by travel companies are referred to the DGSM representative who has access to Interpol and Moroccan databases for further investigation. RAM is developing its own database of scanned images of fraudulent travel documents to assist in identifying future cases. ¶9. (SBU) Discovered fraudulent documents are removed from circulation and normally destroyed following prosecution. Morocco uses a series of antifraud techniques in its printing of official documents and intends to introduce a new National ID Card and passport in 2008 that incorporate state-of-the-art anti-fraud characteristics. Moroccan capability to detect travel document fraud is assessed as good to excellent. -------------- ¶G. Privacy and Data Security -------------- ¶10. (C) Suspicion of smuggling is the most common reason for questioning and detention at ports of entry. Moroccan port authorities are particularly watchful for drug smugglers and sub-Saharan Africans attempting to enter illegally. Suspects can be detained for up to 48 hours before being charged by a prosecutor or granted legal counsel. It is common for names of suspects to be released to the press, but evidence and transcripts of questioning are guarded by the investigating agency, which is normally the DGSN for those detained at ports of entry. Access to computer systems that contain sensitive data is controlled through availability of hardware, passwords, and differing levels of access. For example, Service d'Etranger officials have access to travel histories at the ports of entry, but they do not have access to case information generated through a DGSN investigation. Moroccan citizens can seek remedy for iniquities through the Moroccan Ombudsman (Diwan Al-Madhalim) institution. Foreigners seeking remedy or privacy information must contact their consulates, which must then negotiate through the Moroccan Foreign Ministry for resolution. Morocco does not have legislation that mirrors either the U.S. Freedom of Information Act or the Privacy Act. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley