MOROCCAN PUBLIC AND PALACE IRE PROMPTS REPORTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001599 SIPDIS NEA/FO, NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2007 TAGS: PGOV MO SUBJECT: MOROCCAN PUBLIC AND PALACE IRE PROMPTS REPORTED BREAKTHROUGH ON COALITION Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Propelled by mounting palace and public ire over shameless wrangling for ministerial portfolios, leaders of Morocco's returning coalition parties appear to have reached at least informal agreement on a new government, just in time for the October 12 Parliament opening. In the more than three weeks since the King named Istiqlal Party leader Abbas El-Fassi as PM-designate, he has been unable to get agreement on a new government. Party big shots, particularly the losing socialists, appeared to miss the fact that three-quarters of the electorate didn't want to vote for any of them. Finally, the King stepped in, pushing agreement at the price of more cabinet seats. The new government, which probably will look far too much like the old, seems at best to be taking off with a slow and feeble start. End summary. -------------- A Shaky Start for New Premier -------------- ¶2. (C) In the three weeks since his nomination by the King, El-Fassi has been trying to cobble together a coalition of royalist and nominally leftist parties built around the "Koutla" bloc of the Istiqlal, USFP, and PPS (pro-throne former communists),which has been governing by agreement since before 2002. Even though El-Fassi was seeking to reconstitute the exact same coalition as the outgoing government, the task was surprisingly difficult. Squabbling over portfolio assignments among the ostensible partners took on shameless dimensions. ¶3. (C) The socialist USFP, formerly the largest party in the coalition, could not reconcile itself to its reduced stature in the parliament (having lost more than a third of its seats) and put up the most stumbling blocs. The King's reported mandate to Abbas, that he reduce the number of Ministerial portfolios from 31 to about 26, made it even more difficult for Abbas to satisfy the partners. In the end, that modest good governance initiative had to be sacrificed. When the royal/Berber Movement Populaire, as the second largest governing party, demanded the parliamentary speakership under "democratic logic," the USFP incumbent speaker Radi, insisted on keeping his seat. -------------- The Palace Not Amused over Party Leaders "Onanism" -------------- ¶4. (C) Expectations that a new government would be assembled in time for the King's opening of parliament on October 12 were looking to fall short. The Palace made no secret of its frustration over the delay. Over the weekend of October 7, the King dispatched senior Counselor Mohammed Moatasim to meet with the parties and nudge them toward an agreement. The mission yielded no apparent results. A string of editorials in Le Matin, the daily which functions as a Palace mouthpiece, have been lamenting the drift and scolding the parties for failing to put aside personal interests and forge an agreement for the sake of the nation. An October 11 editorial in the paper was particularly scathing, lamenting an "inadmissible" malaise, reproaching those obstructing the negotiations for holding the nation "hostage, with such grave irresponsibility and intolerable onanism." ¶5. (C) USFP's reported intransigence in the negotiations was likely fueled by their sense of Abbas' reluctance to shift to the major alternative partner, the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD). There was also another coalition alternative with the non-ideological Constitutional Union, with 27 seats. despite disagreements, the agreement between Istiqlal and USFP held. During an October 10 dinner, former MP Abdellah Abbasi told poloffs Fassi "could not break" the Koutla pact, formed in 1989 between Istiqlal, USFP, and the far-left PPS, which committed each party to action exclusively by consensus. In the end, El-Fassi got the King to sign off on a near total elimination of ministerial cuts, and he was reportedly able to buy off Radi with a prestige ministry. Even so, the king still reportedly had to call at least one party leader to urge him to accept the deal. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) If the new government is announced as now anticipated, Abbas El Fassi has gotten off to a slow and feeble start. While the problems were not caused directly by him, his inability to reconcile the competing factions with each other or with the King's reformist desire for a slimmed down cabinet do not mark him as a dynamic leader. In the end, the King's reported compromise on reduction of portfolios, and personal engagement in urging agreement, amount to a reversal of the "democratic logic" that led to his naming El-Fassi in the first place. Perhaps the King will use his October 12 speech on the opening of parliament to scold the parties. ¶7. (C) Despite significant turnover in parliamentary membership, the same party leaders will likely occupy rotated portfolios in a repeat coalition government looking too much like the last one, less some competent technocrats. In addition, the media has been full of reports of rising young leaders being shut out by the old guard, the lack of party democracy, and, in the case of the USFP, the rejection of a large caucus which thought it best to renew the party in opposition. The leader's intransigence will reinforce public impressions of them as incompetent and greedy, driven by personal interests rather than a desire to serve. They appear to have not absorbed to message sent by the two-thirds of the electorate who didn't vote or the countess others who either cast protest ballots or simply refused to register. There appears still a long road ahead for reform, and for democracy. End comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley