ISLAMIST DISSIDENT: LOW TURNOUT PROVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001522

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: KISL PGOV MO
SUBJECT: ISLAMIST DISSIDENT: LOW TURNOUT PROVES
"ILLEGITIMACY" OF MOROCCAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

REF: A. RABAT 1504

B. RABAT 1429

C. RABAT 1050

D. RABAT 396

Classified by Polcouns Craig M. Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) A leader of the dissident Islamist Justice and Charity
Organization (JCO) told us that the low turnout in Morocco's
September 7 elections were a failed referendum on the regime.
He believed that the turnout was actually below the reported
37 percent. He stressed that the JCO had not actively
promoted a voter boycott but believed that the group's
rejection of elections may have influenced many Moroccans to
avoid the polls. He reemphasized the JCO's call for
constitutional change, and a redistribution of power from the
monarchy to "the people." He complained again that the GOM
suppresses the group and its members. End summary.

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Low Turnout: A "Referendum" on an "Illegitimate" System
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2. (C) During a September 21 meeting, Abdelwahed Mutawakil,
Chair of the Political Committee of the dissident Islamist
Justice and Charity (aka Justice and Spirituality)
Organization (JCO),told poloff the low turnout in the
September 7 parliamentary elections (refs A and B) was clear
proof of the "illegitimacy" of Morocco's political system.
Mutawakil opined that turnout "was actually much lower" than
the official government figure of 37 percent, suggesting it
might have been 20 percent or less. He admitted could not
support his estimate with evidence but said that "reports"
from JCO members across Morocco consistently cited nearly
empty polling stations throughout the day.


3. (C) "This was a referendum on the regime," Mutawakil
argued. Even after King Mohammed VI made numerous, direct
appeals to the public to vote, the vast majority of Moroccans
ignored him. This proves the people trust neither the
monarchy nor the system which keeps it in power, he
contended. "Everyone, including the U.S. should recognize
this fact," he stated.


4. (C) The elections were neither free nor fair, he
continued. The regime's strategy of setting up an enormous
number of polling stations (there were, in fact 38,000 of
them) prevents political parties from deploying observers to
all but a fraction of them. Most balloting and counting, at
the precinct level, took place absent any independent
verification, Mutawakil maintained. "It is time to see
reality as it is rather than as it is portrayed through rosy
reports," he added.

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No Boycott, But Possible Influence
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5. (C) Mutawakil underscored that the JCO had not called for
a boycott of the elections - "this would have been illegal."
However, the JCO has long maintained that electoral
participation is futile in a political system that exists as
a facade for an absolute monarchy, he recalled. "We live
with the people and among the people and they know us and
trust us," he claimed. "Therefore, I can't deny that our
position may have influenced (their decision not to vote.)"

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The System, Not Just the Faces, Must Change
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6. (C) Mutawakil declined to comment on the September 19
appointment of Istiqlal Party Chair Abbas El-Fassi as Prime
Minister. "They are all the same," he argued, they are not
even true to their own principles. Even the Islamist PJD are
wasting time by participating in this sham system, viewed
Mutawakil. (Comment: Relations between the JCO and PJD are
ambiguous. While both sides acknowledge some common ground,
they are also quick to dismiss each other as over-rated or
irrelevant. In an early September interview with Al-Jazeera
TV, however, Nadia Yassine, the prominent daughter of JCO
spiritual leader Sheikh Abdessalam Yassin, nonetheless
implicitly endorsed the PJD as the only competing party with
a "moral basis." Still, those voters the JCO inspired to stay
home would have otherwise largely voted for the PJD -- one
likely reason the JCO remains in business and another example
of how the Throne manipulates friend and foe alike. End
comment.)

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RABAT 00001522 002 OF 002


"Persecution" Continues
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7. (C) As for the status of the JCO as a group, "nothing has
changed," Mutawakil claimed. "We are still prevented from
doing anything," no newspaper, no public activities, nothing.
He repeated claims that the GOM fabricates criminal cases
against JCO members. Most recently, he asserted, a young
engineer in Fes, a JCO member, was arrested, tried, and
convicted of murder in a long-dormant case concerning a fatal
campus brawl that took place in the early 1990s. The state's
only conceivable motive in reviving the old and allegedly
baseless charges, Mutawakil insisted, was the engineer's JCO
membership.

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Comment
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8. (C) While we cannot pronounce on the merits of the recent
case in Fes and others the JCO claims are fabricated,
Mutawakil's description of a total GOM lockdown on their
activities is exaggerated. The group has applied for, and
been denied, official recognition under the NGO law.
Nonetheless, the GOM generally tolerates JCO activity "behind
closed doors," and allows Mutawakil and other group leaders
to travel abroad regularly. The JCO's website is accessible
in Morocco and prominent group figures are frequently quoted
in the domestic and international press. Clearly, the GOM's
policy is to contain rather than erradicate the JCO,
apparently part of a broader strategy to forestall
consolidation among Moroccan Islamists.



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RILEY