ISLAMIST DISSIDENT: LOW TURNOUT PROVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001522 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: KISL PGOV MO SUBJECT: ISLAMIST DISSIDENT: LOW TURNOUT PROVES "ILLEGITIMACY" OF MOROCCAN POLITICAL SYSTEM REF: A. RABAT 1504 ¶B. RABAT 1429 ¶C. RABAT 1050 ¶D. RABAT 396 Classified by Polcouns Craig M. Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) A leader of the dissident Islamist Justice and Charity Organization (JCO) told us that the low turnout in Morocco's September 7 elections were a failed referendum on the regime. He believed that the turnout was actually below the reported 37 percent. He stressed that the JCO had not actively promoted a voter boycott but believed that the group's rejection of elections may have influenced many Moroccans to avoid the polls. He reemphasized the JCO's call for constitutional change, and a redistribution of power from the monarchy to "the people." He complained again that the GOM suppresses the group and its members. End summary. -------------- -------------- Low Turnout: A "Referendum" on an "Illegitimate" System -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) During a September 21 meeting, Abdelwahed Mutawakil, Chair of the Political Committee of the dissident Islamist Justice and Charity (aka Justice and Spirituality) Organization (JCO),told poloff the low turnout in the September 7 parliamentary elections (refs A and B) was clear proof of the "illegitimacy" of Morocco's political system. Mutawakil opined that turnout "was actually much lower" than the official government figure of 37 percent, suggesting it might have been 20 percent or less. He admitted could not support his estimate with evidence but said that "reports" from JCO members across Morocco consistently cited nearly empty polling stations throughout the day. ¶3. (C) "This was a referendum on the regime," Mutawakil argued. Even after King Mohammed VI made numerous, direct appeals to the public to vote, the vast majority of Moroccans ignored him. This proves the people trust neither the monarchy nor the system which keeps it in power, he contended. "Everyone, including the U.S. should recognize this fact," he stated. ¶4. (C) The elections were neither free nor fair, he continued. The regime's strategy of setting up an enormous number of polling stations (there were, in fact 38,000 of them) prevents political parties from deploying observers to all but a fraction of them. Most balloting and counting, at the precinct level, took place absent any independent verification, Mutawakil maintained. "It is time to see reality as it is rather than as it is portrayed through rosy reports," he added. -------------- No Boycott, But Possible Influence -------------- ¶5. (C) Mutawakil underscored that the JCO had not called for a boycott of the elections - "this would have been illegal." However, the JCO has long maintained that electoral participation is futile in a political system that exists as a facade for an absolute monarchy, he recalled. "We live with the people and among the people and they know us and trust us," he claimed. "Therefore, I can't deny that our position may have influenced (their decision not to vote.)" -------------- The System, Not Just the Faces, Must Change -------------- ¶6. (C) Mutawakil declined to comment on the September 19 appointment of Istiqlal Party Chair Abbas El-Fassi as Prime Minister. "They are all the same," he argued, they are not even true to their own principles. Even the Islamist PJD are wasting time by participating in this sham system, viewed Mutawakil. (Comment: Relations between the JCO and PJD are ambiguous. While both sides acknowledge some common ground, they are also quick to dismiss each other as over-rated or irrelevant. In an early September interview with Al-Jazeera TV, however, Nadia Yassine, the prominent daughter of JCO spiritual leader Sheikh Abdessalam Yassin, nonetheless implicitly endorsed the PJD as the only competing party with a "moral basis." Still, those voters the JCO inspired to stay home would have otherwise largely voted for the PJD -- one likely reason the JCO remains in business and another example of how the Throne manipulates friend and foe alike. End comment.) -------------- RABAT 00001522 002 OF 002 "Persecution" Continues -------------- ¶7. (C) As for the status of the JCO as a group, "nothing has changed," Mutawakil claimed. "We are still prevented from doing anything," no newspaper, no public activities, nothing. He repeated claims that the GOM fabricates criminal cases against JCO members. Most recently, he asserted, a young engineer in Fes, a JCO member, was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder in a long-dormant case concerning a fatal campus brawl that took place in the early 1990s. The state's only conceivable motive in reviving the old and allegedly baseless charges, Mutawakil insisted, was the engineer's JCO membership. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) While we cannot pronounce on the merits of the recent case in Fes and others the JCO claims are fabricated, Mutawakil's description of a total GOM lockdown on their activities is exaggerated. The group has applied for, and been denied, official recognition under the NGO law. Nonetheless, the GOM generally tolerates JCO activity "behind closed doors," and allows Mutawakil and other group leaders to travel abroad regularly. The JCO's website is accessible in Morocco and prominent group figures are frequently quoted in the domestic and international press. Clearly, the GOM's policy is to contain rather than erradicate the JCO, apparently part of a broader strategy to forestall consolidation among Moroccan Islamists. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** RILEY