DEMARCHING MOROCCO ON IRAN/IAEA; THE LATEST FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001433

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016
TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA IR MO
SUBJECT: DEMARCHING MOROCCO ON IRAN/IAEA; THE LATEST FROM
TEHERAN

REF: A. STATE 123352

B. STATE 124823

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Riley conveyed ref. B ministerial
demarche to MFA Min-Del Fassi Fihri, who accepted the point
but would not commit to a statement. Fassi Fihri had
benefited from the receipt of the substance of ref. A from
his I/O Chief, Nasser Bourita. Bourita, who had just
returned from the NAM meeting in Teheran, previously told
Polcouns that the Iranian regime is feeling the heat of
international pressure. This had led to the advancement of,
as he described, the "pragmatist" Rafsanjani, who he said was
not inclined to push the nuclear issue. Concerning IAEA, we
recommend that UNVIE be in direct contact with the Moroccan
delegation in Vienna. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador conveyed ministerial-level demarche on Iran
and IAEA to Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi
Fihri September 9, underscoring the importance that Iran not
abuse the IAEA process to get away with continuing
enrichment. Fassi Fihri took our request for a statement on
board, acknowledged the importance of the issue, but
indicated that he would pass the request up (i.e. to either
Minister Benaissa, who covers Iran, or to the King). He had
benefited from already receiving the substance of ref. A.


3. (C) Polcouns conveyed ref. A demarche to MFA IO Chief
Nasser Bourita on September 7, and got an unexpected briefing
on what Bourita said were changing atmospherics in Teheran,
with the Rafsanjani-led pragmatists increasingly prominent.
Polcouns stressed that the Iran/IAEA agreement was useful but
far from sufficient and it was vital that pressure be
maintained on Iran to stop enrichment and respect UNSC
resolutions. The USG will be speaking up in Vienna and hoped
Morocco would do the same. He noted that the Ambassador
would be underscoring this message at the Ministerial level.


4. (C) Bourita, who knows the issue well, responded that
Morocco fully supported the UNSC demands. He felt that El
Baradei's statement was balanced--while appreciating the
IAEA-Iran agreement El Baradei did not let them off the hook
on UNSCR obligations. He said the GOM was planning to make a
statement at the BOG meeting that would underscore its
support for full verification and fulfillment of the UNSC
suspension requirement.


5. (C) Bourita had coincidentally just returned from Teheran
where he had attended the NAM meeting with his minister. In
discussion with the Moroccan Ambassador there, with NAM
colleagues and unspecified others, Bourita said the heard
that changes were underfoot in Teheran. The Iranians had
been spooked by international pressure, including by USG
statements and deployments in the region. The tough speech
of French President Sarkozy has had special impact.


6. (C) Bourita said he was told the new head of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard was to a more pragmatic figure. More
important, Former President Rafsanjani was elected head of
the council which "oversees" the spiritual guide and will
eventually choose Khamenei's successor. The day before the
nomination Ahmedinejad had delivered a very tough speech to
the NAM, but Bourita said the Iranian President appeared
quite ill at ease. Two weeks previously, Rafsanjani had made
a speech that was strongly critical of Ahmedinejad and of the
growing tension over the nuclear issue. Bourita said the
Moroccan Ambassador told him that this had not made much
sense at the time but now he viewed it a sign of shifting
attitudes in Teheran. The Ambassador said Iranians were very
concerned about international pressure and fear the hardening
of the U.S. position and the prospect of military action.


7. (C) Bourita said that those with economic interests, like
Rafsanjani's son, are looking to avoid any prospect of a
conflict. Bourita urged that as pressure ratchets up on
Teheran, that care be taken to leave a very wide door open so
the pragmatists can see there is a reasonable exit from the
problem. Morocco knows Rafsanjani well, it was he who
reestablish relations here in the 1990s when they had been
closed for some two decades. While not a moderate, he is a
pragmatist who can be dealt with.


8. (C) Bourita said one consequence of El Baradei's report
was the impact on the Iranian public of its statement that
Iran had not really gone as far as Ahmedinejad had been
claiming. Bourita heard in Teheran that this had led many
Iranians to question why Iran is taking such risks and

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incurring such costs if the nuclear program, which, if it is
not successful.


9. (C) Bourita noted that one question he frequently heard
from the Iranians was why U.S. policy allowed nuclear weapons
to Israel and India, but to not to Iran? He urged the USG to
try to provide some legally and logical answer. While not
referring to the other countries, Polcouns noted that the
international community judged Iran by its actions, as well
as by the outrageous rhetoric of its leadership. Iranian
behavior and deception had led the rest of the world to
conclude they were not to be trusted.


10. (C) Comment: We forward Bourita's comments for on
internal Iranian developments what they are worth. While we
can expect general support from Moroccans, they will likely
tread a fine line that avoids directly alienating Iran. They
want to retain an open relationship, mindful of Iranian ties
with Algeria and Ahmedinejad's offhand offer to help Algiers
with its nuclear power development. We would recommend that
UNVIE remain in close touch with the Moroccans in Vienna on
possible specific language. We continue to seek to convey
the message at the ministerial level.


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RILEY