DEMARCHING MOROCCO ON IRAN/IAEA; THE LATEST FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001433 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016 TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA IR MO SUBJECT: DEMARCHING MOROCCO ON IRAN/IAEA; THE LATEST FROM TEHERAN REF: A. STATE 123352 ¶B. STATE 124823 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Riley conveyed ref. B ministerial demarche to MFA Min-Del Fassi Fihri, who accepted the point but would not commit to a statement. Fassi Fihri had benefited from the receipt of the substance of ref. A from his I/O Chief, Nasser Bourita. Bourita, who had just returned from the NAM meeting in Teheran, previously told Polcouns that the Iranian regime is feeling the heat of international pressure. This had led to the advancement of, as he described, the "pragmatist" Rafsanjani, who he said was not inclined to push the nuclear issue. Concerning IAEA, we recommend that UNVIE be in direct contact with the Moroccan delegation in Vienna. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador conveyed ministerial-level demarche on Iran and IAEA to Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri September 9, underscoring the importance that Iran not abuse the IAEA process to get away with continuing enrichment. Fassi Fihri took our request for a statement on board, acknowledged the importance of the issue, but indicated that he would pass the request up (i.e. to either Minister Benaissa, who covers Iran, or to the King). He had benefited from already receiving the substance of ref. A. ¶3. (C) Polcouns conveyed ref. A demarche to MFA IO Chief Nasser Bourita on September 7, and got an unexpected briefing on what Bourita said were changing atmospherics in Teheran, with the Rafsanjani-led pragmatists increasingly prominent. Polcouns stressed that the Iran/IAEA agreement was useful but far from sufficient and it was vital that pressure be maintained on Iran to stop enrichment and respect UNSC resolutions. The USG will be speaking up in Vienna and hoped Morocco would do the same. He noted that the Ambassador would be underscoring this message at the Ministerial level. ¶4. (C) Bourita, who knows the issue well, responded that Morocco fully supported the UNSC demands. He felt that El Baradei's statement was balanced--while appreciating the IAEA-Iran agreement El Baradei did not let them off the hook on UNSCR obligations. He said the GOM was planning to make a statement at the BOG meeting that would underscore its support for full verification and fulfillment of the UNSC suspension requirement. ¶5. (C) Bourita had coincidentally just returned from Teheran where he had attended the NAM meeting with his minister. In discussion with the Moroccan Ambassador there, with NAM colleagues and unspecified others, Bourita said the heard that changes were underfoot in Teheran. The Iranians had been spooked by international pressure, including by USG statements and deployments in the region. The tough speech of French President Sarkozy has had special impact. ¶6. (C) Bourita said he was told the new head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was to a more pragmatic figure. More important, Former President Rafsanjani was elected head of the council which "oversees" the spiritual guide and will eventually choose Khamenei's successor. The day before the nomination Ahmedinejad had delivered a very tough speech to the NAM, but Bourita said the Iranian President appeared quite ill at ease. Two weeks previously, Rafsanjani had made a speech that was strongly critical of Ahmedinejad and of the growing tension over the nuclear issue. Bourita said the Moroccan Ambassador told him that this had not made much sense at the time but now he viewed it a sign of shifting attitudes in Teheran. The Ambassador said Iranians were very concerned about international pressure and fear the hardening of the U.S. position and the prospect of military action. ¶7. (C) Bourita said that those with economic interests, like Rafsanjani's son, are looking to avoid any prospect of a conflict. Bourita urged that as pressure ratchets up on Teheran, that care be taken to leave a very wide door open so the pragmatists can see there is a reasonable exit from the problem. Morocco knows Rafsanjani well, it was he who reestablish relations here in the 1990s when they had been closed for some two decades. While not a moderate, he is a pragmatist who can be dealt with. ¶8. (C) Bourita said one consequence of El Baradei's report was the impact on the Iranian public of its statement that Iran had not really gone as far as Ahmedinejad had been claiming. Bourita heard in Teheran that this had led many Iranians to question why Iran is taking such risks and RABAT 00001433 002 OF 002 incurring such costs if the nuclear program, which, if it is not successful. ¶9. (C) Bourita noted that one question he frequently heard from the Iranians was why U.S. policy allowed nuclear weapons to Israel and India, but to not to Iran? He urged the USG to try to provide some legally and logical answer. While not referring to the other countries, Polcouns noted that the international community judged Iran by its actions, as well as by the outrageous rhetoric of its leadership. Iranian behavior and deception had led the rest of the world to conclude they were not to be trusted. ¶10. (C) Comment: We forward Bourita's comments for on internal Iranian developments what they are worth. While we can expect general support from Moroccans, they will likely tread a fine line that avoids directly alienating Iran. They want to retain an open relationship, mindful of Iranian ties with Algeria and Ahmedinejad's offhand offer to help Algiers with its nuclear power development. We would recommend that UNVIE remain in close touch with the Moroccans in Vienna on possible specific language. We continue to seek to convey the message at the ministerial level. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** RILEY