MOROCCO'S SEPTEMBER 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001417 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FO: GRAY, CARPENTER, NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2012 TAGS: PGOV MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S SEPTEMBER 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REF: RABAT 1395 AND PASSIM (SEE BELOW) Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Morocco's September 7 parliamentary elections will be its first in five years and second of King Mohammed VI's reign. A crowded, fragmented field of 33 political parties will be competing for the 325 seats in Parliament's lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, of which 30 seats are on a list reserved for women. Most here expect this will be the freest and most transparent election in Morocco's history. International observers (funded by MEPI) are in place for the first time ever, along with local observers. Few expect the government to tamper with the results, and even traditional local vote buying is likely to diminish, but the structure of the electoral system ensures that no party will dominate, keeping the throne in charge. ¶2. (C) Turnout may be as important as the party results, as an indicator of confidence in the system. Our soundings around the country affirmed that many Moroccans, and youth in particular, are alienated from the political parties and over the limited powers of Parliament, and thus are disinclined to vote. However, some recent surveys suggest voter mobilization efforts have had some impact, and turnout may prove better than anticipated. Embassy will forward separately its projection of results. End summary. -------------- A Crowded Field -------------- ¶3. (C) 33 different political parties (22 of which are currently represented in Parliament) will compete for 325 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Of these, 295 members will be elected out of more than 1800 local lists and an additional 30 by a national list reserved (by mutual agreement among the parties rather than by law) for women. Among the candidates are 11 of the 34 members of Morocco's cabinet of Ministers. Whatever the results, there will likely be many changing faces in the next cabinet. -------------- System Upgraded -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOM has made substantial and sometimes innovative efforts to facilitate voter registration and promote voter participation. In a country of some 33 million, there are 15.5 million eligible voters, 49% women, which is 1.6 million more potential voters than in 2002. There are more than 38,000 polling places. Significant government resources have been devoted to the elections. According to official statistics, the GOM is spending USD 29 million to administer the elections and has distributed USD 24 million for the political parties to finance their campaigns. The GOM also spent USD 5 million standardizing voter ID cards and USD 7.3 million updating the voters' registry. In addition to traditional means, the GOM has adopted innovative tactics, such as youth-oriented TV spots, setting up an effective interactive voter registration website, and distributing information by text messaging. ¶5. (C) A sample of the national ballot voters will use on September 7, obtained by the Embassy, indicates to us the potential for confusion. Each party symbol appears twice, in two consecutive columns. Voters are to mark one for their choice for the local list, and one for their choice for the separate national list reserved for women. We see the potential for many voters (a significant portion of whom will be illiterate) to misunderstand that they need to mark the ballots twice. ¶6. (C) So far we judge media access as fairly equitable, both independent newspaper and broadcast outlets, which are regulated. If anything skewed (per voter) somewhat in favor of the smaller parties that don't have a seat in Parliament. The four major parties each have their own party newspapers which give ample exclusive coverage to their own candidates and positions. We have been struck by the general absence of political ads on the many billboards available and the relative paucity campaign posters or banners. Most visual campaigning is by flyer, and in many places the streets are littered with flyers that appear to have been tossed away, presumably by paid distributors. The deadline for announcement of candidates and the start of the individual campaign season was only two weeks before the elections. It is not surprising then, that many voters have not made up their minds, and many appear now to be deferring until the very last minute. This increases somewhat the unpredictability of the results. RABAT 00001417 002 OF 004 -------------- Transparency -------------- ¶7. (C) The September 7 polls promise to be freer and more transparent than any which have preceded it. Domestic election monitors from civil society have been accorded unprecedented official recognition, with the Royally-mandated Consultative Human Rights Commission (CCDH) assigned to coordinate and liaise between the participating NGOs and the Ministry of Interior. Even more significantly, the GOM, through the CCDH, has invited for the first time in Moroccan history a delegation of international observers to watch the polling on September 7. ¶8. (C) Prospects for the presence of international observers seemed dubious as recently as late spring. Senior GOM officials had expressed strong opposition to the concept. Sustained U.S. advocacy for their inclusion, highlighted during the May visit of NEA DAS Carpenter (Ref O-Para. 19 below),appears to have made an impact, and the GOM position was reversed in late June, after the personal intervention of the King. Organized by the National Democratic Institute, funded through a MEPI grant, a group of 45 observers from 15 different countries including 7 Arab states, will be accredited to fan out across the country on Election Day to observe all stages of the balloting and counting process. (Note: Embassy staff will also, less formally, be deployed around the country to observe the conduct of the election and its environment. End note.) -------------- Combatting Excess -------------- ¶9. (C) In our travels across Morocco this summer (reftels), discussions with politicians and civil society leaders have revealed relatively few fears that the GOM will tamper with the integrity of the electoral process or attempt to manipulate the results. Though many are alienated from politics and apathetic, "ordinary citizens" also generally tell us they do not expect the government to involve itself in fraud or manipulation. However, at the local level, many individual candidates and local political party chapters have been accused of various excesses and violations. As of August 31, the GOM said that it had received over 700 complaints of violations, in which seven had already generated specific prosecutions with at least 360 other investigations launched. Even the previously untouchable Fouad Ali El-Himma, who recently left his job as Interior Minister-Delegate, has been targeted for formal complaints. ¶10. (C) We have repeatedly heard that the GOM's tough line against electoral corruption has had a tangible impact across the country. Several stern messages from the King in the past year, and particularly last September's unprecedented arrest and prosecution for electoral offenses of 15 candidates for the Chamber of Councilors, Parliament's Upper House, sent a chilling message to many local elites long accustomed to various forms of electoral fraud and manipulation. Vote buying and other manipulative practices have certainly not been purged from the system, but this year they have gone farther underground. -------------- Turnout is the Key Indicator -------------- ¶11. (C) Aside from the results themselves, the Palace will be watching closely, and with some angst, for voter turnout on September 7. The GOM has invested a large amount of its resources, and consequently its prestige, in achieving the largest possible voter turnout, clearly hoping to bill the elections as a public vote of confidence in the Moroccan political system. Throughout 2007, and particularly in the past few months, on billboards, radio and TV spots, and in the print media, the GOM has been sponsoring ads encouraging citizens to let their voices be heard and fulfill their civic duty to turn out and vote. Parallel, and more extensive efforts to turn out the vote have been made by Moroccan NGOs, with many of their activities funded by international donors including USAID and MEPI. ¶12. (C) Our conversations with voters across the country (reftels) indicate that those working to promote participation have their work cut out for them. Popular disaffection with the political system, and political parties in general runs deep and wide. We have heard over and over the view from Moroccans that their member of Parliament and local political party representatives are only concerned with their personal interests. That politicians visit them once, just before elections, and make promises they quickly forget. RABAT 00001417 003 OF 004 ¶13. (C) Public opinion surveys, including one recently carried out by Al-Akhawayn University with support from a MEPI grant, have scientifically documented public disaffection with the parties. However, the same survey, for which we obtained preliminary results on August 25, suggests that the considerable efforts to promote participation this September may be bearing fruit. Almost 79 percent of those surveyed randomly in urban and rural districts in four regions of Morocco reported that they intended to vote. Of the same group of respondents, only 50 percent reported they voted in 2002. A similar result was predicted in a survey released by the pro-palace Daba 2007, which also has been funded by the USG to stimulate turnout. If these predictions come to fruition, it will be a pleasing result for the GOM, which will with some justification be able to sell it as a vote of confidence in the political system. ¶14. (C) Ironically, as payment was the principal motivation for many to go to the polls, particularly in poor areas, the anti-corruption and vote-buying campaign could have a side effect of depressing turnout. We will have to parse the results carefully. -------------- The Issues -------------- ¶15. (C) Many of the parties have come out with more or less detailed platforms, most for the first time. Most, no matter where they sit on the political spectrum have focused on voters' main concerns--the economy and employment. ¶16. (C) One issue that will define this election, however, is the growth of the Islamic-oriented PJD and what voters will indicate by what is widely expected to be a bigger share of Parliament for them. Although we believe that much of the appeal of the PJD is their stance on and reputation for good governance, the prospect of increasing Islamic influence on pubic life is not uncontroversial, particularly among the western-identified new generation in places like Rabat or Casablanca. So the vote is also partly a plebiscite on the influence of "the bearded ones," which might encourage some to vote. ¶17. (C) Despite the probably relatively clean election day, structural engineering of the electoral system limits its ability to produce a viable government reflecting the will of the people. Moreover, the government itself has limited powers, relative to the throne. Some of these issues were noted in the preliminary report of the international observers, and likely will be addressed in more detail in their final report. This is an additional benefit of the observation effort and help make this another step forward in the process of political reform in Morocco. ¶18. (U) Additional information on the elections may be obtained from the Interior Ministry website: www.elections2007.gov.ma. (Note: Septel will offer Post prognostications on likely electoral outcomes. End note.) ¶19. (U) Full List of reftels (NOTAL): ¶A. RABAT 1395 ¶B. RABAT 1392 ¶C. RABAT 1340 ¶D. RABAT 1335 ¶E. RABAT 1331 ¶F. RABAT 1274 ¶G. RABAT 1272 ¶H. RABAT 1255 ¶I. RABAT 1249 ¶J. RABAT 1248 ¶K. RABAT 1155 ¶L. RABAT 1122 ¶M. RABAT 1050 ¶N. RABAT 996 ¶O. RABAT 994 ¶P. RABAT 852 ¶Q. RABAT 680 ¶R. RABAT 675 ¶S. RABAT 638 ¶T. RABAT 549 ¶U. RABAT 360 ¶V. RABAT 225 See also reporting from Casablanca. Several additional field reports from Rabat or Casablanca are pending septel. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat RABAT 00001417 004 OF 004 ***************************************** RILEY