SCENESETTER FOR DIRECTOR MUELLER'S VISIT TO MOROCCO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001034

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR DIRECTOR ROBERT MUELLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC PREL PGOV MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DIRECTOR MUELLER'S VISIT TO MOROCCO

Classified by Ambassador Thomas Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

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Overview
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1. (C) My staff and I are delighted to welcome you to Morocco
at a time of increased focus on the terrorist threat in North
Africa. The U.S. finds in Morocco a capable and active
partner in the war against terror, though there is still room
for closer cooperation and enhanced support from our side for
the country's CT efforts. In the past three years, the GOM
has wrapped up a steadily increasing number of extremist
cells preparing to conduct attacks. The fact that the
Moroccans have so far succeeded in preempting major attacks
is reassuring, but the apparently multiplying number of
nascent terror cells and suicide bombers is not.


2. (C) The GOM is pursuing an interdisciplinary approach to
fighting terror, seeking to address the economic
marginalization of youth and refute extremist ideology by
propagating Islamic messages of tolerance and moderation as
it pursues law enforcement and intelligence operations
against specific terror cells. Progress on the ideological
and economic fronts can only be realized over the mid- to
long-terms.


3. (C) However important, CT is certainly not the only issue
on the minds of the Moroccan leadership this summer: There
have been major diplomatic developments in the
long-stalemated Western Sahara conflict: In mid-June, two
days of direct talks between Morocco and the separatist
Polisario Front ended in agreement to meet again. Morocco is
also preparing for its first direct legislative elections in
five years, to be held in September. A legal Islamist party
is poised to make significant gains, though most observers
expect only limited impact on Morocco's political system, as
power remains concentrated in the hands of the Royal Palace.


4. (C) Your meetings with senior GOM officials constitute an
opportunity to thank the Moroccans for their cooperation,
particularly their efforts to protect U.S. diplomatic
facilities in Rabat and Casablanca, and applaud their efforts
on CT. You can also congratulate them on their robust and
effective efforts to combat narcotics production and urge
them to provide us with specific proposals for enhanced
assistance in areas such as bomb detection and disposal, and
border controls.

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Suicide Bombing Series in Casablanca
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5. (C) A spate of abortive suicide bomb attacks in Casablanca
this March and April, including two directly targeting U.S.
interests, constituted a rude wake up call for the Moroccan
public, and some in the leadership as well, which had seen no
significant terrorist attacks since a series of coordinated
bombings in Casablanca killed 45 persons on May 16, 2003. A
total of 10 Moroccan suicide bombers either detonated
themselves, were killed by police, or were captured in a
series of incidents in Casablanca in March and April. On
April 10, two brothers detonated themselves, one in front of
the American Consulate-General in Casablanca, the other at
the nearby American Language Center, apparently mistaken for
a USG facility. No links have been established between any
of the bombers and transnational terror networks. The
bombers appear to have come from small, autonomous,
home-grown cells inspired by radical jihadist ideology.


6. (C) Thanks to luck and the obvious ineptitude of the
bombers, no civilians were hurt in the attacks (one Moroccan
policeman was killed in action during a raid). Given the
direct targeting of USG facilities, and the knowledge that
more extremists were at large, we closed the
Consulate-General building until the GOM took enhanced
security measures, specifically to protect the building from
the threat of a vehicle-borne bomb, which they did after a
delay of almost two months.

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The Broader Regional Threat
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7. (C) The Casablanca incidents more or less coincided this
spring with news of the merger of the Algerian GSPC terror
group with Al-Qaida to form Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). The franchise was announced in messages from both

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Algerian Jihadist Abdelmalek Droukdal and Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
Osama Bin Laden's deputy. The impact on Morocco of this
development is still unclear, though it has been broadly
interpreted as an incorporation of all of North Africa into
Al-Qaida's theater of operations. Some Moroccans participate
in the GSPC/AQIM, which is mainly holed up in remote and
mobile camps in southern Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania.
Senior Moroccan officials have told us of their concern about
the Sahara/Sahel region's potential as a terrorist safe-haven
and base of operations. This threat led to the formation
several years ago of the USG's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP),though so far TSCTP assistance, mostly
DOD, has been principally directed toward the Sahel states.

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Multiplying Domestic Cells
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8. (C) Though there has so far been little known GSPC or
Al-Qaida activities inside Morocco, there has been a steady
increase in the past three years in the number of jihadist
cells dismantled by the Moroccan government as they organized
to conduct terror attacks. The details of most of these
cases have filtered into the public, which was particularly
shocked by the exposure in the summer of 2006 of a cell
composed of at least 56 members, which included uniformed
members of the police and military. Even two wives of Royal
Air Maroc pilots were arrested and implicated as fund-raisers
for the cell. Trials for the group are scheduled to begin
June 29. Inspired by international jihadist ideology, these
various independent jihadist operational units have mainly
been home-grown with few if any material links to
transnational terror networks, although there have been
several cells found to be feeding Moroccan recruits into the
foreign fighter pipeline to Iraq, for eventual participation
in "martyrdom operations" organized by Sunni insurgents.


9. (C) The fact that the Moroccan government has been able to
identify and suppress numerous cells in the past three years
is a tribute to the GOM's operational CT capabilities.
However, we would be foolish to assume that the GOM is
catching all of them, and the fact that terror cells are
appearing with increasing frequency is an alarming indicator
that jihadist ideology is finding fertile ground in Morocco.

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The GOM's Holistic Approach
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10. (C) The GOM has wisely expanded the scope of its CT
efforts beyond identification and disruption operations to
attack the ideological and economic roots of the problem.
Both the GOM and international donors are funding projects to
address the economic marginalization of youth - seeking to
provide them with better educational, employment, and housing
opportunities. The impact of these efforts will only be felt
over the mid- to long-term, however, and critics charge that
the GOM's efforts to combat poverty are superficial and
hampered by public corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency.


11. (C) The GOM has been relatively energetic on the
ideological front. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs is led by
an assertively moderate visionary who has sought to overhaul
the country's system for regulating mosques, preachers, and
religious education. A major conference in late May brought
1200 of the country's religious scholars and spiritual
leaders together for a full day seminar which offered a
point-by-point refutation of the tenets of extremist
theology. A number of other significant innovations have
been introduced, including efforts to engage with imprisoned
jihadists, but on this front as well, the effort is limited
both by resource shortages and entrenched reactionaries
within the religious establishment.

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Other Key Issues: Western Sahara and Elections
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12. (C) Director Mueller, you will find during your stop here
that the Moroccans are also preoccupied with the issue of
Western Sahara. The long stalemated conflict over the
territory, occupied by Morocco but also claimed by the
separatist Polisario front, sheltered in Algeria, has
recently seen important shifts. There were two days of
direct talks between Morocco and the Polisario June 18-19.
Their agreement simply to meet again in August is viewed as a
success. Morocco wants the Saharans to accept autonomy, an
initiative we and the international community view as serious
and credible. The Moroccans may use their meetings with you

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to thank you for U.S. support and urge higher profile support
for their autonomy plan for the territory, should the talks
fail.


13. (C) This September, Morocco will hold its first direct
parliamentary elections in five years. The elections are
expected to be reasonably transparent and free of systematic
fraud, though electoral engineering and carefully sculpted
districts dictate a fairly predictable, non-threatening
outcome. The Islamist Party of Justice and Development
appears poised to double its representation in parliament and
may garner more seats than any other party. However, no
party will be able to get a majority, and the formation of
another broad coalition government is a near certainty.
Though the elections are of symbolic importance, political
power in Morocco remains largely concentrated in the hands of
the Palace, and the King has the power to appoint or dismiss
the Prime Minister, other Ministers, and even dissolve
parliament at will.

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Narcotics: A Domestic Success Story
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14. (C) You may want to congratulate your GOM interlocutors
on the government,s recent accomplishments in reducing
cannabis cultivation. In 2005, Morocco produced 53,400
metric tons of cannabis, down from 98,000 the previous year,
and in 2006 succeeded in completely eliminated cannabis
production in the northern province of Larache, according to
government data verified by the UN. A 2006 GOM investigation
into the network of a major drug baron arrested in the north
resulted in the arrest of more than a dozen high-ranking
government, judicial, military and law enforcement officials
linked to narcotics-related corruption. Despite aggressive
government efforts to combat cannabis production, Morocco
remains one of the world,s largest producers and exporters
of the drug.

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What More We Can Do to Help
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15. (C) Director Mueller, I would urge you above all to use
this visit to thank and congratulate the Moroccans on their
energetic and focused pursuit of the war on terror. The
coordination and information exchange relationship we enjoy
with Moroccan security services is consistently first rate.
Our Moroccan colleagues have proven themselves motivated and
capable in fighting terror, but they still face limitations
imposed by resource shortfalls and gaps in training,
equipment, and institutional capacity. An FBI explosives
expert who visited following the April bombings identified
some basic equipment and training that would help the
Moroccans establish a bomb disposal unit that meets modern
standards. The Embassy is currently working with Washington
to secure funding to enhance Morocco's EOD capabilities, and
I hope we can count on your support in making this happen. I
encourage you to press the Moroccans to provide us with more
specific information on their priorities for assistance that
would enhance their CT capabilities.


16. (C) Thank you for including Morocco on your itinerary.
We look forward to a successful and productive visit.

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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
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RILEY