KOSOVO: POSITIVE KOSOVAR ALBANIAN REACTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000096 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: POSITIVE KOSOVAR ALBANIAN REACTION TO AHTISAARI VISIT/PACKAGE Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Reaction by Kosovo Albanian leaders and the media to the final status package, as presented in Pristina by UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari on February 2, has been positive. The Unity Team welcomed the package and issued a statement saying they were committed to continuing the process on the basis of the provisions contained in the document. PM Ceku, however, tempered his remarks by noting that the document "did not meet all our expectations and demands" and later, on a primetime talk show with the other UT leaders, expressed disagreement with the package's treatment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),arguing that it should be the core of a future Kosovo defense force. He was joined in this criticism by opposition leader Hashim Thaci, signalling that the Unity Team will likely ask for modification of the KPC language in the Ahtisaari document. Media coverage and initial commentary from even committed foes of the Ahtisaari process were also upbeat, with only the hardest of the hardliners still expressing dissatisfaction. ¶2. (C) Reaction among Kosovo Serbs has been largely negative, but muted. Moderate Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic -- the only Serb leader to meet with Ahtisaari -- was critical of the package, saying it did not clarify what kind of status was at stake and reportedly adding that the package might result in the Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo declaring their own independence and thus increase the threat of renewed conflict. The general security environment remains calm: a February 3 demonstration against the package in the divided city of Mitrovica called by Albin Kurti's Self-Determination Movement attracted only 100-150, and there were no incidents, according to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). However, reports indicate that Kurti will try hard to mobilize a significant number of people for February 10 demonstrations and may provoke violence, a possibility that KFOR, UNMIK police, and KPS are prepared to contend with. END SUMMARY. Unity Team Welcomes Package... ¶3. (SBU) After meeting with UN Special Enboy Ahtisaari on February 2 in Pristina, the Unity Team of negotiators, composed of the five main governing and opposition leaders, issued a statement of clear support for Ahtisaari and his package. The UT noted that the document contained "all the elements" for a functioning, independent state with the necessary guarantees for communities that live in Kosovo -- "the Serb community before all." President Sejdiu promised to engage fully in the follow-on consultations scheduled by President Ahtisaari for Feb. 13 in Vienna and agreed to have a UNOSEK team led by Albert Rohan come to Pristina on Feb. 9 to further explain parts of the package. The other UT members, including PM Agim Ceku, Assembly Speaker Kole Berisha, and opposition leaders Hashim Thaci and Veton Surroi also welcomed the document, noting that in their estimation it provided the opportunity for Kosovo to become an independent state. ¶4. (SBU) At a subsequent primetime call-in talk show on February 2, Unity Team members again expressed their support for Ahtisaari and the package. They noted that while Ahtisaari did not mention the word "independence," his package contained all the attributes that the word implied, and they were confident that the outcome would be independence for Kosovo. They also accepted Ahtisaari's suggested timeline and next steps. During the television program, all five participants eloquently defended the decentralization provisions of the agreement, saying that it was a means of governing Kosovo in accordance with the Euro-Atlantic standards to which they aspire. The group refuted the proposition that decentralization constituted the loss of territory and defended the provisions allowing for links between Serbia and Serbs living in Kosovo. They also acknowledged the need for new national symbols (flag, anthem PRISTINA 00000096 002 OF 003 and seal) to help create a Kosovo that welcomed all. Responding to a phoned-in question as to why the document did not say the word "independence," Ceku said that it should be clear to all Kosovars that the status outlined by Ahtisaari does indeed add up to all the elements of statehood, including Kosovo's territorial integrity. ...But PM Ceku Expresses Disappointment with Treatment of KPC ¶5. (C) Sounding one sour note, PM Ceku made it a point to add that the document "did not meet all our expectations and demands." Ceku openly disagreed with with the document's treatment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),which he formerly commanded (note: the package foresees the KPC being disbanded after one year, as a new, 2,500-strong, vetted Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is stood up),calling for the KPC's transformation into the new security force and noting that "the KPC has prepared itself for seven years to become the future army." This comment prompted Thaci to echo the transformation demand. (Comment: Interestingly, the current KPC commander, Gen. Sylejman Selimi, has been the most realistic about his organization's future, boldly asserting to hardline KLA associations recently that the restructuring process will be difficult, that the KPC's mandate will end, and that many current KPC members will not become part of the new security force. End Comment.) Ceku concluded by saying that the UT would return to Ahtisaari to secure "what Kosovo deserves ... a package in accordance with the will of its people." Media Reaction Favorable, Press Conference ¶6. (SBU) The Albanian-language media also has been generally favorable about Ahtisaari's visit and the contents of the package. Print and broadcast media reported factually on the positive reaction by Kosovo's leaders and the former carried articles from the U.S. and other western press stressing that the international community strongly supports Ahtisaari. Editorials for the most part were not concerned that the document failed to mention "independence"; rather, they focused on the package elements, which they interpreted as leading in the direction of independence. The editor-in-chief of the daily Express, a tabloid publication not known previously for its strong support of the status process, went so far as to argue that refusing the document would be the same as refusing the 1999 Rambouillet Accord and that the "'no' should be left to Belgrade and to stubborn people in Kosovo." There were a few negative comments, including one by the head of the Council of Defense and Human Rights, who maintained that Ahtisaari had given the Serbs the "right to veto" and that the proposal preserved Serbia's sovereignty over the old and new Serb majority municipalities (a misconception we have also heard from some hardline MPs and are working to counter). Other commentary was moderately critical of the issues of decentralization, Kosovo's share of Serbia's international debt, and the future of the KPC. ¶7. (SBU) Perhaps as a result of this favorable inclination, the Pristina media levelled few tough questions at Ahtisaari during a February 2 press conference. Local participants seemed hesitant and/or confused, and the 'burning' question of whether Ahtisaari's package meant independence for Kosovo went unasked until well into the conference. The UN Special Envoy handled the question by saying that he would not be drawn into that discussion, that people could draw their own conclusions, and that he himself would draw none until he made his report to the UN Security Council. Kosovo Serbs Predictably Negative, but Muted ¶8. (C) Reaction among Kosovo Serbs has been largely negative, but muted. Moderate Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic was the only leader to meet Ahtisaari and, after the meeting, said the package did not clarify what kind of status was at stake, arguing that the document would only serve to PRISTINA 00000096 003 OF 003 make things more difficult. Ivanovic, who met Amb. Wisner February 5 (reported septel),was also quoted in the press as observing that the northern Serb municipalities might well declare their own independence and that the package could lead to renewed conflict, though he later claimed his remarks had been misinterpreted. SDM's Demonstration Small, Uneventful; Situation Calm ¶9. (SBU) Not surprisingly, the Self-Determination Movement (SDM) led by firebrand Albin Kurti firmly opposed the package and called for a February 3 demonstration in the divided city of Mitrovica. According to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), the event attracted only 100-150 supporters, lasted about an hour and a half, and ended without incident. KPS also reported that the situation throughout Kosovo in the wake of the visit has remained calm, with no unusual activity. (Comment: SDM will hold what will presumably be larger demonstrations on February 10 in Pristina and Ferizaj. We are in contact with UNMIK Civpol and KFOR to determine what measures will be taken to prevent a repeat of last November 28, when SDM was able to damage property, including UNMIK HQs, with apparent impunity. End Comment.) Comment ¶10. (C) Apart from Ceku and Thaci's comments on the treatment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),the reaction was a good one, engendered through careful coaching and extensive outreach work by USOP and others in the international community. The Unity Team is largely on board with the elements of the package, but we will have to keep a careful eye on Ceku and Thaci's assertions regarding the KPC; their comments have the potential to stir up KPC anxieties at a time when calm leadership and reassurance is required. We would recommend that UNOSEK continue to make clear to both Ceku and Thaci that while their concerns about the "disbandment" word might be assuaged through some different phraseology, the substance of the provisions regarding the KPC cannot and will not change, making it imperative that both leaders moderate the tone of their criticism. END COMMENT. ¶11. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW