KOSOVO: KOSOVARS ANXIOUS AND EXPECTANT, BUT CALM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000074 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: KOSOVARS ANXIOUS AND EXPECTANT, BUT CALM, IN ADVANCE OF AHTISAARI VISIT Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Kosovar Albanians eagerly anticipate the upcoming Feb. 2 visit by UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, believing that his arrival will mark the final phase in the status determination process. The Kosovar Albanian "Unity Team" of negotiators from the major political parties understand the importance of presenting a positive initial response to Ahtisaari while reserving the right to offer comments on the package after further review, and they will accept without hesitation Ahtisaari's invitation for further rounds of discussions. Kosovo Serbs will listen to Ahtisaari's message carefully for a description of the rights and guarantees afforded them by the package, but they will almost certainly be guarded in their reaction, under pressure from Belgrade and from their own hardline leadership to avoid any indication that Ahtisaari's proposals might be acceptable to them. Nevertheless, the more specifics Ahtisaari can provide publicly, the more Serbs will be able to confront squarely the impending status recommendation. A USOP/USAID/OSCE/Unity Team joint effort to begin public outreach to both ethnic communities is now underway, with initial television spots already being broadcast that point to a brighter future for Kosovo and a positive change ahead. End summary. Albanians Eagerly Waiting, Prepared for Ahtisaari ¶2. (C) Kosovar Albanians of all political stripes are eagerly awaiting Ahtisaari's arrival on the afternoon of February 2, believing that his visit marks the beginning of what will be the last phase of discussions and diplomatic activity before Ahtisaari makes his final status recommendation to the UN Security Council. The Unity Team of negotiators has gone through some tough times lately, with widening fractures between the governing parties and an increasingly restive opposition, as well as ruptures within President Sejdiu's LDK party itself. Nevertheless, the members of the Unity Team well understand the stakes involved in Ahtisaari's visit, and they plan a coordinated and positive initial response to his proposals. They will also accept without hesitation his invitation to conduct further 
discussions in Vienna. ¶3. (C) We have made clear to the entire Unity Team that while they may choose to offer comments or suggestions on the body of the Ahtisaari document once they have had time to study it, the proposals were carefully crafted and room for flexibility is likely minimal, especially in those areas pertaining to the international civilian and military presence, as well as the construct of the security sector in Kosovo. This is a message that Ahtisaari himself may wish to reiterate at the outset of his Feb. 2 meeting with the Unity Team, to set the tone and prevent any miscalculations by the Kosovars -- particularly from Prime Minister Ceku and/or opposition leader Hashim Thaci (both with strong connections to former KLA fighters),who if not discouraged early might press for changes to the provisions dealing with the Kosovo Protection Corps and the stand up of a Kosovo Security Force. (Note: Thaci professed to COM recently that "in the end, he will accept anything Ahtisaari delivers," though he might still be tempted to court favor with his KLA colleagues by championing a full transition of the current KPC into a Kosovo army.) ¶4. (C) In other respects, however, and despite media sniping about the implications of the decentralization provisions of the package for Kosovo's "functionality," Kosovars are almost certain to welcome what they will hear from Ahtisaari, having comprehended that his proposals will provide the basis for a favorable status decision. To underscore the positive change that the status process will bring about, TV spots have already begun airing as part of a USOP/USAID/OSCE/Kosovar campaign to enhance public understanding; the first ads will simply refer to the prospect of a brighter future for all Kosovars, while later messages will target Albanian and Serb audiences separately and contain more detailed information PRISTINA 00000074 002 OF 002 about what is in the Ahtisaari package. Serbs Quiet, Will Largely Ignore the Process ¶5. (C) Kosovo Serbs, in meetings with us and with other Contact Group interlocutors, continue to demonstrate a conflicted and mainly negative attitude towards the Ahtisaari process. Still constructive are the relatively few Kosovar Serb leaders like SLKM President Oliver Ivanovic who grasp the significance of Ahtisaari's document and are still willing to engage on the substance, but by far the larger body of Serb leaders -- north and south -- are under the sway of Belgrade and their own hardline extremists who have made it plain they will punish any perceived engagement with the Albanians or any excessive interest in the negotiation process. Kosovo Serbs invited to meet with Ahtisaari in Pristina will come and listen politely, but will make plain their disinterest in anything having to do with the status decision and their intention to utilize "all legal and democratic means" to protest independence for Kosovo if that is what emerges from the process. ¶6. (C) Despite this, Ahtisaari's public statement while in Pristina and his private interaction with representatives of the Serb community will be an important opportunity to get the word out -- one that we can spread throughout Serb enclaves and in the north -- on the benefits and guarantees the package will afford Serbs in Kosovo. The more specifics offered, the greater the incentive Serbs will have to confront squarely the impending status decision and consider carefully their options in light of his assurances. ¶7. (C) We expect no violence related to the Ahtisaari visit, and very little public reaction from the Kosovo Serbs at all, other than to restate their essential rejection of the process. There could be demonstrations on the Kosovar Albanian side, either on the day of the visit or just preceding, from the small but rhetorically powerful "Self-Determination" movement; security preparations will be high and public support for the protest would be very low. At this moment, all Kosovar eyes are fastened on President Ahtisaari -- Kosovars continue to be invested in the status process and will do much to see it through to its successful conclusion, though they hope for unambiguous signs that this last round of discussions will not be open-ended and that Ahtisaari will make his final recommendation without undue delay. ¶8. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW