KOSOVO FINAL STATUS: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000557

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN,
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT
FOR ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NEXT
STEPS AT UNSC, ASKS FOR PATIENCE/RESTRAINT

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In Pristina July 9-10, EUR A/S Fried
reassured Kosovo's restive Unity Team, made up of the main
governing and opposition leaders, that the U.S. would neither
abandon Kosovo nor weaken in support for Kosovo's
independence, and briefed them on the details of a new
"minimalist" UNSC resolution. Asking for patience and
restraint, Fried noted that the provisions of the draft
resolution would likely involve a 4-6 month period of further
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina and would not
explicitly address status, but he also made clear the
eventual outcome would be what President Bush said it would
be -- supervised independence for Kosovo. If Russia blocked
such a resolution, Fried indicated, the U.S. and its EU
partners would move ahead with this initiative by common
consent. While accepting the need for the widest degree of
international support for independence possible, Kosovo
leaders were nervous about new negotiations and feared status
would remain unresolved beyond the end of the negotiation
period. PM Ceku asked what was left to discuss with Serbia,
while opposition leader Veton Surroi claimed Pristina would
be squeezed to make further concessions. Opposition PDK
leader Hashim Thaci complained that only for the sake of
status had his party "not acted like an opposition." He
pressed for holding parliamentary elections on time (mandates
expire in October),regardless of progress on status, as a
means of maintaining the legitimacy of Kosovo's institutions.
Despite these concerns, Unity Team members expressed strong
confidence in the U.S. and appeared relieved when Fried
announced they were all invited to a July 23 meeting in
Washington with the Secretary.


2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd): UNMIK, ICO and KFOR reps told
Fried the security situation remained for now in fairly good
shape, but pointed to the growing potential for unilateral
Kosovar political action and radicalization of moderate
forces in response to the continued lack of clarity. Serb
Orthodox Church leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava,
realistic about independence, nevertheless worried about
implementing protective measures for Kosovo Serbs and
proceeding with Ahtisaari-mandated provisions protecting
cultural and religious heritage sites. In a televised
interview, A/S Fried reiterated that the outcome for Kosovo
would be supervised independence, but appealed to Kosovars to
be patient, to work with the U.S. and international
community, and to take no action that would put this outcome
at risk. A/S Fried's visit helped provide context for
Kosovars on the steps ahead, but we will need continuously to
hold the Kosovars' hands in the weeks and months that follow.
END SUMMARY.

Message of Patience, Restraint, Assurance


3. (C) EUR A/S Fried, in Pristina July 9-10, met separately
with President Sejdiu, PM Ceku, Assembly caucus leaders, and
Kosovo's Unity Team to deliver a message of patience and
restraint as the U.S. and its European partners work to craft
a new "minimalist" resolution at the UNSC to authorize the
international presences envisioned in the Ahtisaari proposal.
He reaffirmed President Bush's resolve that Kosovo will be
independent, but noted that this effort would require a
limited period of new negotiations between Belgrade and
Pristina lasting perhaps four months, to demonstrate --
particularly to European publics -- that supervised
independence was the only possible and sustainable outcome
for Kosovo. Should Russia block this resolution, Fried said,
the U.S. and its EU partners would move ahead with this
initiative by common consent. He appealed to Kosovo leaders
to work with the U.S. and international community and not
fall prey to provocations or the impulse to take unilateral
action, either by imposing artificial deadlines or declaring
independence. A/S Fried assured all that Kosovo would in the
end be independent and that the U.S. wanted as many countries
as possible to recognize and accept this fact. To
demonstrate continued U.S. engagement, Fried invited all

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Unity Team members to a July 23 meeting in Washington with
Secretary Rice, an invitation accepted with alacrity and

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enthusiasm.

Message Accepted, But Not Happily


4. (C) Kosovar leaders expressed their deep appreciation
for U.S. efforts and generally accepted Fried's message, but
evinced real concerns about the process as described. PM
Ceku asked what could possibly be further negotiated with
Belgrade and complained that Pristina had not been consulted
on this new resolution. Opposition ORA leader Veton Surroi
maintained that Pristina would be squeezed to make further
concessions: "You will ask us for more...and we have already
given away the family jewels." Noting that his party had not
acted like a real opposition since the Unity Team's founding,
PDK leader Hashim Thaci argued that it was time for the
international community to fulfill its obligations to Kosovo.
Thaci also pressed on the thorny issue of elections, saying
they should be held on time to maintain the legitimacy of
Kosovo's institutions, regardless of status resolution. He
made his intentions clear: "There will be no political
address," he insisted, for the Unity Team after September if
there are no plans to hold elections on time. (Note: In June
2006, the SRSG postponed municipal elections, due in November
2006, in anticipation of a decision on status. Mandates for
Kosovo Assembly MPs expire in October 2007. End Note.)
Fried indicated understanding for the legitimacy issue,
though he warned that elections could delay the period of
negotiations and thus the status process generally, and he
observed that it would be exceptionally difficult to maintain
unity while an election campaign was underway.


5. (SBU) Fried heard much the same fears from Assembly
caucus leaders, particularly that Pristina would be asked to
make more concessions or that status would remain unresolved
even after this new negotiating period. The idea of holding
elections before status brought a divided response, with
governing coalition delegates generally opposed and
opposition delegates strongly in favor. Assembly members
were uniformly critical of the Unity Team's performance, but
Fried reminded them that the Team had worked constructively
with the international community and under its overall
guidance, and asked that the Assembly not take steps to
either limit the Team's mandate or revoke its competency.
Despite their evident reservations, caucus leaders expressed
their full confidence in the U.S. and pledged not to do
anything without the consent and agreement of the United
States.

Internationals See Potential for Unilateral Steps


6. (C) At July 9 dinner hosted by COM, OSCE Amb. Wnendt
(Ger),USKFOR BG Earhart, COSKFOR BG Wolf (U.S.),and ICO
Prep Team Deputy Ben Crampton (UK) told Fried that the
security situation was generally calm and stable, but
emphasized that the political situation was extremely
fragile. They worried that in the absence of real clarity on
status, moderate Kosovo leaders might be pressured by extreme
voices -- even within their own parties -- to take dangerous
unilateral steps. Discussion also centered on elections and
the need both to maintain the legitimacy of Kosovo
institutions and to deal with the inherent dangers of holding
an election before final status had been resolved; all
acknowledged the problems involved in holding elections in a
pre-status environment and the potential threat to Kosovo
unity, but all were equally convinced that without surety on
a date for status, holding back opposition demands for
democratic elections would be extraordinarily difficult, and
might cost the Unity Team its opposition membership at any
rate.

Moderate Kosovo Serb leaders


7. (C) A/S Fried laid out the way ahead to moderate Serb
Orthodox Church leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava.

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Both leaders agreed strongly that Belgrade used Kosovo mostly
as a political lever, but noted the difficulty for moderate
Belgrade politicians to speak freely and productively about
Kosovo. They were realistic about Kosovo independence, but
worried about the fate of individual Serb communities in
Kosovo in an atmosphere of prolonged Albanian frustration and
delay in the status process. Asked about the building of a
security wall around the Pec Patriarchate (a measure that
USOP, UNMIK and ICO have supported),Teodosije said that at
the USOP July 4 reception he was confronted by PISG Energy
Minister Ethem Ceku (a KLA war veteran from the Peja/Pec
region, though a nominal moderate),who asserted that if "you
build walls you don't make friends," to which Teodosije
responded, "we will build the wall and then make friends."


8. (C) Father Sava also noted his concerns about continuing
proposals for partition of Kosovo emanating out of Belgrade,
calling such ideas "disastrous," and speculating that there
might be those in Belgrade who -- despite their public stance
against partition -- wanted to provoke Albanian unilateral
action that would engender a Serb response in Kosovo's north
essentially creating a partition outcome. Both he and
Teodosije noted that there were some Albanian leaders "they
could talk to," though others were more problematic, and
underscored the critical nature of USOP and international
support for implementation of those Ahtisaari provisions
dealing with religious heritage. They also acknowledged that
Belgrade-appointed municipal representatives in Kosovo's Serb
enclaves were often acting against local Serb interest by
erecting barriers to interaction with the international
community. Asked what Fried's message to Serbian President
Tadic should be, Teodosije said, "do not sacrifice the
(Kosovo Serb) people." In closing, Father Sava expressed
hope that US troops would be available to help Decani
monastery should there be trouble in future, noting that
Italian KFOR was well-meaning but the US flag "calms people
down."

Media Outreach


9. (U) In a wide-ranging, one-on-one interview on KTV's
"Rubikon" news program, which aired Kosovo-wide the evening
of July 10, Fried underscored that President Bush's recent
remarks in Albania in favor of Kosovo's independence were the
product of careful deliberation and decision. Fried
emphasized that Presidents Bush and Sarkozy had publicly
supported the Ahtisaari plan of supervised independence for
Kosovo. He walked viewers through the concept behind the
promulgation of a new draft resolution, but said the outcome
of the process would remain supervised independence.


10. (U) A/S Fried redirected a question on whether the new
negotiation period would be four or six months, saying the
mere fact that Kosovo was counting the months to independence
meant that Kosovo was succeeding. He praised the Kosovo
leadership, especially the Unity Team, for its high level of
responsibility and partnership with the international
community, and appealed to Kosovars to continue to work with
the U.S. and international community and not take unilateral
action.


11. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable.
KAIDANOW