KOSOVO FINAL STATUS: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000557 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS AT UNSC, ASKS FOR PATIENCE/RESTRAINT Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In Pristina July 9-10, EUR A/S Fried reassured Kosovo's restive Unity Team, made up of the main governing and opposition leaders, that the U.S. would neither abandon Kosovo nor weaken in support for Kosovo's independence, and briefed them on the details of a new "minimalist" UNSC resolution. Asking for patience and restraint, Fried noted that the provisions of the draft resolution would likely involve a 4-6 month period of further negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina and would not explicitly address status, but he also made clear the eventual outcome would be what President Bush said it would be -- supervised independence for Kosovo. If Russia blocked such a resolution, Fried indicated, the U.S. and its EU partners would move ahead with this initiative by common consent. While accepting the need for the widest degree of international support for independence possible, Kosovo leaders were nervous about new negotiations and feared status would remain unresolved beyond the end of the negotiation period. PM Ceku asked what was left to discuss with Serbia, while opposition leader Veton Surroi claimed Pristina would be squeezed to make further concessions. Opposition PDK leader Hashim Thaci complained that only for the sake of status had his party "not acted like an opposition." He pressed for holding parliamentary elections on time (mandates expire in October),regardless of progress on status, as a means of maintaining the legitimacy of Kosovo's institutions. Despite these concerns, Unity Team members expressed strong confidence in the U.S. and appeared relieved when Fried announced they were all invited to a July 23 meeting in Washington with the Secretary. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd): UNMIK, ICO and KFOR reps told Fried the security situation remained for now in fairly good shape, but pointed to the growing potential for unilateral Kosovar political action and radicalization of moderate forces in response to the continued lack of clarity. Serb Orthodox Church leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava, realistic about independence, nevertheless worried about �00A;implementing protective measures for Kosovo Serbs and proceeding with Ahtisaari-mandated provisions protecting cultural and religious heritage sites. In a televised interview, A/S Fried reiterated that the outcome for Kosovo would be supervised independence, but appealed to Kosovars to be patient, to work with the U.S. and international community, and to take no action that would put this outcome at risk. A/S Fried's visit helped provide context for Kosovars on the steps ahead, but we will need continuously to hold the Kosovars' hands in the weeks and months that follow. END SUMMARY. Message of Patience, Restraint, Assurance ¶3. (C) EUR A/S Fried, in Pristina July 9-10, met separately with President Sejdiu, PM Ceku, Assembly caucus leaders, and Kosovo's Unity Team to deliver a message of patience and restraint as the U.S. and its European partners work to craft a new "minimalist" resolution at the UNSC to authorize the international presences envisioned in the Ahtisaari proposal. He reaffirmed President Bush's resolve that Kosovo will be independent, but noted that this effort would require a limited period of new negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina lasting perhaps four months, to demonstrate -- particularly to European publics -- that supervised independence was the only possible and sustainable outcome for Kosovo. Should Russia block this resolution, Fried said, the U.S. and its EU partners would move ahead with this initiative by common consent. He appealed to Kosovo leaders to work with the U.S. and international community and not fall prey to provocations or the impulse to take unilateral action, either by imposing artificial deadlines or declaring independence. A/S Fried assured all that Kosovo would in the end be independent and that the U.S. wanted as many countries as possible to recognize and accept this fact. To demonstrate continued U.S. engagement, Fried invited all PRISTINA 00000557 002 OF 003 Unity Team members to a July 23 meeting in Washington with Secretary Rice, an invitation accepted with alacrity and SIPDIS enthusiasm. Message Accepted, But Not Happily ¶4. (C) Kosovar leaders expressed their deep appreciation for U.S. efforts and generally accepted Fried's message, but evinced real concerns about the process as described. PM Ceku asked what could possibly be further negotiated with Belgrade and complained that Pristina had not been consulted on this new resolution. Opposition ORA leader Veton Surroi maintained that Pristina would be squeezed to make further concessions: "You will ask us for more...and we have already given away the family jewels." Noting that his party had not acted like a real opposition since the Unity Team's founding, PDK leader Hashim Thaci argued that it was time for the international community to fulfill its obligations to Kosovo. Thaci also pressed on the thorny issue of elections, saying they should be held on time to maintain the legitimacy of Kosovo's institutions, regardless of status resolution. He made his intentions clear: "There will be no political address," he insisted, for the Unity Team after September if there are no plans to hold elections on time. (Note: In June 2006, the SRSG postponed municipal elections, due in November 2006, in anticipation of a decision on status. Mandates for Kosovo Assembly MPs expire in October 2007. End Note.) Fried indicated understanding for the legitimacy issue, though he warned that elections could delay the period of negotiations and thus the status process generally, and he observed that it would be exceptionally difficult to maintain unity while an election campaign was underway. ¶5. (SBU) Fried heard much the same fears from Assembly caucus leaders, particularly that Pristina would be asked to make more concessions or that status would remain unresolved even after this new negotiating period. The idea of holding elections before status brought a divided response, with governing coalition delegates generally opposed and opposition delegates strongly in favor. Assembly members were uniformly critical of the Unity Team's performance, but Fried reminded them that the Team had worked constructively with the international community and under its overall guidance, and asked that the Assembly not take steps to either limit the Team's mandate or revoke its competency. Despite their evident reservations, caucus leaders expressed their full confidence in the U.S. and pledged not to do anything without the consent and agreement of the United States. Internationals See Potential for Unilateral Steps ¶6. (C) At July 9 dinner hosted by COM, OSCE Amb. Wnendt (Ger),USKFOR BG Earhart, COSKFOR BG Wolf (U.S.),and ICO Prep Team Deputy Ben Crampton (UK) told Fried that the security situation was generally calm and stable, but emphasized that the political situation was extremely fragile. They worried that in the absence of real clarity on status, moderate Kosovo leaders might be pressured by extreme voices -- even within their own parties -- to take dangerous unilateral steps. Discussion also centered on elections and the need both to maintain the legitimacy of Kosovo institutions and to deal with the inherent dangers of holding an election before final status had been resolved; all acknowledged the problems involved in holding elections in a pre-status environment and the potential threat to Kosovo unity, but all were equally convinced that without surety on a date for status, holding back opposition demands for democratic elections would be extraordinarily difficult, and might cost the Unity Team its opposition membership at any rate. Moderate Kosovo Serb leaders ¶7. (C) A/S Fried laid out the way ahead to moderate Serb Orthodox Church leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava. PRISTINA 00000557 003 OF 003 Both leaders agreed strongly that Belgrade used Kosovo mostly as a political lever, but noted the difficulty for moderate Belgrade politicians to speak freely and productively about Kosovo. They were realistic about Kosovo independence, but worried about the fate of individual Serb communities in Kosovo in an atmosphere of prolonged Albanian frustration and delay in the status process. Asked about the building of a security wall around the Pec Patriarchate (a measure that USOP, UNMIK and ICO have supported),Teodosije said that at the USOP July 4 reception he was confronted by PISG Energy Minister Ethem Ceku (a KLA war veteran from the Peja/Pec region, though a nominal moderate),who asserted that if "you build walls you don't make friends," to which Teodosije responded, "we will build the wall and then make friends." ¶8. (C) Father Sava also noted his concerns about continuing proposals for partition of Kosovo emanating out of Belgrade, calling such ideas "disastrous," and speculating that there might be those in Belgrade who -- despite their public stance against partition -- wanted to provoke Albanian unilateral action that would engender a Serb response in Kosovo's north essentially creating a partition outcome. Both he and Teodosije noted that there were some Albanian leaders "they could talk to," though others were more problematic, and underscored the critical nature of USOP and international support for implementation of those Ahtisaari provisions dealing with religious heritage. They also acknowledged that Belgrade-appointed municipal representatives in Kosovo's Serb enclaves were often acting against local Serb interest by erecting barriers to interaction with the international community. Asked what Fried's message to Serbian President Tadic should be, Teodosije said, "do not sacrifice the (Kosovo Serb) people." In closing, Father Sava expressed hope that US troops would be available to help Decani monastery should there be trouble in future, noting that Italian KFOR was well-meaning but the US flag "calms people down." Media Outreach ¶9. (U) In a wide-ranging, one-on-one interview on KTV's "Rubikon" news program, which aired Kosovo-wide the evening of July 10, Fried underscored that President Bush's recent remarks in Albania in favor of Kosovo's independence were the product of careful deliberation and decision. Fried emphasized that Presidents Bush and Sarkozy had publicly supported the Ahtisaari plan of supervised independence for Kosovo. He walked viewers through the concept behind the promulgation of a new draft resolution, but said the outcome of the process would remain supervised independence. ¶10. (U) A/S Fried redirected a question on whether the new negotiation period would be four or six months, saying the mere fact that Kosovo was counting the months to independence meant that Kosovo was succeeding. He praised the Kosovo leadership, especially the Unity Team, for its high level of responsibility and partnership with the international community, and appealed to Kosovars to continue to work with the U.S. and international community and not take unilateral action. ¶11. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable. KAIDANOW