KOSOVO: KFOR AND UNMIK POLICE BRIEF ON READINESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000492 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: KFOR AND UNMIK POLICE BRIEF ON READINESS Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The KFOR commander and UNMIK police commissioner recently provided updates on their readiness posture as the status process moves into July and beyond. Both have focused on immediate challenges, including the June 23-28 presence in Kosovo of "marchers" from Serbia who will culminate their visit with the construction of a provocative monument in north Mitrovica on June 27 and then continue south to Gazimestan on June 28 (the Serbian Vidovdan holiday),as well as the projected June 30 demonstration in Pristina organized by the Self-Determination Movement. KFOR and UNMIK police have also, individually and jointly, engaged in planning for longer-term scenarios as well as operational exercises designed to enhance readiness. Both acknowledge, however, that while the situation on the ground remains calm, it is, in COMKFOR's words, "complex and volatile" and watchfulness remains the key mantra on the security front. End summary. UNMIK Commissioner Monk: UNMIK (P) Planning ¶2. (C) On June 20, UNMIK Police Commissioner Monk gave assembled Contact Group liaison offices a fairly upbeat assessment of UNMIK police capabilities and planning. He noted in particular that by August, UNMIK will have nearly its full complement of 1565 officers, up from the current ¶1497. Monk cited excellent cooperation with the EU Planning Team in putting together transition plans for handover to the ESDP Rule of Law mission following a UNSC resolution, and claimed that special efforts were underway to ensure that sensitive police investigations would not fall through the cracks during the transition. ¶3. (C) Monk raised two immediate challenges faced by UNMIK police, the first occurring in the June 23-28 timeframe as marchers from Serbia make their way into northern Kosovo for a week-long celebration of the Serbian "Vidovdan" holiday, culminating in the commemoration of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje at the Gazimestan monument near Pristina on June 28. Monk expressed confidence that UNMIK police, working closely with KFOR, could handle the events associated with the march. ¶4. (C) UNMIK and KFOR plan to escort buses carrying participants from Gate 1 of the administrative boundary line with Serbia and from Serb enclaves, such as Gracanica, to the Gazimestan site. (An associated ceremony, also being closely followed by KFOR and UNMIK police, is planned on June 27 in north Mitrovica, where participants will place an angel on the top of already existing monument to symbolize the plight of the Serb community in Kosovo.) Participants are not expected to number more than 100, though there is the possibility of radical Serbian elements, such as the "Tsar Lazar" movement, joining the activities. UNMIK police are working through police contacts in Serbia to try and ensure that such radical elements are contained or prevented from joining the march. (Note: Embassy Belgrade will also intercede with Serbian Interior Minister Jocic to make this point.) ¶5. (C) Monk's other focus was on the projected June 30 demonstration of the Self-Determination Movement. Acknowledging the mistakes made during the February 10 SDM protest, in which two demonstrators were killed by Romanian riot control police, Monk and his aides indicated that the same successful tactics would be employed on June 30 that had kept the last SDM event peaceful on March 31: close cooperation with KFOR and defining in advance the route that protesters would take. (Comment: With firebrand SDM leader Kurti still in pre-trial detention, it is unlikely the June 30 event will escalate into anything significant. However, SDM leaders have thus far refused to meet with the KPS spokesman Veton Elshani, as they have done in the past, to agree on details. Elshani tells us he is still pursuing this channel of communication. There are also rumblings that war veterans, frustrated by the delay in status, may throw in PRISTINA 00000492 002 OF 002 their lot with MSD, though thus far USOP intercession has helped convince the veterans to avoid such a course. End Comment.) KFOR: Keeping an ear to the ground, ready for contingencies ¶6. (C) COMKFOR LTG Roland Kather (Germany) assembled heads of liaison offices the evening of June 20 for a similar briefing, this one focusing on KFOR preparations for the uncertainties accompanying a prolonged status process. Kather and his Chief of Staff BG Al Bryant (U.S.) described their view of the security situation as "calm but volatile and complex," noting that they viewed the period immediately following the Bush/Putin summit at the beginning of July as the next potentially sensitive time given mounting public expectations of the summit's outcome. COSKFOR outlined KFOR's operational objectives during this period of uncertainty and public anxiety: reassuring the population of KFOR's commitment to security; increasing situational awareness through increased patrols and interaction with the people; deterring non-compliant groups; and engaging with other members of the international community to ensure full coordination. COSKFOR made it clear that KFOR was watching a number of potential hot spots, including Pristina and Mitrovica, but also a variety of smaller towns and villages primarily in eastern and central Kosovo. ¶7. (C) COSKFOR reviewed what he termed KFOR's "enhanced readiness posture," which involved the presence and rehearsal of out-of-theater forces (including, currently, a 500-man Italian infantry battalion which KFOR has requested remain in Kosovo till July 12, operating in the Zubin Potok and upper Drenica areas, and a 200-man Czech reinforced company in the Podujevo region; German ORF forces were also in Kosovo in the April-March timeframe) and the exercising of MNTF reserve forces from within Kosovo (9 companies on a 12-hour alert) and from the EU TacRes in Bosnia (which recently rehearsed movements into Kosovo from Bosnia through both Serbian and Montenegrin routes). COSKFOR also detailed a marked increase in the number of focused KFOR operations over the last 30 days throughout Kosovo, each consisting of 2-3 companies (100-300 soldiers) over 3-5 days -- all in addition to KFOR's daily patrol activities consisting of some 220 individual patrols and 60 vehicle checkpoints. ¶8. (C) COM and COSKFOR pointed to other planning and coordination efforts with a wide range of interlocutors and organizations, starting with UNMIK police and KPS, but including as well the Serbian CHOD and the Serbian Minister for Kosovo. Noting the difficulty of planning for every possible political scenario, they nevertheless emphasized the value of readiness, and gave at least tentative outlines of their posture in the pre-UNSCR phase, on resolution day (or a day in which the Kosovars declare independence unilaterally), and in the post-resolution period. COMKFOR asserted that he had instituted a "ten-minute rule": whatever happens, KFOR can be on the spot within ten minutes. He also reviewed with liaison office heads KFOR's policy with regard to assisting members of the international community in the event of a mass evacuation; he underscored that KFOR's primary mission remained the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, but said KFOR would assist within "means and capabilities" to help get everyone out. ¶9. (C) Comment: There is an elevated level of planning and coordination within and among key security elements in Kosovo, but the uncertainty of the status process leaves planners hamstrung in their effort to ensure full preparedness. We continue to review with KFOR and with UNMIK (P) the possible parameters of security threats in this volatile time, and we will provide back insights they glean from interaction with Kosovars on the ground. KAIDANOW