Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PRISTINA362
2007-05-07 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: FUTURE STAND-UP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

Tags:  PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI 
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000362 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: FUTURE STAND-UP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000362 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: FUTURE STAND-UP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) has the lead and has made progress on plans to stand up a new Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) after the status decision is made. Budget, organizational structure, and necessary legislation have already been drafted as part of the larger post-status transition from UNMIK to the Kosovo government. Some tasks remain, such as renovating the UNMIK annex currently planned to house the MFA, completing office and position descriptions, and recruiting and training staff. OPM believes this progress has been possible because the work has taken place largely outside of the sometimes cumbersome transition working group structure. However, this relatively non-transparent process remains a sore point for some, in particular the opposition ORA party, which says it only learned about the MFA planning through the media. Although the OPM is committed to a professional diplomatic service in the longer term, in the short term political battles loom over the locations and number of embassies, and appointments of Kosovo,s first Minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassadors. It is highly likely that the minister and most other politically-appointed staff will come from the senior governing coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). At this point, Austria appears to be the lead country in providing diplomatic training and assistance; at the appropriate time, we could look for ways to plug into this, including possibly bringing the head of training to the Foreign Service Institute. END SUMMARY. Status of the Transition Planning Process ¶2. (SBU) Besnik Tahiri, public policy adviser to PM Ceku and co-Chair of the Governance Working Group (GWG),along with the British development agency DFID, the office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the former head of the British Office (now funded by the EU),began the technical work on standing up an MFA in fall 2006. The two laws this group drafted - establishing the MFA and addressing diplomatic status, immunities, and privileges in Kosovo - were presented in February 2007 to the GWG along with a draft resolution confirming Kosovo's volu
ntary adherence to ten pages of international treaties and conventions. These two laws and the resolution are set to be introduced and passed during the 120-day transition period after a new UNSC resolution on Kosovo has been approved, together with a raft of other transition-related legislation. ¶3. (SBU) Outside the framework of the GWG, however, and without explicit sanction from opposition parties, the Prime Minister's office has also drafted a 140-page report (later leaked to the media) that lays out a proposed budget, salaries, locations of the initial fourteen embassies, organizational structure, and MFA objectives for the first eighteen months. Work is now beginning on a comprehensive training strategy, detailed office descriptions, and position descriptions. Negotiations are ongoing for the MFA to be located in the UNMIK annex building in Pristina after that building reverts to the Kosovo government. Complications have primarily centered on the date that UNMIK would be able to transfer the building. Since some renovations would be required, the OPM would like to have access to the building as soon as possible to reduce the period when temporary accommodations would be required. Tahiri is pushing for the recruitment of civil servants to begin in the near future, but the plan assumes that formal recruitment would not be completed until the end of the summer. Final political decisions remain on salaries, exactly which embassies to open within the first year, and how many of the ambassadors and ministry staff will be political appointees. Objectives for the First Eighteen Months ¶4. (SBU) The draft law establishing the MFA sets forth as objectives early membership in the UN, World Bank, IMF, and Council of Europe, and achieving broad support among other members in organizations subject to a Serbian veto. Other PRISTINA 00000362 002 OF 004 stated (and probably unachievable in this timeframe) aims include: receiving a Partnership for Peace invitation from the NATO Summit in 2008; completing the process of treaty succession with key bilateral partners and multilateral organizations; assisting with one or more peacekeeping operations; and supporting other ministries in negotiating treaties of significance to foreign investors or to the rule of law. ¶5. (SBU) In relation to Serbia, the draft calls for negotiating a reapportioning of Serbian sovereign debt, initiating a policy dialogue, and influencing Serbian public opinion in a more favorable direction with regard to Kosovo, as well as developing a strategy to address unresolved Kosovar claims (e.g., pensions, frozen foreign currency deposits) and pursuing solutions to economic issues (e.g., overflight rights). More broadly, the draft describes other key goals: finally and officially resolving the border issue with Macedonia, replacing the Kosovo-Macedonian provisional Free Trade Agreement with a permanent treaty, providing consular assistance abroad for Kosovar citizens, and initiating close contacts with diaspora organizations, who are seen as the most likely initial foreign investors in Kosovo. Structure of the Ministry ¶6. (SBU) Under the OPM plan, the ministry would be organized with a Minister,s Office, a Deputy Minister, a Principal Political Adviser, and a Permanent Secretary reporting directly to the Minister. Reporting to the Permanent Secretary would be five offices: Consular Affairs; Legal SIPDIS Affairs and Human Rights; Media; Protocol; and Internal Audit. There are also three individuals who would report directly to the Permanent Secretary: the Director General, who has under him/her a Deputy and three policy sections (Strategy and Economic Affairs, International Relations and Security Policy, and Regional Affairs); a Director of Budget and Finance; and a Director of General Administration (Human Resources, Administration, Procurement, and Translation). By the end of the first year, the MFA would according to the plan have 148 staff, with 64 individuals in the main ministry and 84 individuals in fourteen embassies. ¶7. (C) These embassies, ranging in size from 2-10 people, would be in the following countries: the U.S. (Washington D.C., also covering the World Bank and the IMF); UK; France; Germany; Italy; Austria (also covering the OSCE); Switzerland; Albania; Croatia; Macedonia; Montenegro; Slovenia; the United Nations (New York - initially a Consulate-General); and the European Commission/European Union (Brussels). Tahiri pointed to funding limitations, and said there might be pressure to add Greece, Turkey, China, Russia, and Serbia to the list. He argued that Greece's proximity makes it possible to fulfill those diplomatic functions from Pristina. He also acknowledged that China, Russia, and Serbia are unlikely to recognize Kosovo's independence and allow the opening of an embassy, but speculated that a liaison office of some sort would be needed with at least Serbia, even if done under an economic rubric. ¶8. (SBU) There is some debate on how much of a role the new embassies should play in consular affairs versus carrying out Kosovo,s international diplomatic strategy. Kosovo has a large diaspora in the U.S, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria; under the proposed Ahtisaari settlement &all persons... residing outside Kosovo who left Kosovo on or after 1 January 1998 and on the date of the entry into force of this Settlement meet the criteria for being registered as a habitual resident shall have the right to vote.8 Significant numbers may either want to return to Kosovo, or be forced to return to Kosovo by their current host nation. There is a risk that embassies would be overwhelmed with issues related to immigration, repatriation, voting, and documentation. Discussions are ongoing, but planning recognizes that the new embassies will have some consular role. PRISTINA 00000362 003 OF 004 Budget ¶9. (SBU) The total MFA budget for the first full year (mid-2007 to mid-2008) is estimated at 6.833 million euro. This amount assumes legislation establishing the ministry is passed in late summer, embassies are established in Fall-Winter 2007 in rudimentary, medium-cost hotel rooms, a rent-free ministry headquarters building is located, and there is donor-funded training. In subsequent years the budget is projected to increase as embassies transition from hotels to permanent locations and as the number of locations increase; the budget in 2010 (highly speculative) is estimated at 15 million euro. The budget has been initially reviewed by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. It will be revised again before being integrated into the Kosovo Comprehensive Budget in June. The OPM and its advisors are considering a variety of cost-saving measures, including using volunteer staff and donated space for embassies and co-locating embassies. The Looming Question: Who Will Fill the Positions? ¶10. (C) The ruling LDK party sees the MFA as their ministry, and will likely determine who becomes foreign minister. LDK names that have been floated to USOP staff include Skender Hyseni (chief political advisor to President Sejdiu),Sabri Hamiti (General Council Member and party representative to the Kosovo Assembly presidency, also the Chair of the Assembly's Committee on International Cooperation and Integration into the EU),and Lutfi Haziri (Deputy PM and Minister of Local Government). Hyseni has been cited at least once in the press as a candidate. (Comment: It is a widely known secret that Veton Surroi, chair of the small ORA party and whose father was a prominent Yugoslav diplomat, sees himself as Kosovo,s first foreign minister. This may explain ORA,s irritation at the overall non-transparency of the planning by the Prime Minister's office. End Comment.) ¶11. (SBU) Whatever the outcome, our conversations with those involved suggest ambassadorial posts will clearly be determined in the short term by political agreements in Pristina. While some parties have raised the idea of using members of the Kosovar diaspora as ambassadors, most if not all of the initial fourteen will likely be political appointees from the larger parties. However, the draft law on the establishment of the foreign ministry states that after five years, at least fifty percent of new appointments of heads of mission or ambassadors must come from serving members of the Kosovo Diplomatic Service. OPM and its advisors emphasize their commitment to professionalize this service, and have said repeatedly that one of their measures of success in the short term is the recruitment of young, energetic, professional civil servants, and in the longer term, a reduction in the number of political appointees serving as heads of mission. Austria Lead Donor Country, Other Needed Assistance ¶12. (SBU) The OPM and its advisers favor a Kosovo-based training program, assisted by one primary donor. Given its ongoing conversations with Pristina University, Austria appears to be the most likely candidate to lead. OPM advisers have raised the need for a Human Rights/International Law expert to work with the ministry, which would most appropriately be filled by a European, as well as the need for secure communications equipment. OPM,s British adviser expressed concern to us that a comprehensive training strategy is lacking, and that donors will offer one-off programs that will not be well coordinated or help train ministry staff in skills like cable writing and classification of documents. The OPM advisers' preference is for a &virtual academy8 in Kosovo, where either Pristina University or the Kosovo Institute of Public Administration would contract out courses, but retain central control of the comprehensive training program. Austria,s Diplomatic Academy of Vienna has already been in conversations with PRISTINA 00000362 004 OF 004 Pristina University on developing a joint training program to do this; DFID and other donors have begun to propose programs as well. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: The PISG, aided by some able international advisers, has made some good progress on planning to establish Kosovo's first Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but at the cost of excluding opposition parties from much of the planning, which will almost certainly cause problems down the road. The lack of transparency -- different from most other aspects of the transition planning process -- was in some measure dictated by the EU and British approach, which focused on the government and the PM's office as the locus of planning. With regard to the future development of the diplomatic service, it makes sense that one country -- in this instance, Austria -- has stepped forward to take the lead on providing diplomatic training and assistance. We may in future look for ways to add value, including possibly bringing the head of the training program to the Foreign Service Institute and/or local universities such as Georgetown, to share best practices and information on structuring diplomatic corps training programs. KAIDANOW

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