KOSOVO: SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT TO KOSOVO LEAVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000336 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED DATES THROUGHOUT) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK UNSC YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT TO KOSOVO LEAVES DELEGATION FAVORABLY IMPRESSED, BUT DOUBTS STILL LINGER FOR SOME MEMBERS PRISTINA 00000336 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Whatever Russian hopes may have been for an April 27-28 UN Security Council trip that would leave permreps more sympathetic to the plight of Kosovo Serbs and hostile to the prospect of Kosovo independence, it appears that goal was not achieved; instead, delegation members appeared pleasantly surprised by the attitude and presentation of Kosovar Albanians, who convincingly spoke to the issues of standards fulfillment, their commitment to multi-ethnicity, and the historical context of their desire for independence. In contrast, permreps heard a strident, uncompromising, and obviously pre-cooked message from Serbs in Mitrovica and from the hardline Serb Orthodox prelate Artemije, who overplayed his hand by including two of Serbian PM Kostunica's advisers in his meeting with the UNSC. Serbs consistently raised refugee and IDP return as a basic issue for them, although SC delegates were taken to see the rebuilt village of Svinjare, where Serbs have refused to return despite the availability of housing. Non-Serb minorities were abundantly clear that they support independence and believe Ahtisaari's plan can be the basis for a promising future for Kosovo. EU representatives briefed on preparations for the Interntional Civilian Office and the EU Rule of Law mission, prompting initial irritation among some delegation members that the Europeans had proceeded with planning for Ahtisaari implementation even in the absence of Security Council action, but that irritation subsided when EU reps expained the need for prudent preparation for what might well be the largest such EU mission anywhere in the world. ¶2. (C) Summary, cont. Permreps left Kosovo noticeably impressed, though several -- including the South African and Indonesian -- still appeared to feel that Ahtisaari had skewed the settlement too far in the Albanian direction and that some sort of "third way" (between the status quo and independence),in line with the "substantial autonomy" proposal Belgrade had floated with the delegation the day before, might be possible. Further work will need to be done to explain that the Ahtisaari document is the compromise option between the initial Serb position of substantial autonomy (never changed and never fully articulated) and the Albanians' desire for full independence. In one interesting aside during the trip, Russian permrep Churkin sounded out Amb. Khalilzad on how a UN resolution on Kosovo might be formulated to endorse Ahtisaari but take into account Serb concerns and call on the EU to develop a comprehensive strategy for integrating both Kosovo and Serbia. Whether that sounding represented anything more than Churkin's own personal rumination will have to be seen. End Summary. Kosovars Succeed in Impressing ¶3. (C) Kosovar authorities did a good job of presenting themselves and their aspirations to the visiting Security Council members. In a punishing schedule of meetings on April 27, the delegation met with the multi-party Kosovar Albanian "Unity Team," the Kosovo government, Assembly heads of caucus, and, later in the day, with Albanian political representatives in south Mitrovica. The next day, the delegation traveled to Krushe e Vogel, a small village where Albanian men and boys were massacred by Serb forces in March ¶1999. In the Unity Team and government sessions, Kosovar leaders made clear that the historical context of their treatment under the Milosevic regime in Serbia meant that they could never again contemplate living under Serb sovereignty, no matter what government was now in place in Belgrade. In vivid terms, they expressed their commitment to multi-ethnicity and tolerance in Kosovo, as well as refugee and IDP returns, though they acknowledged more needed to be done on all fronts. Several permreps, including the Peruvian, noted to COM at a reception that night how surprised they had been to see the maturity of the Kosovo government and its apparent readiness to take on the independence challenge. Permreps also heard a strong message PRISTINA 00000336 002.2 OF 003 of support for independence and the Ahtisaari package from non-Serb minority leaders (Bosniak, Turk and Roma) in a separate meeting; this was particularly important to counteract the accusations of Serb assembly members (note: almost all Serb parties boycott the Kosovo Assembly, but a few take part in committee deliberations),who complained that their positions were ignored and overvoted by the Albanian parties. Serbs Take an Uncompromising Hard Line, But May Have Overplayed ¶4. (C) In contrast to the Kosovars' moderate tone, Serb interlocutors were harsh and uncompromising in their condemnation of Ahtisaari, his plan, and the prospect of Kosovo independence under any circumstances. A large meeting of Serb reps in northern Mitrovica (including the three northern mayors and local CCK officials) was dominated by a loud and overbearing Marko Jaksic, together with his cohort Milan Ivanovic. Amb. Khalilzad noted that at least one comment was made during the meeting inferring that if the Albanians asserted their independence, "why shouldn't the Serbs?" implying that the declaration of a separate Serb entity in Kosovo had not been ruled out by the hardline leadership as a possible response to Kosovo's independence. The same unyielding Serb attitude was evident in the delegation's meeting in Gracanica with firebrand Serb Orthodox Bishop Artemije, who referred to the threat posed by Albanian extremists and described what he termed as the mistreatment and abuse suffered by the Serbs at the hands of Albanians under UN administration. Present at the Artemije meeting were two of Serbian PM Kostunica's key advisers, Slobodan Samardzic and Leon Kojen, the latter of whom spent the entire meeting whispering into Artemije's ear -- a fact noted with vocal annoyance by UK deputy permrep Karen Pierce. The obvious confluence of Serbian state authority and the Church's stand did not escape the attention of the UNSC delegation members (Artemije subsequently showed up uninvited at the next day's site visits to Orahovac and Brestovik in an effort to squelch any possible note of moderation from local Serb residents),nor did the stridency of the Serb tone throughout, giving SC delegates the clear sense that compromise on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan was a non-starter for the Serbs, who uniformly demanded new negotiations with a new negotiator. EU Brief Brings Burst of Irritation from Indonesian, South African ¶5. (C) Local EU planners for the International Civilian Office and the EU Rule of Law mission, both slated to be established in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan, briefed permreps on their activities. The briefing elicited a short burst of irritation from the Indonesian and South African permreps, who complained that, while EU equities in Kosovo were obvious, the planning activity preceded any decision by the Security Council. South African permrep Kumalo elaborated on this at some length, at one point exclaiming that "if this is a European issue, why don't you just say so and ask us to endorse your plans -- like we in African Union do -- rather than present us with only one option for a solution and claim it is the best way?" (Note: Kumalo took up this theme again, though in a slightly more constructive tone, with USOP DPO at the evening reception, reported septel.) ICO Planning Team head Torbjorn Sohlstrom and EUPT head Casper Klynge responded that prudent and timely planning was necessary ahead of any SC resolution if the ambitious transition timelines envisaged under the Ahtisaari plan were to succeed. The French permrep also intervened to point out that this would be by far the largest EU-led mission anywhere in the world to date, and it would be irresponsible not to plan ahead; however, he said, the content and structure of a resolution remained in Security Council hands. Kumalo and the Indonesian permrep appeared mollified by these answers. PRISTINA 00000336 003.2 OF 003 Russian Permrep Broaches Content of UNSC Resolution with Amb. Khalilzad ¶6. (C) Late on April 28 as the visit progressed, Russian permrep Churkin broached the subject of the UNSC resolution with Amb. Khalilzad. Amb. Khalilzad emphasized that the votes were now in place for endorsement of the Ahtisaari plan and that the U.S. was prepared to move quickly. Churkin noted that it would be better if the vote were unanimous, a point heartily agreed by Amb. Khalilzad. Churkin asked, however, how we could expect Moscow to support Kosovo independence in light of other challenges Moscow was facing (alluding to U.S. missile defense plans in Europe and the Russians' own domestic political calendar). He raised the possibility of a resolution on Kosovo endorsing the Ahtisaari plan, but also stating something affirmative on refugee returns, perhaps establishing a Special Envoy to deal with the issue. In addition, Churkin said, the resolution could call on the EU to develop a comprehensive strategy for integrating both Serbia and Kosovo. Amb. Khalilzad responded positively to both suggestions. Comment ¶7. (C) While the trip may not have swayed all the fence-sitters in the Security Council, it looks as though it left permreps with a more positive vision of Kosovo than either they or the Russians would have imagined at the outset. The most important lingering doubt among some permreps is whether there exists some other option besides the Ahtisaari plan; this reflects their lack of understanding of the 15-month process of negotiations and the failure of the Serbs to engage in fruitful discussions or move off their original negotiating position -- never clearly articulated -- of substantial autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. Ahtisaari himself will have a chance to brief the delegation the evening of April 28, and we have relayed to him the delegation's concerns ahead of that meeting. Most interesting was the Russian permrep's ruminations on the possible content of an affirmative UNSC resolution on Kosovo, though whether this was simply a product of Churkin's own mind or a reflection of what Moscow might contemplate we leave to Embassy Moscow's judgement. Post wishes to thank USUN for its invaluable assistance in negotiating a useful and successful schedule for the visiting delegation to Kosovo; the visit seems to have made a positive difference. End Comment. ¶8. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW