KOSOVO: A/S FRIED TELLS SERBS AND ALBANIANS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000194

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: A/S FRIED TELLS SERBS AND ALBANIANS TO
REJECT ALL EXTREMISM AS DECISION ON KOSOVO STATUS NEARS

REF: PRISTINA 169

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During his March 6-8 visit to Kosovo, EUR
Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried warned both Albanians and
Serbs to make sure that extremists from both sides do not
raise tensions in the run up to the decision on Kosovo's
final status. Serb leaders from the north were resolute in
their refusal to accept the Ahtisaari proposal; southern
Serbs were more pragmatic in wanting the best for their
communities out of any deal. Kosovo's Albanian leadership
pledged they were ready to attend the final round of
negotiations in Vienna on March 10 and promised, despite some
reservations, to accept the Ahtisaari package as "the formula
for Kosovo's independence." Fried found KFOR prepared to
handle any major threat to a safe and secure environment in
northern Kosovo, though COMKFOR (protect) cautioned that he
may need political help if some participating contingents
demur on taking immediate action while they wait for
instructions from their capitals. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) A/S Fried held extensive discussions with Kosovo
government officials, KFOR, and representatives from Kosovo's
Serb community both north and south of the Ibar River during
his March 6-8 visit to Kosovo. He also visited Decani
Monastery in western Kosovo and met with Bishop Teodosije and
Father Sava. The visit received wide coverage in both the
local Albanian and Serbian language media, including a
30-minute interview on RTK with A/S Fried, broadcast in
prime-time.

Kosovars ready to accept Ahtisaari proposal


3. (C) A/S Fried assured members of Kosovo's Unity Team (as
well as President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim Ceku
individually) that resolution of Kosovo's status is at its
final stage and that the USG will see it to the end. He
warned that tensions at this final stage will escalate on
both sides, noting that as the process concludes Serbs will
be increasingly desperate, some EU countries will be nervous,
and Russia will be waiting for Kosovo's leadership to falter
so that it can call for further delay. Fried underscored
that the U.S. would wait for Ahtisaari's status
recommendation and then at the right time express its support
for that recommendation clearly and publicly. Fried also
asked that Kosovo government leaders consider the reactions
of audiences both at home and abroad in crafting their
response once Ahtisaari's recommendations are made public,
advising them to be conscious of their obligations to their
minority communities and not triumphalist. Fried noted that
Kosovo's initial reactions will make instant headlines in
Europe and elsewhere, and asked that the Unity Team not let
extremists like Albin Kurti and his Self-Determination
Movement define Kosovo to the rest of the world.


4. (C) Sejdiu told A/S Fried that members of the Unity Team
were ready for the final meeting with Ahtisaari and the
Belgrade delegation on March 10 and would be willing to
accept additional changes, within reason, if Belgrade
presented specific ideas. He maintained that the Kosovo
government would have an inclusive approach to all the
communities here, not only with Serb community
representatives like Bishop Teodosije, but also with ordinary
people. He also noted that Kosovo will build strong
relations with its neighbors, but believed that the U.S.
could help them implement the 2001 border agreement between
the then-FRY and Macedonia. Similarly, in their private
meeting, PM Ceku expressed reservations to Fried over those
portions of the Ahtisaari proposal dealing with the
dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps, acceptance of the
2001 border agreement, and the size of the special protection
zones around Serbian Orthodox religious and patrimonial
sites, though he agreed that in the end, these were a cost
worth paying for status.


5. (C) A/S Fried told the entire Unity Team that it should

PRISTINA 00000194 002 OF 004


continue to reach out to moderate Serbs, like Serbian List
for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) party leader Oliver Ivanovic.
He also applauded opposition leader and Unity Team member
Veton Surroi's proposed efforts to discuss Kosovo's final
status with PermReps of UN Security Council members the week
of March 12. Main opposition leader Hashim Thaci intimated
privately, however, that the price of his continued
participation in the Unity Team after Ahtisaari submits his
package would be the formation of a government of unity with
senior coalition party the Democratic League of Kosovo.
(Note: At a March 8 follow-up meeting, COM told Thaci in very
clear terms that the USG opposed formation of a unity
government at this time, given the impact on stability and
the need to project an image of Kosovo's maturity during a
very sensitive time. End Note.)

A/S Fried assures Serbs that the international community will
stay


6. (SBU) A/S Fried assured Kosovo Serb leaders in northern
and southern Kosovo that the USG believes the Ahtisaari
proposal is the best way to ensure the long-term preservation
of everything that is Serb in Kosovo: the Serb people, their
communities, schools, cities, language and cultural heritage.
He told them that the international community and KFOR will
stay as long as is necessary to implement the proposal and
make this a reality, adding that Kosovo,s status was not the
end, but rather the beginning of its path towards the EU. In
response to specific concerns expressed by the Serbs, A/S
Fried assured them that the package will not cut their ties
to Belgrade, and said that the international community will
be here to assist Kosovo Albanian leaders with its
implementation. He urged Serb leaders to engage and
participate in this process, noting to the northern mayors
specifically that they should think twice about their actions
in the coming weeks since it is "easy for any fool to start a
war."


7. (SBU) Responses from Serb leaders varied. All were
adamant that they oppose independence, but most added that
they were encouraged by his words about USG support for their
long-term presence in Kosovo. Some, like Bishop Teodosije
and Father Sava, along with SLKM leader Oliver Ivanovic and
moderate southern Serb Vesna Jovanovic, were willing to
engage in constructive discussions about concrete proposals
to improve the lives of Serbs here. Jovanovic raised the
issue of financial assistance to new Serb majority
municipalities, noting that a sewage system was a critical
priority for the citizens of Partesh. She also put in a
pitch for the Gjilan/Gnjilane villages of Silovo and Pones to
join Ahtisaari,s proposed Novo Brdo municipality. However,
others -- including the three northern mayors Dragisa Milovic
(Zvecan),Slavisa Ristic (Zubin Potok) and Velimir Bojovic
(Leposavic) -- hewed closely to the official Belgrade
position, insisting that the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan
are &unacceptable8 to Serbs in toto because they will lead
to independence for Kosovo. The mayors claimed that Serbs
would use only non-violent, democratic means to further their
objectives, though Ristic and Bojovic were careful to add
that they would use force to protect themselves if Albanians
try to &take control of what they have.8


8. (SBU) Bishop Teodosije, Father Sava and Ivanovic asked A/S
Fried for USG support for the nascent Serbian National
Assembly (SNA),the inaugural session of which Ivanovic was
forced to postpone after hard-liners pushed their way into
the hall and verbally assaulted organizers and participants
on March 4 (reftel). A/S Fried told all of his Serb
interlocutors that the USG supports the democratic right of
all people to organize, assemble freely and engage in
discussions about their future. He made it clear that
extremism on either side will not be tolerated, and
specifically expressed his condemnation of the SNA disruption
to the northern mayors, who looked uneasy at the reference.

KFOR in a better place than a year ago


PRISTINA 00000194 003 OF 004



9. (C) A/S Fried visited Camp Nothing Hill (CNH) in
Leposavic, KFOR's only permanent base north of the Ibar
River. In addition to the half-battalion sized force located
at CNH, there are four other battalions (German, French,
Greek and a combination of Norwegian and Danish troops)
stationed at bases south of the Ibar who patrol north of the
river and could be deployed to reinforce CNH within three
hours. Nothing Hill's Forward Operating Base commander
(German) and the commander of the (rotating) U.S. contingent
there briefed A/S Fried on KFOR's operations north of the
Ibar. Currently, there are four full platoons at CNH
conducting patrols: two U.S. platoons with 45 soldiers; one
German platoon with 22 soldiers; and one Austrian platoon
with 31 soldiers. The U.S. contingent has 20 Humvees, the
German contingent has seven wheeled 4x4 vehicles and the
Austrians have four armored personnel carriers and 2 tactical
wheeled vehicles.


10. (C) Troops from CNH perform 15-20 patrols per day,
including three one-hour visits daily to Gate One, the
primary entry point from Serbia to the northern
municipalities. (NOTE: Until the end of February, CNH had
provided a permanent presence at Gate One. The U.S. company
commander said that his troops could return to Gate One, but
it would reduce their ability to conduct patrols. END NOTE).
The CNH commander said that the current UNCivPol formed
police unit (riot-trained police) currently at Gate One is
composed of Pakistani and Bangladeshi police. The base
commander described for Fried the contingency plan to perform
a blocking mission at Gate One (or further south along that
main road, depending on the circumstances) in case
belligerents attempt to cross into Kosovo through the gate;
he was confident that CNH troops could hold this position for
three days, and longer with reinforcements.


11. (C) Interlocutors also discussed the expiration in May
2007 of Germany's permanent presence at CNH. An Italian
Operational Reserve Force battalion will arrive the end of
May and stay for 30 days, resulting in a three week gap. A/S
Fried expressed concern about the timing for transitioning
responsibility for CNH to another nation and introducing new
troops unfamiliar with the area at this particularly
vulnerable time. COMKFOR LTG Roland Kather (protect) and
KFOR COS BG Albert Bryant separately told Fried that NATO is
currently looking for a member nation to agree to provide a
permanent headquarters element for CNH after the Germans
depart.


12. (C) A/S Fried and COMKFOR also agreed that there are
concerns over potential KFOR passivity and reluctance to
demonstrate strength and resolve in northern Kosovo against
Serb checkpoints and restrictions on movement due to national
caveats, whether spoken or unspoken. COMKFOR reassured A/S
Fried that KFOR would not hesitate to act, but added that he
would need strong political support to pressure some of the
contingent commanders to act aggressively and not drag their
feet while they conferred with their capitals. COMKFOR said
that he would use non-caveated national contingents to ensure
freedom of movement in the north, and A/S Fried promised the
USG would engage politically with its allies, if necessary.


13. (C) At a dinner with international represenatives
including SRSG Ruecker and PDSRSG Schook, as well as at a
subsequent meeting with local Contact Group liaison office
heads, there was general agreement that KFOR's posture was
robust and that KFOR could handle most military eventualities
dealing with freedom of movement, absent a broad breakdown of
law and order in Kosovo. There was greater concern, however,
with the range of possible political provocations that might
be staged by Serb hardliners in the north; all noted that the
U.S. and EU countries would need to react strongly to such
provocations or risk a correspondingly bad response from
Albanian extremists poised to assert their presence in the
north. In this, Belgrade's actions -- to either encourage or
dissuade Serb hardliners from pursuing a violent course --
would be critical, making it important to express these
redlines to Belgrade repeatedly and forcefully.

PRISTINA 00000194 004 OF 004




14. (SBU) This cable has been cleared by A/S Fried.


15. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable
for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW