KOSOVO: SDM MARCH 3 PROTEST PEACEFUL, RESULT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000168 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SDM MARCH 3 PROTEST PEACEFUL, RESULT OF INTENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE BY KOSOVO'S LEADERSHIP REF: A. PRISTINA 142 ¶B. PRISTINA 164 Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Self-Determination Movement (SDM), virulently opposed to President Ahtisaari's final status package for Kosovo and continued UNMIK presence, held a peaceful protest March 3 in the center of Pristina that attracted fewer than 3000 participants. No serious incidents, injuries or arrests were reported. In contrast to the violent SDM protest on February 10 -- at which two demonstrators were killed and dozens injured -- the peaceful outcome on March 3 was due to better communication between the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and SDM; the fact that Albin Kurti, SDM leader and firebrand, remains in jail; and -- most important -- strong pressure on the SDM by the Kosovar political leadership, USOP and other key internationals condemning violence and equating support for SDM with being opposed to the future of Kosovo. Despite the positive outcome to this demonstration, we can expect stepped-up SDM activity in the months leading up to final status resolution, since resolution will render irrelevant SDM's raison d'etre. END SUMMARY. March 3 protest: Without incident, this time ¶2. (SBU) The Self-Determination Movement (SDM) held a March 3 demonstration in the center of Pristina in opposition to the Ahtisaari final status package, the Unity Team, and the continued presence of UNMIK. About 2000-3000 protestors gathered at the SDM offices around 2:30 p.m. and then, holding placards saying "Down with UNMIK!" and chanting anti-package slogans and demanding the release of jailed SDM leader Albin Kurti, marched past the National Theater, the Assembly building, OSCE HQ, police HQ and, finally, UNMIK HQ. In contrast to previous demonstrations, SDM "marshalls" in their signature white t-shirts controlled the crowd by forming a human cordon around the group. UNMIK and KPS officers allowed protestors to pass but ringed them on either side and did not allow them to enter buildings. At the Assembly building, protestors stopped to listen to SDM leader Glauk Konjufca rant about the Ahtisaari package and then broke a glass and plywood box symbolizing the package. ¶3. (SBU) A possible confrontation at UNMIK HQ was averted when police, after a few tense minutes had gone by, removed barricades at the order of PDSRSG Schook and allowed protestors to pass. They did so without incident, and then dispersed on the way back to the SDM offices, where the leaders called a press conference at 4:30 p.m. DOJ/ICITAP rep, who was with the KPS leadership throughout, reported that the SDM marshalls did a good job of contolling the crowd; they were between protestors and police at all times. There were no reports of violence or property damage. Qualitatively different demonstration ¶4. (C) The peaceful outcome of this latest SDM protest -- as opposed to the violent demonstrations of November 28 and February 10 -- was the result of a number of factors, including better communication between the KPS leadership and SDM. The two held a number of meetings in the week before the protest; though SDM refused to renounce violence categorically, movement leaders apparently calculated that it was wise to avoid confrontation. To this end, KPS skillfully used the media to pressure SDM and appeal to public opinion by portraying the KPS as the good guys: police made it clear they would accommodate SDM's legitimate requests, but asserted resolutely that they would not tolerate damage to property or people. Both KPS and UNMIK police were also visibly better prepared; if violence had occurred (and it was clear that demonstrators did come armed with paint bottles ready to lob at official government and UNMIK vehicles, but all such vehicles had been pulled back behind the barricades),UNMIK police had both tightened PRISTINA 00000168 002 OF 002 command-and-control and employed improved tactics to confront demonstrators (ref a). ¶5. (C) The continued incarceration of SDM leader and firebrand Albin Kurti also had a beneficial effect (ref b). Kurti has made confrontation with police the hallmark of his leadership of the SDM movement and a means to augment his own influence, small as that may be, over the Kosovo political scene. He has also steadfastly refused to meet with the KPS, regarding it as an institution of "traitors." With Kurti held incommunicado in prison, the SDM was left without its organizational genius and its most insidious influence. ¶6. (C) But key to the SDM's markedly different approach to this demonstration was the clear condemnation of violence by the Kosovar political leadeship. President Sejdiu, PM Ceku and main opposition leader Thaci all strongly condemned the February 10 violence and urged demonstrators on March 3 to be peaceful. Sejdiu was even more bold, urging citizens not to demonstrate at all, equating the demonstration with being against the independence of Kosovo. Key internationals also helped to underscore this message. COM gave a sharply-worded televized interview on March 2, reprinted in full by the widely-distributed daily newspaper Koha Ditore the morning of the demonstration, describing the SDM organization as being the enemy of the future of Kosovo. Comment: What next? ¶7. (C) We can breathe a sigh of relief that the March 3 protest came off peacefully. But we can also expect stepped-up SDM activity in the months leading up to final status resolution, since resolution means that SDM's raison d'etre -- opposing the status package -- will no longer be relevant. We will keep the pressure on Kosovo's leadership to renounce violence at every opportunity, work with them to keep Albin Kurti in jail, and encourage them to pursue the Ahtisaari process productively as the most effective counterpoint to SDM's negative message. End Comment. ¶8. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW