KOSOVO: AMB. WISNER DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR
ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: AMB. WISNER DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE OF
SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI PACKAGE

PRISTINA 00000104 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: USG Special Envoy for Kosovo Status Amb.
Frank Wisner, in Pristina February 4-5, told the Kosovo
Albanian leadership, Kosovo Serb leaders, Assembly MPs, and
the media that the Ahtisaari final status package is good for
Kosovo and should be strongly supported. He received a
positive reaction from President Sejdiu, PM Ceku and the
other political leaders of Kosovo's Unity Team. PM Ceku,
however, complained about the treatment of the Kosovo
Protection Corps (KPC) in the document and asserted that
specific reference to the 2001 border agreement between the
then-FRY and Macedonia that affected Kosovo would be
difficult to accept. Wisner also heard general support for
the package from a group of MPs, coupled with criticism that
"ethnically based" decentralization would fail to integrate
Kosovo Serbs and (incorrect) claims this would maintain
Belgrade's sovereignty in Serb-majority areas. Wisner
answered these criticisms by noting that Ahtisaari had
presented a balanced package designed to create a functional,
viable Kosovo while providing security and other guarantees
to the Kosovo Serb community. He noted that Ahtisaari was
open to suggestions, but cautioned all not to re-visit
sensitive aspects that dealt with security, or reject key
principles, such as decentralization. Wisner also made clear
to PM Ceku the border issue was not negotiable.


2. (C) Wisner found palpable tension between Oliver Ivanovic
and Randjel Nojkic, two moderate Kosovo Serb political
leaders. Nojkic, who represents enclave Serbs south of the
Ibar river, accused Ivanovic of failing to combat suggestions
from the northern Serb leadership that a potential partition
of Kosovo might serve Serb interests, while Ivanovic claimed
that it would be "physical and political suicide" for him to
openly oppose such an idea. Moderate Kosovo Serb religious
leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava were critical of
Belgrade for reacting emotionally and irresponsibly, but very
much doubted Kosovar authorities would implement provisions
for Serbs. At a dinner with key internationals, including
SRSG Ruecker and COMKFOR Kather, Wisner heard the expectation
that the Serb-majority north would react primarily
rhetorically to any independence declaration; KFOR, however,
was prepared to deal with contingencies above and beyond
this. Wisner reiterated USG support for Ahtisaari at a press
conference and answered the inevitable 'does this mean
independence?' question by exhorting all to let President
Ahtisaari finish his work. END SUMMARY.

President Sejdiu, Unity Team Positive About Ahtisaari Package


3. (C) In Pristina February 4-5, USG Special Envoy for
Kosovo Status Amb. Frank Wisner delivered a message of strong
support for President Ahtisaari's final status package and
found broad acceptance among President Sejdiu and the other
members of the Unity Team. Speaking on behalf of the Team,
Sejdiu said that while they still needed to analyze it
further, the package was "acceptable to us." He promised
continued cooperation with Ahtisaari and welcomed UNOSEK's
offer to explain in more detail key provisions of the
package. Main opposition leader Hashim Thaci reiterated this
support, thanked Wisner for the U.S. contribution to the
process, and said any suggestions would be made with
goodwill. Thaci did specifically raise the package's
treatment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),asking that
the KPC not be "disbanded," but "transformed" into the new
security force. Wisner recognized Kosovar sensitivity to the
dignity and honor of the KPC and recommended the Unity Team
work with Ahtisaari to find the appropriate wording. The
important point is Kosovo will have a security force
developed under the guidance of NATO and that the KPC would
end its mandate. (Note: In an aside with Hashim Thaci and
later with the entire Unity Team, Wisner also stressed the
importance of stability within the government and a focus on
the transition effort. Thaci repeated his pledge to maintain
the Unity Team. He agreed to hold off on an open attack on
the government "for a while," though he would not be held to

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anything more. Wisner reminded Thaci that the U.S. is
determined to see the government do its work since there is
everything at stake for all of us in ensuring Kosovo reach
and go beyond final status to a new constitution and
elections. We appreciate the role Thaci has played to date,
Wisner said, but expect him to be equally constructive in the
months ahead.)

PM Ceku Raises Some Concerns


4. (C) In a separate meeting, PM Ceku raised two concerns
he had with the package: the treatment of the KPC, and
reference to the 2001 border agreement between the former FRY
and Macedonia that he claimed would create difficulties in
the border areas affected, especially since the same
municipality (Vitina) would lose territory to the newly
created Serb-majority municipality of Kllokot. Ceku argued
the KPC should be given more recognition than just simply
disbanding it in favor a new force, and that specific
reference to the 2001 border agreement should not be included
in the document. Wisner responded that nothing in the
document denigrated the KPC, but that it needed to be
articulated in the document that the KPC would be phased out
as a new security force, under NATO's tutelage, was stood up.
Wisner also made it crystal clear that the 2001 border
agreement is a closed issue: the border between Kosovo and
Macedonia would be demarcated based on this agreement,
period. He stated firmly to Ceku that should the Kosovar
government choose to consider this an open issue, it would
find itself on the opposite side of the U.S. and
international community. (Wisner and Ceku spoke on the
subject by telephone February 7. Ceku agreed there would be
no further public statements about the border and that the
issue would only be discussed with Ahtisaari. Sejdiu made
the same pledge in a later call. Wisner told both that the
issue is "closed" and no change can be expected.) In an
aside, Wisner reminded Ceku that Ceku had asked Wisner in New
York City if he enjoyed our support. Wisner told Ceku he had
our support, but that we expect him to do his job vigorously
and effectively.

MPs Generally On Board, Question "Ethnic Based"
Decentralization


5. (C) At a meeting with a dozen Assembly MPs of all
political stripes, Wisner heard words of gratitude for the
U.S. and general support for the package, but also concerns
about "ethnic based" decentralization, fears that Kosovo
would be asked to make further compromises, and a lack of
information from the Unity Team. One MP claimed
Serb-majority municipalities would create the "Bosniazation"
of Kosovo and would maintain Belgrade's sovereignty in these
areas. Another asked what else Kosovo would be asked to give
up in the future and that "super rights" for Serbs would
create problems for Albanians. Wisner noted that
decentralization based on ethnicity was necessary at the
present time to build confidence and trust in the Serb
community. Decentralization along these lines, Wisner
argued, would not diminish the Albanian or any other
community; Kosovo would in this way demonstrate its readiness
to accept the highest standards of minority protection.
Wisner assured the MPs that the outcome would not be
analogous to Dayton, nor was the agreement a set of
"concessions" to Belgrade; rather, it was a carefully
conceived compromise reflecting Ahtisaari's best judgment on
how to reconcile competing interests.

Kosovo Serb Leaders Jittery, North-South Divide,
Implementation Worries


6. (C) Moderate Kosovo Serb political leaders Oliver
Ivanovic and Randjel Nojkic expressed differing worries to
Amb. Wisner. Ivanovic complained that the package did not
expressly give Kosovo Serbs the legal status of a
"constituent nation," which he claimed was necessary to
ensure their rights were not slowly eroded by successive

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Kosovo Albanian governments. Nojkic was clearly worried
about the possible partition of Kosovo, insisting that this
would be "catastrophic" for Serbs who, like him, lived in
enclaves south of the Ibar river. The tension between Nojkic
and Ivanovic, who lives in the Serb-majority area north of
the Ibar, was palpable: prior to the meeting, in response to
an open accusation from Nojkic that he was fanning the flames
of partition by not actively opposing such an idea, Ivanovic
asserted that it would be "physical and political suicide"
for him to publicly oppose partition, despite his own view
that it is dangerous. (Note: In an aside to COM, Nojkic
also asserted that Ivanovic had put pressure on him not to
attend the Feb. 2 meeting between Serb representatives and
Ahtisaari, again engendering some resentment between the
two.)


7. (C) Moderate Serb Orthodox Church leaders Bishop
Teodosije and Father Sava were happy to see that the English
version of the package contained suggestions they had made
during the negotiating process. Teodosije (protect)
criticized Belgrade officials for reacting emotionally and
irresponsibly by discarding the package without even reading
it, and -- despite what he termed "pressures" from his own
church hierarchy to stop engaging with the international
community -- said that he and Sava would offer UNOSEK
comments on the cultural heritage portion of the package
(provided to EUR/SCE and UNOSEK). Nevertheless, the two men
were preoccupied with mechanisms for ensuring implementation.
Teodosije, who said he had not slept for a few nights out of
worry, admitted that he had no confidence that Kosovar
authorities would carry out their obligations and expressed
deep concern about the fate of Serbs once Ahtisaari made a
recommendation for independence. He cited the recent
incident in the Decani Monastery Special Zoning Area (SZA)
where Kosovo authorities removed illegal construction only
after numerous interventions by USOP. Amb. Wisner reassured
the two religious leaders that the U.S. and others would be
there to ensure correct implementation and, responding to
Father Sava's fear that partition would be terrible for Serbs
and the Serb Orthodox Church south of the Ibar, said again
there would be no division of Kosovo.

Internationals Focused on North, Security


8. (C) At a dinner hosted by COM, key internationals,
including SRSG Ruecker, D/SRSG Schook, COMKFOR LTG Kather,
OSCE Amb. Wnendt, and ICO preparation team head Sohlstrom,
told Wisner they expected reaction to independence in the
Serb-majority north to be primarily rhetorical, though
provocations against Albanians in the north or against the
international community could not be discounted, raising the
specter of possible Albanian retaliation. COMKFOR asserted
KFOR's readiness to deal with these eventualities.
International representatives discussed the importance of a
well-orchestrated handover of responsibility for
international policing in Kosovo from UNMIK to the ESDP
mission, and debated the merits of a more robust executive
police presence within the ESDP framework, noting that
capacity building of the Kosovo Police Service was important
over the long term to combat crime and corruption in Kosovo.
UNMIK Mitrovica Regional Representative Gerry Gallucci
described for Wisner efforts to engage the hardline Serb
leadership in the north and make them understand the costs of
directly confronting the international community through
violent means.

Press Conference, Public Service Announcement


9. (SBU) Speaking to the press with President Sejdiu, Amb.
Wisner said the Ahtisaari package represents a new beginning
for Kosovo. He called on the Unity Team and Kosovar
government to explain the proposal to the people of Kosovo,
and promised the continued support and cooperation of the
U.S. in the coming weeks and months. Answering the
inevitable question on whether the proposal meant
independence for Kosovo, Wisner asked all to let Mr.

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Ahtisaari finish his work and that, in due time, Ahtisaari
would address that issue. Amb. Wisner also taped a public
service announcement that aired on local TV21, which states
clearly that the USG fully supports the Ahtisaari package and
encourages all to work toward a Kosovo that is inclusive of
everyone; the PSA is scheduled to run on other stations
repeatedly over the next few weeks.


10. (U) Amb. Wisner has cleared this message.


11. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its
entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW