KOSOVO: AMB. WISNER DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000104 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR ACKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO: AMB. WISNER DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI PACKAGE PRISTINA 00000104 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: USG Special Envoy for Kosovo Status Amb. Frank Wisner, in Pristina February 4-5, told the Kosovo Albanian leadership, Kosovo Serb leaders, Assembly MPs, and the media that the Ahtisaari final status package is good for Kosovo and should be strongly supported. He received a positive reaction from President Sejdiu, PM Ceku and the other political leaders of Kosovo's Unity Team. PM Ceku, however, complained about the treatment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in the document and asserted that specific reference to the 2001 border agreement between the then-FRY and Macedonia that affected Kosovo would be difficult to accept. Wisner also heard general support for the package from a group of MPs, coupled with criticism that "ethnically based" decentralization would fail to integrate Kosovo Serbs and (incorrect) claims this would maintain Belgrade's sovereignty in Serb-majority areas. Wisner answered these criticisms by noting that Ahtisaari had presented a balanced package designed to create a functional, viable Kosovo while providing security and other guarantees to the Kosovo Serb community. He noted that Ahtisaari was open to suggestions, but cautioned all not to re-visit sensitive aspects that dealt with security, or reject key principles, such as decentralization. Wisner also made clear to PM Ceku the border issue was not negotiable. ¶2. (C) Wisner found palpable tension between Oliver Ivanovic and Randjel Nojkic, two moderate Kosovo Serb political leaders. Nojkic, who represents enclave Serbs south of the Ibar river, accused Ivanovic of failing to combat suggestions from the northern Serb leadership that a potential partition of Kosovo might serve Serb interests, while Ivanovic claimed that it would be "physical and political suicide" for him to openly oppose such an idea. Moderate Kosovo Serb religious leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava were critical of Belgrade for reacting emotionally and irresponsibly, but very much doubted Kosovar authorities would implement provisions for Serbs. At a dinner with key internationals, including SRSG Ruecker and COMKFOR Kather, Wisner heard the expectation that the Serb-majority north would react primarily rhetorically to any independence declaration; KFOR, however, was prepared to deal with contingencies above and beyond this. Wisner reiterated USG support for Ahtisaari at a press conference and answered the inevitable 'does this mean independence?' question by exhorting all to let President Ahtisaari finish his work. END SUMMARY. President Sejdiu, Unity Team Positive About Ahtisaari Package ¶3. (C) In Pristina February 4-5, USG Special Envoy for Kosovo Status Amb. Frank Wisner delivered a message of strong support for President Ahtisaari's final status package and found broad acceptance among President Sejdiu and the other members of the Unity Team. Speaking on behalf of the Team, Sejdiu said that while they still needed to analyze it further, the package was "acceptable to us." He promised continued cooperation with Ahtisaari and welcomed UNOSEK's offer to explain in more detail key provisions of the package. Main opposition leader Hashim Thaci reiterated this support, thanked Wisner for the U.S. contribution to the process, and said any suggestions would be made with goodwill. Thaci did specifically raise the package's treatment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),asking that the KPC not be "disbanded," but "transformed" into the new security force. Wisner recognized Kosovar sensitivity to the dignity and honor of the KPC and recommended the Unity Team work with Ahtisaari to find the appropriate wording. The important point is Kosovo will have a security force developed under the guidance of NATO and that the KPC would end its mandate. (Note: In an aside with Hashim Thaci and later with the entire Unity Team, Wisner also stressed the importance of stability within the government and a focus on the transition effort. Thaci repeated his pledge to maintain the Unity Team. He agreed to hold off on an open attack on the government "for a while," though he would not be held to PRISTINA 00000104 002.2 OF 004 anything more. Wisner reminded Thaci that the U.S. is determined to see the government do its work since there is everything at stake for all of us in ensuring Kosovo reach and go beyond final status to a new constitution and elections. We appreciate the role Thaci has played to date, Wisner said, but expect him to be equally constructive in the months ahead.) PM Ceku Raises Some Concerns ¶4. (C) In a separate meeting, PM Ceku raised two concerns he had with the package: the treatment of the KPC, and reference to the 2001 border agreement between the former FRY and Macedonia that he claimed would create difficulties in the border areas affected, especially since the same municipality (Vitina) would lose territory to the newly created Serb-majority municipality of Kllokot. Ceku argued the KPC should be given more recognition than just simply disbanding it in favor a new force, and that specific reference to the 2001 border agreement should not be included in the document. Wisner responded that nothing in the document denigrated the KPC, but that it needed to be articulated in the document that the KPC would be phased out as a new security force, under NATO's tutelage, was stood up. Wisner also made it crystal clear that the 2001 border agreement is a closed issue: the border between Kosovo and Macedonia would be demarcated based on this agreement, period. He stated firmly to Ceku that should the Kosovar government choose to consider this an open issue, it would find itself on the opposite side of the U.S. and international community. (Wisner and Ceku spoke on the subject by telephone February 7. Ceku agreed there would be no further public statements about the border and that the issue would only be discussed with Ahtisaari. Sejdiu made the same pledge in a later call. Wisner told both that the issue is "closed" and no change can be expected.) In an aside, Wisner reminded Ceku that Ceku had asked Wisner in New York City if he enjoyed our support. Wisner told Ceku he had our support, but that we expect him to do his job vigorously and effectively. MPs Generally On Board, Question "Ethnic Based" Decentralization ¶5. (C) At a meeting with a dozen Assembly MPs of all political stripes, Wisner heard words of gratitude for the U.S. and general support for the package, but also concerns about "ethnic based" decentralization, fears that Kosovo would be asked to make further compromises, and a lack of information from the Unity Team. One MP claimed Serb-majority municipalities would create the "Bosniazation" of Kosovo and would maintain Belgrade's sovereignty in these areas. Another asked what else Kosovo would be asked to give up in the future and that "super rights" for Serbs would create problems for Albanians. Wisner noted that decentralization based on ethnicity was necessary at the present time to build confidence and trust in the Serb community. Decentralization along these lines, Wisner argued, would not diminish the Albanian or any other community; Kosovo would in this way demonstrate its readiness to accept the highest standards of minority protection. Wisner assured the MPs that the outcome would not be analogous to Dayton, nor was the agreement a set of "concessions" to Belgrade; rather, it was a carefully conceived compromise reflecting Ahtisaari's best judgment on how to reconcile competing interests. Kosovo Serb Leaders Jittery, North-South Divide, Implementation Worries ¶6. (C) Moderate Kosovo Serb political leaders Oliver Ivanovic and Randjel Nojkic expressed differing worries to Amb. Wisner. Ivanovic complained that the package did not expressly give Kosovo Serbs the legal status of a "constituent nation," which he claimed was necessary to ensure their rights were not slowly eroded by successive PRISTINA 00000104 003.2 OF 004 Kosovo Albanian governments. Nojkic was clearly worried about the possible partition of Kosovo, insisting that this would be "catastrophic" for Serbs who, like him, lived in enclaves south of the Ibar river. The tension between Nojkic and Ivanovic, who lives in the Serb-majority area north of the Ibar, was palpable: prior to the meeting, in response to an open accusation from Nojkic that he was fanning the flames of partition by not actively opposing such an idea, Ivanovic asserted that it would be "physical and political suicide" for him to publicly oppose partition, despite his own view that it is dangerous. (Note: In an aside to COM, Nojkic also asserted that Ivanovic had put pressure on him not to attend the Feb. 2 meeting between Serb representatives and Ahtisaari, again engendering some resentment between the two.) ¶7. (C) Moderate Serb Orthodox Church leaders Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava were happy to see that the English version of the package contained suggestions they had made during the negotiating process. Teodosije (protect) criticized Belgrade officials for reacting emotionally and irresponsibly by discarding the package without even reading it, and -- despite what he termed "pressures" from his own church hierarchy to stop engaging with the international community -- said that he and Sava would offer UNOSEK comments on the cultural heritage portion of the package (provided to EUR/SCE and UNOSEK). Nevertheless, the two men were preoccupied with mechanisms for ensuring implementation. Teodosije, who said he had not slept for a few nights out of worry, admitted that he had no confidence that Kosovar authorities would carry out their obligations and expressed deep concern about the fate of Serbs once Ahtisaari made a recommendation for independence. He cited the recent incident in the Decani Monastery Special Zoning Area (SZA) where Kosovo authorities removed illegal construction only after numerous interventions by USOP. Amb. Wisner reassured the two religious leaders that the U.S. and others would be there to ensure correct implementation and, responding to Father Sava's fear that partition would be terrible for Serbs and the Serb Orthodox Church south of the Ibar, said again there would be no division of Kosovo. Internationals Focused on North, Security ¶8. (C) At a dinner hosted by COM, key internationals, including SRSG Ruecker, D/SRSG Schook, COMKFOR LTG Kather, OSCE Amb. Wnendt, and ICO preparation team head Sohlstrom, told Wisner they expected reaction to independence in the Serb-majority north to be primarily rhetorical, though provocations against Albanians in the north or against the international community could not be discounted, raising the specter of possible Albanian retaliation. COMKFOR asserted KFOR's readiness to deal with these eventualities. International representatives discussed the importance of a well-orchestrated handover of responsibility for international policing in Kosovo from UNMIK to the ESDP mission, and debated the merits of a more robust executive police presence within the ESDP framework, noting that capacity building of the Kosovo Police Service was important over the long term to combat crime and corruption in Kosovo. UNMIK Mitrovica Regional Representative Gerry Gallucci described for Wisner efforts to engage the hardline Serb leadership in the north and make them understand the costs of directly confronting the international community through violent means. Press Conference, Public Service Announcement ¶9. (SBU) Speaking to the press with President Sejdiu, Amb. Wisner said the Ahtisaari package represents a new beginning for Kosovo. He called on the Unity Team and Kosovar government to explain the proposal to the people of Kosovo, and promised the continued support and cooperation of the U.S. in the coming weeks and months. Answering the inevitable question on whether the proposal meant independence for Kosovo, Wisner asked all to let Mr. PRISTINA 00000104 004.2 OF 004 Ahtisaari finish his work and that, in due time, Ahtisaari would address that issue. Amb. Wisner also taped a public service announcement that aired on local TV21, which states clearly that the USG fully supports the Ahtisaari package and encourages all to work toward a Kosovo that is inclusive of everyone; the PSA is scheduled to run on other stations repeatedly over the next few weeks. ¶10. (U) Amb. Wisner has cleared this message. ¶11. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. KAIDANOW