DFA OFFICIAL CALLS FOR DIALOGUE IN COMOROS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 004227 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/S ANTANANARIVO FOR G. SIBLEY, S. RODRIQUEZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS SF SO CN AU SUBJECT: DFA OFFICIAL CALLS FOR DIALOGUE IN COMOROS, ETHIOPIAN TROOPS OUT OF SOMALIA REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 1227 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. PRETORIA 0103 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Catherine Kay. Reasons 1.4(b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The AU sanctions against the Comoran island of Anjouan are beginning to create a "certain amount of nervousness" on Anjouan and thus some momentum for negotiations, according to DFA Director Maitland. The AU Commission is planning a roundtable discussion on Comoros o/a January 21 in Addis Ababa on the margins of the Council of Ministers meeting, which the SAG hopes will "reenergize" the diplomatic track. The SAG strongly opposes military action against Anjouan. On Somalia, Maitland believes that Ethiopia should withdraw immediately, that other regional powers should stop interfering, and that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) should be expanded to include the broad range of political actors, including the "Asmara group." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) PolOff met December 19 with Graham Maitland, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Director for the Horn of Africa and Indian Island Nations; Phindile Xaba, Deputy Director responsible for the Horn; and Wolf Rothkegel, Deputy Director responsible for Comoros. -------------- Comoros -- Need Dialogue -------------- ¶3. (C) According to DFA Director Maitland, the AU sanctions against the Comoran island of Anjouan are beginning to have some impact, creating a "certain amount of nervousness in Anjouan." He attributes recent moves toward talks -- including the Grand Comoran President's peace initiative and private signals from Colonel Bacar's camp that he is ready to negotiate (NFI) -- to the new dynamic created by the AU sanctions. Rothkegel added that the central government in Moroni also is becoming aware (1) that sanctions will not, by themselves, lead to Bacar's departure, and (2) that outside military action is unlikely, both of which may lead them back to the negotiating table. ¶4. (C) The AU Commission plans to host a roundtable discussion on Comoros on the margins of the next AU Council of Ministers meeting, currently scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa o/a January 21. Maitland and Rothkegel view the AU event as an opportunity to "reenergize the diplomatic channel." They hope Colonel Bacar and President Sambi will attend, but noted that the AU, not South Africa, will issue invitations. Speaking frankly, Maitland said that the central government is too "obsessed" with holding a new election in Anjouan, which will not solve the political problems in the Comoros. The fundamental problems relate to a clash of visions about the future of the country, the degree of centralization, and the future of the union institutions -- and neither Bacar, Sambi, nor any other Comoran leader is demonstrating leadership to deal with those complex issues. ¶5. (C) According to Maitland, South Africa strongly opposes military action against Bacar and will not support an AU mandate or involvement in such operation. The SAG believes the only lasting solution to the crisis in Comoros is political and will emerge from dialogue, not military force. Qpolitical and will emerge from dialogue, not military force. Maitland also noted that a military intervention would be logistically complicated and "not as easy as one might think." -------------- Somalia -- Ethiopia Must Get Out -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to Somalia, Maitland and Xaba repeated the theme (see ref B) that the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia was a "huge mistake" and their troops should leave as soon as possible. (NOTE: Publicly, South Africa supports the AU mission in Somalia. We suspect that more senior DFA PRETORIA 00004227 002 OF 002 officials privately share Maitland's reservations about the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia. END SUMMARY.) The Ethiopians have done little to create security or to help the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),and have instead opened to the door to an "Islamist comeback." Maitland dismissed the argument that a precipitous Ethiopian withdrawal would create a security vacuum, suggesting instead that the AU forces are "not doing much anyway" and "security is already bad." ¶7. (C) According to Maitland, there are two keys to stability in Somalia. First, regional governments, including Ethiopia, but also Eritrea and others, must cease their interference in Somalia. There must be a Somali solution to the Somali political crisis. Second, the TFG must broaden its government to include a wide range of political actors, including the "Asmara group." ¶8. (C) Maitland confirmed that South Africa is not planning any new initiatives on Somalia. The SAG continues to pay its contribution to the AU for AMISOM and would consider requests for assistance with reconciliation. The SAG also partially funded a "track two" meeting that took place in November in South Africa, hosted by the South African non-governmental organization ACCORD. Both members of the TFG and "Asmara group" attended the meeting, but Maitland did not offer to share any details from this initiative. (COMMENT: Post will reach out to ACCORD following the South African summer holidays to seek additional information on the meeting. END COMMENT.) BOST