NO IMMEDIATE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 004218 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, AF, AF/S, S/P E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM ZI SF SUBJECT: NO IMMEDIATE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ZUMA REF: A. 05 PRETORIA 2383 ¶B. PRETORIA 1598 ¶C. PRETORIA 4217 PRETORIA 00004218 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Chief of Mission Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The election of Jacob Zuma as African National Congress (ANC) President (Ref C) will not result in any immediate changes in South Africa's foreign policy. Should Zuma become national president following parliamentary elections in early 2009 -- not a foregone conclusion with corruption charges hanging over him -- we would expect the South African Government (SAG) to focus more on domestic issues and less on foreign policy. Zuma would not micromanage foreign policy, as Mbeki has done, and would rely more on his Foreign Minister and team, which remain unknown at this time. Key strands of Mbeki's approach would likely continue, such as the focus on Africa and South-South cooperation, but Zuma's foreign policy would probably be less ideological, more pragmatic, and less inclined toward complicated intellectual debates and grand initiatives. Some analysts believe that Zuma, a more typically "African" leader than the British-educated Mbeki, could be more effective in building ties with other regional leaders and promoting South Africa's agenda in Africa. While Zuma's pragmatism could result in improved U.S.-South African relations, many of his key advisors come from the far left of South Africa's political spectrum and are suspicious of the United States. Analysts believe Zuma's poor judgment in his personal and professional life raises questions about his leadership skills and effectiveness in promoting South Africa's future foreign policy agenda. END SUMMARY. -------------- Mbeki Still National President -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite Jacob Zuma's election as ANC President, Thabo Mbeki will remain South Africa's national President until early 2009 when parliamentary elections are due to be held, and thus will continue to drive the country's foreign policy for the remainder of South Africa's UN Security Council tenure. (NOTE: The national President is elected by parliament, which can only remove him/her via a no-confidence vote or for misconduct, violating the law, or inability to perform the functions of office. The only other way to force an early Mbeki departure would be early parliamentary elections, called by a majority of the National Assembly. We believe this is unlikely, and Zuma allies have stated that they will not try to remove Mbeki. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) As ANC President, Jacob Zuma will have some influence on major foreign policy issues in 2008, but day-to-day decisions will remain in Mbeki's hands and those of his key advisors. The ANC sets broad policy guidelines for government, but generally does not tie the hands of the executive in its implementation. South Africa's current foreign policy strategy, set by the ANC National Executive Committee, will continue to guide Mbeki, as well as the future president. The policy resolutions under debate in Polokwane following ANC elections deal almost entirely with domestic issues, evidence that South Africa's foreign policy remains generally non-controversial among ANC members. ¶4. (C) Zuma's election as ANC president does not/not mean Q4. (C) Zuma's election as ANC president does not/not mean that he is assured of becoming national president in 2009. Zuma was charged in 2005 with corruption and fraud in connection with an arms deal (ref A). Although the case was dropped from the court rolls in August 2007 pending resolution of related appeals, prosecutors have a strong case and could charge Zuma again once the Constitutional Court has decided the last remaining appeal. If Zuma is convicted, he has said he would step down as ANC President. (NOTE: The South African Constitution prohibits anyone convicted of a serious crime from becoming a member of parliament, and thus the party candidate for President. END NOTE.) -------------- Zuma Team Unclear -------------- PRETORIA 00004218 002.2 OF 004 ¶5. (C) Should Zuma become national president, he would be less likely to micromanage foreign policy than President Mbeki has done, and would rely more on advisors, according to head of the Brenthurst Foundation Greg Mills. Mills speculated that Zuma might chose an "Mbeki-ite," such as current Minister for Provincial and Local Government Sydney Mufamadi as Foreign Minister, as an olive branch to the Mbeki camp. Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) Director Ivor Jenkins said that Zuma understands that foreign policy and finance are two of his weakest points and will strive, at least initially, for continuity in these areas. Zuma might even keep current ForMin (and ex-wife) Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to reassure the Mbeki wing of the ANC and the international community. ¶6. (C) Zuma's current crop of senior advisors, such as COSATU Secretary General Zwelinzima Vavi and South African Communist SIPDIS Party (SACP) head Blade Nzimande, include few foreign policy experts. Newly-elected ANC Deputy President Motlanthe would likely be a key voice on international issues, particularly if he assumes the Deputy Presidency of the country. Mo Shaik, former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs Unit for Policy, Research and Analysis, Ambassador to Algeria, ANC intelligence operative, and a brother of imprisoned fraudster Schabir Shaik, is a close Zuma ally and would have influence on international issues. Others mentioned by Embassy contacts as possible foreign policy advisors in a Zuma administration include: former chief of the South African National Defence Force Siphiwe Nyanda; South African Ambassador to Washington Welile Nhlapo; KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Finance and Economic Development Zweli Mkhize; former Zuma political advisor Ebrahim Ebrahim; and SAG Great Lakes Envoy Kingsley Mamabolo. -------------- More Focused on Domestic Issues -------------- ¶7. (C) Should Zuma become national president, he would likely focus his energies, at least initially, on domestic issues, according to Mills, Jenkins, and South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) head Elizabeth Sidiropolous. Zuma owes his election, at least in part, to the trade unions, who expect him to deal first with issues of poverty, HIV and AIDS, income inequality, unemployment, and service delivery. Mills believes that the Mbeki era may represent the peak of South Africa's activity on foreign policy, although perhaps not its effectiveness. Mbeki has a profound personal interest in foreign policy and spent most of his life in exile. Mbeki was schooled in the philosophy that South Africa's future was deeply intertwined with the future of the world, and that broader international forces held the key to South Africa's development. Zuma is much more a creature of internal politics and struggles, and is less convinced of the importance of global institutions and power dynamics to the country's future. -------------- Less Dogmatic on Multilateral Issues? -------------- ¶8. (C) Zuma's multilateral diplomacy would be more pragmatic and straightforward, Mills suggested. Zuma would not "over-intellectualize" issues, like South Africa's vote Q"over-intellectualize" issues, like South Africa's vote against the Burma resolution in the UNSC on "jurisdictional" grounds or more recent opposition to the U.S.-sponsored UN resolution on rape. In this sense, Mills believes that Zuma would be more straightforward and transparent, without the "liberation politics paranoia," and, thus, easier to deal with. Advisor Mo Shaik told PolOff that South Africa under Zuma "will talk less, and listen more," and stop trying to tell every country how to solve its conflicts using the South African model. ¶9. (C) Certain elements of Mbeki's foreign policy would continue, particularly South-South cooperation, Sidiropolous said. Zuma would continue to have close ties with countries such as Cuba that supported the ANC during the anti-apartheid struggle and would strongly support the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and G-77. South Africa would continue to side with the Africa bloc in multilateral fora, although perhaps would be PRETORIA 00004218 003.2 OF 004 more sensitive to its perceived role as "big brother" on the continent. On international economic issues, SAIIA's Sidiropolous suggested that there is a danger that Zuma might become more protectionist due to pressure from the trade unions, leading the SAG to become an even less helpful player in multilateral trade talks. -------------- Continuity in Africa -------------- ¶10. (C) Zuma would likely continue South Africa's intensive engagement in Africa, particularly on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Even a domestic-focused administration would view peace and stability in Africa as important to South Africa's future. Mbeki's "grand initiatives," like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the "African Renaissance," would largely fade away under Zuma, according to Mills. (NOTE: Mills believes that NEPAD is already irrelevant, noting that he has spent three months traveling around Africa and not once did NEPAD come up; only Mbeki and donors talk about NEPAD. END NOTE.) ¶11. (C) Zuma has some policy experience in Africa. Most prominently, he served as regional mediator in Burundi from 2002-2005, and by most accounts did a good job. According to Henri Boshoff, Great Lakes expert at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS),Zuma was a patient and effective mediator, listening to all sides and gently nudging the parties toward an agreement. IDASA's Jenkins also noted that Zuma, who comes from rural KwaZulu-Natal and has at least three wives, is a more typically African leader than the British-educated, elitist Mbeki, and may in fact be more effective in promoting South Africa's agenda in Africa. (COMMENT: Despite Mbeki's reputation as peacemaker, one could argue that Burundi is the SAG's most obvious conflict resolution success, and that Zuma -- not Mbeki -- deserves most of the credit. Mbeki's mediations in Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe to date have not been successful, and South Africa was one of many players in the DRC peace talks. END COMMENT.) ¶12. (C) On Zimbabwe, there are signs that Zuma would be more publicly critical of President Robert Mugabe and would end South Africa's policy of "quiet diplomacy." At a 10 December 2007 speech at the University of Witwatersrand on Human Rights Day, Zuma criticized "world leaders" (read: Mbeki) for standing by and watching "the deterioration of nations" (read: Zimbabwe). IDASA's Sydney Masamvu believes that Zuma would be "more robust" in his criticism of Mugabe's policies. Zuma's allies in COSATU and SACP are openly sympathetic to the opposition in Zimbabwe, Masamvu noted, and Zuma would also be more sensitive to the growing domestic resentment of Zimbabwean immigrants (estimated between one and three million) who are perceived to be taking jobs and housing away from poor South Africans. In a May 2, 2007, meeting with then-Charge (ref B),Zuma exhibited a firm grasp of Zimbabwean politics, noting that Mugabe's seizure of white farms had nothing to do with land reform. Zuma criticized African leaders for staying in office too long, a likely reference to both Mugabe and Mbeki. -------------- Improved Bilateral Relations? -------------- ¶13. (C) It is too soon to tell whether a Zuma presidency Q13. (C) It is too soon to tell whether a Zuma presidency would affect significantly U.S.-South African relations. Much depends on whom he would select for his foreign policy team and how Mbeki and Zuma navigate the transition ahead. We agree with the think tank analysts that Zuma would likely be more pragmatic than Mbeki, would not "over-intellectualize" issues, and would be less inclined to involve South Africa in disputes where it has minimal national interest (like the Middle East). Zuma likely would be more straightforward in his policymaking, making him somewhat easier to work with than Mbeki. Zuma's style is more open and consensual, and could result in enhanced access to senior policymakers. This may create opportunities for new initiatives and closer cooperation on key issues. PRETORIA 00004218 004.2 OF 004 ¶14. (C) Zuma's openness and pragmatism make him susceptible to lobbying from the full range of international actors. On any given issue, this could result in positions sympathetic or contrary to U.S. interests. For example, Zuma might not vote against a UNSC Burma resolution on technical or legalistic grounds, but an interested regional power could still negotiate a "no" vote via a "pragmatic" backroom deal. ¶15. (C) SAIIA's Sidiropolous and other analysts raise the valid concern that Zuma has exhibited poor judgment in his personal and professional life, most recently in connection with corruption and rape allegations. He sometimes makes bizarre public statements, such as claiming that showering prevents the spread of HIV, and he lacks formal education. Many of Zuma's closet allies come from the far left of South African politics, and are deeply suspicious of the United States. All these elements raise questions about Zuma's ability to make consistently thoughtful decisions and his commitment to promoting good governance and economic reform in Africa, hallmarks of Mbeki's Africa policy. They also add a degree of unpredictability to the future direction of South Africa's foreign policy should Zuma succeed in winning the national presidency in 2009. BOST