SOUTH AFRICA PROMISES 100 MORE TROOPS FOR DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003916 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/S E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR KPAO SF SU SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA PROMISES 100 MORE TROOPS FOR DARFUR DURING BASHIR VISIT REF: A. PRETORIA 3765 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. PRETORIA 3297 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. South Africa will deploy 100 additional troops to UNAMID by year end and will consider additional specialized contributions after other countries finalize their pledges. The commitment to send additional troops came during President Bashir's November 5-7 official visit to South Africa. Mbeki rolled out the red carpet for Bashir, including hosting an official dinner in his honor November 6. Mbeki said he was "pleased" with Bashir's briefing on Darfur and urged all armed factions to participate in the Libyan-hosted peace talks. On the North-South process, Bashir told Mbeki the Government of Sudan (GOS) and Government of South Sudan (GOSS) had agreed on a three-month plan to address the key issues that led to the withdrawal of the GOSS from the Government of National Unity. Mbeki expressed his deep disappointment with the "failure" of the developed countries to fulfill the pledges made in Oslo to support the GOSS, hinting that this was part of problem with delays in CPA implementation. While we are disappointed with Mbeki's (predictable) failure to pressure Bashir publicly, we expect that Mbeki privately nudged Bashir on Darfur and CPA implementation. Post encourages the Department to consider high-level consultations with senior SAG leadership. END SUMMARY. -------------- (A Few) More Troops for Darfur -------------- ¶2. (SBU) South African Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota announced November 7 that South Africa will augment its contribution to UNAMID from 700 to 800 "by the end of December." Lekota kept open the possibility of increasing its troop contribution beyond the 800, but said that South Africa wants to see "how much is coming from countries and what we can do to top it up." His comments followed a November 7 joint press conference by President Mbeki and Sudanese President Bashir in Cape Town, during which Mbeki said that South Africa is "looking at" the specialized needs for the UN/AU hybrid force, but noted that South Africa already has substantial troops commitments in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). (NOTE: Mbeki rolled out the red carpet for Bashir's "official visit" to South Africa, including hosting a banquet in Bashir's honor November 6. South Africa, however, did not make the Bashir visit a "state visit," as it did with the recent visit for DRC President Kabila. END NOTE.) -------------- Mbeki Supports Libya Talks -------------- ¶3. (U) During President Bashir's November 5-7 official visit to South Africa, President Mbeki said that South Africa and Sudan "shared a common commitment" to the "speediest resolution" of the Darfur conflict in Sudan and "earliest deployment" of UNAMID. Claiming to be "very pleased" with Bashir's briefing on Darfur, Mbeki urged all armed factions to participate in the Libya peace talks. He called on the international community to take "firm action against anybody who willfully absent themselves" from the talks. ¶4. (U) On the UNAMID deployment, Bashir urged South Africa to send more troops. He said in the joint press conference that all necessary agreements for the UNAMID deployment have been signed, but noted that the UNSYG has not yet presented his Qsigned, but noted that the UNSYG has not yet presented his report to the General Assembly on UNAMID. -------------- --- Pleased with Bashir Report on CPA, Blames Donors -------------- --- ¶5. (SBU) Mbeki said that Bashir had brought "good news" on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),notably the agreement between the GOS and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) on a three month "programme of action" that "would help to address the matters" that led the GOSS to pull out of the government of national unity. Mbeki also expressed frustration with (unnamed) international donors, who pledged USD 4 billion at the Oslo donor's PRETORIA 00003916 002 OF 002 conference, but have only disbursed a small amount of those funds. (NOTE: DepForMin Aziz Pahad said November 7 that "developed countries" had only "made available" USD 400 million of the USD 4 billion pledged. END NOTE.) This "very disappointing" failure to deliver promised funds, Mbeki said, presented a "serious challenge" to the peace process. ¶6. (U) Mbeki also highlighted the ongoing SAG training program for GOSS civil servants through the University of South Africa (UNISA) (ref B). The program has trained nearly 700 GOSS officials through 14 training courses. (NOTE: Post contributed USD 150,000 to the SAG-GOSS-UNISA trilateral program in FY 2007 and is considering further FY 2008 contributions. END NOTE.) -------------- "Strategic Partner" -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Mbeki lauded the South African-Sudanese relationship, calling Sudan a "strategic partner." Mbeki and Bashir both highlighted the importance of the economic ties between their two countries. The two also agreed to upgrade the Joint Binational Commission to the ministerial level. The next meeting of the Commission will likely take place early next year, according to DepForMin Pahad. Bashir and Mbeki signed seven bilateral agreements, including: -- Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation; -- Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments; -- Agreement on Cooperation in Fields of Arts and Culture; -- Statement of Intent on Social Development; -- Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation; -- Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Immigration, Population and Election Matters; and -- Bilateral Trade Cooperation Agreement. (NOTE: Given the limited GOS-SAG bilateral relationship, the term "strategic partner" would seem to be more sound than fury. We have not reviewed the text of the agreements, so cannot comment on their value or importance. South Africa regularly signs large numbers of bilateral agreements during official visits. Many of the agreements are never -- or barely -- implemented. END NOTE.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Mbeki's failure to blame Khartoum publicly for any of the problems in Darfur or with the North-South peace process is disappointing, although predictable. South Africa is loathe to criticize fellow African countries publicly, believing such public pressure to be counterproductive. In addition, Mbeki is nearly always sympathetic to arguments about the failures of the developed countries to do their part, such as on the supposed gap between pledges and disbursements in southern Sudan. That said, we believe the SAG is not completely naive and is well aware of the problems with Bashir's leadership. Mbeki likely pressured Bashir (albeit gingerly) to eliminate the barriers to quick deployment of UNAMID and address GOSS concerns about CPA implementation, particularly on Abyei (septel). We will seek meetings with senior DFA officials who participated in the discussions and will report additional information septel. ¶8. (C) Given South Africa's continuing involvement in Sudan, we recommend that the Department consider engaging senior SAG leadership on U.S. policy in Darfur and southern Sudan, particularly to address the lingering SAG belief that the developed countries, including the United States, have not done enough to support CPA implementation. Such a visit Qdone enough to support CPA implementation. Such a visit would also present opportunities to press the U.S. public diplomacy agenda on Sudan issues, both with international journalists based in South Africa and public audiences. BOST