U.S.-INDIA 123 AGREEMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN REACTIONS

UNCLAS PRETORIA 002649 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, SCA/INS AF/S E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG PREL KNNP KTIA SF SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA 123 AGREEMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN REACTIONS REF: SECSTATE 104171 (U) This is an action request -- see para 4. ¶1. (U) DepPolCouns presented reftel non-paper, a copy of the White House press release, and the full transcript of U/S Burns' 27 July press briefing to DFA Deputy Director for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Michiel Combrink on 30 July. Combrink had not heard Friday's announcement and was astonished by the news. Admitting he had not thought it would be possible for the two sides to bridge their remaining differences, he heaped praise on lead negotiator Dick Stratford. ¶2. (SBU) Upon reviewing reftel non-paper Combrink commented that it appeared the U.S. had "caved on reprocessing." He expressed strong interest in seeing the full text of the agreement, if/when that became possible. Combrink anticipated that the SAG would have many questions about the details of the agreement and welcomed the prospect of consultations on the way forward in the NSG. He noted that some NSG outreach activities were planned for the margins of the September IAEA General Conference in Vienna and suggested that as a possible venue for initial USG-SAG bilateral consultations. (NOTE: DDG Abdul Minty does not plan to travel to New York for UNGA 1st Committee sessions. END NOTE.) Combrink wryly noted that NAM, NSG, and AU countries would likely "have a lot to say" about the agreement and its implications. Within the NSG he predicted that Ireland and Sweden would have comments/reactions but he did not expect significant substantive reactions from most other Participating Governments. ¶3. (SBU) Combrink volunteered that he did not forsee the NSG holding a special plenary session on this issue, "because an India/IAEA safeguards agreement must come first." However, a Consultative Group meeting could happen at any time. Current SAG thinking was to schedule the next CG meeting in November, to coincide with other international meetings (as a cost-saving measure). While this is a bit later than the traditional early October timeframe, Combrink commented that it would give India time to engage with the IAEA and to demonstrate sincerity about concluding its safeguards agreement. ¶4. (SBU) Stressing that this was not an "official demarche" but merely an "expert query" Combrink requested an explanation of how the U.S.-India agreement fits with USG obligations under the Pelindaba Treaty, specifically Article 9 and Protocol I, Article 2. Combrink commented there could be some potentially serious problems, as there was "no way" India could conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified in Art. 9(c) because India "would never agree" to open all its nuclear facilities to inspection. Combrink said he was interested in the USG interpretation because the SAG currently is engaged in a strong effort to gain the six additional ratifications required for the Pelindaba Treaty to enter into force and he wanted to be prepared to "manage any outfall" unintentionally caused by the U.S.-India agreement. He expressed hope that we would be able "to put our heads together" on this and hinted he was willing to consider a draft amendment to the treaty text if required. (ACTION REQUEST: Please advise how Mission should respond to Combrink's legal query. Although it was not couched as an official demarche, the SAG is likely to start voicing this concern to other interested parties if they do not receive a timely response. END ACTION REQUEST.) Combrink also made the inevitable reference to potential conflicts with NPT commitments, but acknowledged this was "a manageable thing." Bost