DFA UN DIRECTORATE ON KOSOVO, LEBANON TRIBUNAL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 001801 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/UNP, AF/S, NEA/ARPI, EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC PINR KNNP UNSC UNMIK SF YI IR LE SUBJECT: DFA UN DIRECTORATE ON KOSOVO, LEBANON TRIBUNAL, IRAN SANCTIONS REF: A. SECSTATE 063229 ¶B. SECSTATE 061222 ¶C. SECSTATE 061194 ¶D. SECSTATE 059351 ¶E. PRETORIA 1718 ¶F. PRETORIA 1676 ¶G. PRETORIA 1744 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Don Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The SAG has not finalized its position on Kosovo final status, but is getting closer. The ForMin's Brussels meeting with President Sejdiu was positive and helpful. Lower level Pretoria meetings with Bishop Artemije and Ulber Hysa were not. DFA working levels remain poorly informed and ideological in their views, but may no longer have influence over decision-making. The SAG is also undecided about the Hariri tribunal, but is uncomfortable with the idea of imposing a decision from outside and is sympathetic to the argument that Christians are overrepresented. DFA working levels welcomed information about the Iranian solicitation of light water reactor bids and Gen. Zolqadr's travel to Russia, but did not believe South Africa would have legal grounds to prevent such activities or travel. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) DepPolCouns presented Ref A-D points regarding Kosovo final status, establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and implementation of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 to DFA United Nations: Political Deputy Directors Ilia du Buisson and Simon Cardy on 16 May. Du Buisson covers European issues in the Security Council, while Cardy handles Middle East matters. They share responsibility for UNSC counter-terrorism and sanctions issues. -------------- Kosovo Final Status -------------- ¶3. (C) Du Buisson reported that no decisions had yet been made on Kosovo policy; they are "close, but we're still consulting." She confirmed that Ref D non-paper responding to questions raised during A/S Silverberg's 25 April visit had been circulated to DFA working levels (Ref E) and expressed appreciation for the level of detail it contained. She had no specific queries or comments on its contents. Du Buisson confirmed that ForMin Dlamini Zuma had met with Kosovar President Sejdiu on 15 May in Brussels and that Kosovo had also been discussed at length during the ForMin's EU consultations. She had no readouts, but said she understood the Sejdiu meeting went well and that the ForMin allowed it to continue beyond the allotted timeframe, due to her personal interest in hearing what Sejdiu had to say. (NOTE: Du Buisson was under the impression that the ForMin had initiated the Brussels meeting -- we did not correct her.) She reported that DFA Chief Director: United Nations (Political) Xolisa Mabhongo had met seperately with both Bishop Artemije and Ulber Hysa in Pretoria the week of 07 May. Artemije, who was viewed as a level-headed, reasonable representative of the Serb minority, argued that the Kosovars would force the remaining Serbs from their homes as soon as managed independence was implemented and could never be trusted to protect Serb rights. Hysa horrified the DFA reps in attendance with the statement "if we don't get what we need we will take it ourselves," playing directly into Artemije's portrayal of the Kosovars. ¶4. (C) Du Buisson and Cardy engaged in a wide-ranging discussion about Kosovo, the greater Balkans, and the Ahtisaari plan. They demonstrated a simplistic understanding of the history and dynamics of the situation, which appeared heavily influenced by Serbian and Russian arguments. Both remained steadfast in the belief that the single best global approach to conflicts such as Kosovo is the South African model -- peaceful negotiation until the parties reach a mutually acceptable solution. They viewed anything less, certainly anything imposed from outside by the international community, as somehow immoral. ¶5. (C) It is not clear the degree to which Du Buisson and Cardy are echoing or influencing the views of SAG decision-makers. The following comments were of greatest interest and/or are likely to have had wider circulation within DFA: -- They persistently refered to managed independence as "creating an EU protectorate." -- They noted that a number of (unnamed) European countries, while paying lip service to "European unity," had privately complained to them about various aspects of Ahtisaari. -- They expressed concern that the important benefits of economic reconstruction, foreign investment, and a guaranteed path to EU membership are not explicitly spelled out in Ahtisaari. -- They voiced profound doubt that the EU would expand again in the near-to-mid-term and that the EU would ever accept Kosovo as a member since "they won't even take Turkey." -- They appeared convinced the Kosovar Albanians could not be trusted to protect the rights of the Serb minority. -- They interpreted the UNSC report on its trip to the region very negatively, describing the visit as heavily biased to the Albanian side. They said they had heard there was a lot of "whispered complaints on the margins" by attending PermReps about this fact. (COMMENT: This sounds like something that might have come from PermRep Kumalo's own report of the trip, since it does not track with other reporting.) They also raised the usual concerns about precedent and repeated the age-old complaint that "the West" never listens to Africa about African issues, so why should Africa defer to Europe on Kosovo. -------------- Lebanon Tribunal -------------- ¶6. (C) Cardy reported that the SAG also has not reached a decision about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. South Africa's starting point is to listen to all sides and to encourage "internal processes" to continue to completion. He admitted that "we're not sure we have heard from everyone yet" and said that their Embassy in Damascus had been sent out on "a fishing expedition" this week. He agreed that all parties supported the idea of a tribunal in principle, but stubbornly insisted this was why it was inappropriate for the UN to "politicize" the matter by making "provocative political statements" and imposing a decision from outside. Cardy sidestepped pointed questions about how long justice could be delayed, arguing that "the UN is doing the spadework anyway." He argued forcefully that Christians held "an artificial stranglehold on power" and therefore a parliamentary decision would not be representative; he also noted that the SAG had a close relationship with the Prime Minister and was sensitive to what he was trying to accomplish. -------------- Iran Sanctions -------------- ¶7. (C) Other than tongue-in-cheek expressions of thankfulness that DFA Deputy Director Combrink (Refs F-G) was the one responsible for the bulk of Iran sanctions implementation, du Buisson and Cardy had minimal reactions to Ref B-C demarches. Both were thankful for the alert regarding the Iranian solicitation of reactor bids and speculated that it was a publicity stunt. They repeated Combrink's Ref F caution that South Africa may not have legal grounds to prevent domestic companies from participating in such an effort. Neither had heard about the Zolqadr incident and appreciated being alerted that the Iranians were using such tactics, but after a brief discussion concluded it was unlikely they would have legal grounds to refuse entry to an Iranian official who had legitimate business to conduct. They did take on board DepPolCouns' reminder that they could inquire whether an alternate Iranian official might be available, if a listed official applied for entry. They also committed to ensure that senior officials were briefed about the incident and that it would be taken into account when considering travel requests. Bost