THE LOGIC BEHIND COSATU'S ZUMA SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 001654 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/S E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR SF SUBJECT: THE LOGIC BEHIND COSATU'S ZUMA SUPPORT REF: A. 05 PRETORIA 4438 ¶B. 06 PRETORIA 393 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Long-time Embassy contact, academic, and labor activist Eddie Webster discussed COSATU's rocky relationship with the ANC and its calculated strategy of taking over ANC policy by supporting ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma, who they consider an "empty vessel." Webster argued that COSATU decided to support Zuma sometime during Mbeki's first Presidential term after years of disillusionment with the ANC's market-friendly economic policies and lack of labor consultation. However, COSATU's rallying cries for Zuma could be putting its political influence in the mid-term at risk, depending upon who is elected ANC President in December. END SUMMARY. -------------- COSATU'S VISION OF ITSELF -------------- ¶2. (C) DepEconCouns and PolOff met with Eddie Webster, Head of the University of Witwatersrand Sociology Department, long-time Embassy contact, and respected labor academic and activist on 02 May to discuss COSATU's rocky political relationship with the ANC. Webster traced the origins of the hostility between COSATU and the ANC back to 1992 when COSATU was excluded from formal negotiations with the National Party government over a new Constitution. COSATU believed the crucial role it played during the anti-apartheid struggle had earned it a permanent seat at the table. According to Webster, the federation's resentment at being "sidelined" by the ANC was further exacerbated in 1996 when the ANC announced the market-friendly GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) policy without first consulting its labor allies. "COSATU was at the forefront of the liberation struggle in the 1980s," Webster explained. "It has always seen itself as more than a labor union. It sees itself as a political actor, too." -------------- ZUMA AS A MEANS TO AN END -------------- ¶3. (C) COSATU's continuing disappointment with the ANC eventually led the federation and the South African Communist Party to a decision to support ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma as President Mbeki's successor during Mbeki's first Presidential term, according to Webster. Zuma provided them "an empty vessel with working class charisma." The idea was to surround Zuma with smart people who could help him make the government more labor-friendly and left-leaning when he assumed Mbeki's mantle. Webster advised against focusing on Zuma as a person, but rather on what COSATU hopes to achieve through the use of Zuma. Webster also warned that recent news articles claiming COSATU had dumped Zuma were false, noting that he heard that the meeting during which Zuma's support was rescinded was "completely ordinary." (COMMENT: Webster's comments on COSATU's calculation that Zuma's lack of vision and strong ideological leanings make him an ideal candidate have been echoed by other Embassy contacts. However, COSATU's membership is not monolithic and reports of COSATU dumping Zuma still could have been leaked by an anti-Zuma faction within COSATU. END COMMENT) ¶4. (C) What is personal, however, is South African Communist Party Chairman Blade Nzimande's hatred of Mbeki. Webster believes that Nzimande was and continues to be a driving force behind COSATU and SACP support for Zuma, not out of respect for Zuma but out of spite for Mbeki. Webster explained that Nzimande has never gotten over the public humiliation he suffered when he was not appointed Mbeki's first Minister of Education in 1999. Webster reported that after Mandela assured him the post, Nzimande brought his mother, with whom he is extremely close, to Parliament to hear the announcement only to hear Mbeki call out Kader Asmal's name as Minister. -------------- YOU SAY CORRUPTER; WE SAY BENEFACTOR -------------- ¶5. (C) COSATU could not have anticipated the extent of Zuma's legal troubles, but Webster does not think these difficulties impact COSATU's support for Zuma, given the reasons behind PRETORIA 00001654 002 OF 002 it. Webster believes that though Zuma is guilty of corruption, a credible case can be made that Zuma is, at the same time, a scapegoat. Webster said that other ANC members have committed far more corrupt acts with little consequence, citing ANC Secretary General Motlanthe's involvement in OilGate (Ref A) as one example. When asked how so many South Africans can ignore the irrefutable evidence of Zuma's corruption that came out of the Shaik trial, Webster explained that most people view Shaik and Zuma's relationship as one of "benefactor/recipient," rather than corrupter/corrupted. Webster further explained that "most ANC members have had benefactors in their careers, including President Mbeki; it was the only way to survive when blacks weren't allowed capital." ¶6. (C) Webster believes the difference between Zuma and Mbeki simply boils down to "basic needs." Mbeki does not have children or family to support (his mother is financially independent) and is motivated more by power and control than money. Zuma, on the other hand, is not necessarily motivated by unabated avarice, but rather by his need to support three wives, numerous children, as well as other family members. Webster also noted that Zuma probably would not be able to even understand the accounts and records relating to Shaik,s bribes. (NOTE: Zuma's inability to read financial records, if true, does not equate to naivete. It does, however, indicate that he would need significant intellectual support for the implementation of macroeconomic policy. END NOTE) The rape allegations in early 2006 (Ref B) were a different matter. Webster personally believes what Zuma did was unacceptable and tantamount to "incest no matter what country you live in or what culture you are from." However, the fact that Zuma was found innocent of rape in an independent court of law means that the incident cannot and should not be held against him. (Note: Webster knew both Zuma and the alleged victim's father, "Judson," in the early-mid 1970s and said they were very close. Webster also noted that he and Zuma attended Judson's wedding to his bride, who was pregnant with the victim at the time. END NOTE) -------------- -------------- COSATU ZUMA SUPPORT NOW MORE ABOUT CHANGE OF GUARD -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Though the relationship between COSATU and the ANC remains acrimonious, Webster believes that policy differences between the two have narrowed in recent years. The SAG is expanding infrastructure spending, has abandoned its privatization policy (although it does insist that parastatals have "hard budgets"),and has used trade remedies to curtail cheap imports from China. Most significantly, it has implemented a system of low income social grants that is virtually "unprecedented" anywhere in the world. (COMMENT: Recent press reports note that there are 12 million South Africans who receive some type of government grant, compared to 8.3 million formal taxpayers. END COMMENT) Asked then why tension between COSATU and the ANC rages on, Webster sighed and said, "Politics is about power and patronage, isn't it?" -------------- BIO NOTE -------------- ¶8. (C) Webster is probably the most well-connected industrial sociologist in the country, having strong professional and personal ties to the labor leadership. He has mediated several internal COSATU conflicts, including last year's ugly battle between COSATU's president, Willie Madisha, and its secretary general, Zwelinzima Vavi. Webster also confided to SIPDIS us that he would be meeting with the National Intelligence Agency, upon their request, to discuss the possibility of strike-related violence in the near-future. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) COSATU is following in the footsteps of other African labor unions that feel they must be tied to a political party to have any influence. Given South Africa's market-friendly economic policy and COSATU's perceived right to be involved in non-economic decisions, like social issues and foreign policy toward Zimbabwe, they are probably correct. However, COSATU could be playing with fire by spporting a longshot like Zuma, especially if an Mbeki loyalist (or Mbeki himself) is elected ANC President in December. TEITELBAUM