FNL PEACE PROCESS BOGGED DOWN, VAN ECK SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000154

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR BU SF
SUBJECT: FNL PEACE PROCESS BOGGED DOWN, VAN ECK SAYS

REF: A. TRENKLE-CARROLL EMAIL OF 12/21/2006


B. BUJUMBURA 15

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Perry Ball. Reasons 1.4(
b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The FNL peace process remains bogged down in
administrative arguments, according to ISS analyst Jan van
Eck. The FNL still refuses to participate in the JVMM
because the GOB has not released from prison some of the FNL
representatives for the JVMM and because the South African
Mediation did not make funds available for travel. Van Eck
blames South Africa for not managing the process better.
Looming issues in the peace process, in van Eck's view,
include the increasingly unhappiness of FNL combatants who
are not receiving support and the likely GOB rejection of the
"Palipehutu-FNL" name for the political party as
ethnically-based. South Africa plans to expand its
deployment in Burundi under AU auspices to 1,100 troops to
implement the FNL peace process. It hopes other African
countries will join the AU force by July. END SUMMARY.

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Delays in Formation of JVMM
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2. (C) Institute for Security Studies (ISS) analyst Jan van
Eck told PolOff January 11 that the Palipehutu-FNL is
increasingly frustrated with the implementation of the
September 7 Ceasefire Agreement. Van Eck said that following
the December 16 agreement on immunity (Ref A),he had been
optimistic that the peace process was back on track. In the
agreement, brokered by the South African Mediation, ruling
party CNDD-FDD leader Hussein Radjabu agreed to grant
immunity to Palipehutu-FNL members, overcoming an earlier
objection to the use of the ethnically-based word
"Palipehutu" in the immunity decree.


3. (C) With the immunity issued resolved, the FNL agreed to
send representatives to take part in the Joint Verification
Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM),as envisioned in the Ceasefire
Agreement. The FNL should have arrived in Burundi January
10, but FNL leader Agathon Rwasa told van Eck that the FNL
now refused to participate because: (1) some of their
representatives on the JVMM had not been released from jail
as the GOB promised; and (2) the South African Mediation did
not make funds available for travel as promised.

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South Africa to Blame?
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4. (C) Van Eck placed the blame for the problems largely on
the shoulders of the South African Mediation, which he
complained is disorganized and uncoordinated. The FNL has
largely lost faith in SAG Great Lakes Envoy Kingsley
Mamabolo. They continue to trust the head of the Mediation,
SAG Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula, although
Nqakula is extremely busy with his domestic portfolio and
does not devote sufficient attention to the FNL mediation, in
van Eck's view. Van Eck has personally urged Nqakula to
travel to Dar es Salaam the weekend of January 13 to attempt
to bring the FNL back on board.

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Key Problems
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5. (C) Van Eck identified two looming issues with the FNL
peace process:

-- FNL fighters in the field have not been provided any food,
medical supplies or other support since September. The FNL
told South Africa they needed USD 12 million for total
support, which included funds to set up the FNL as a
political party. Van Eck admitted this amount was
"laughable," but the South African Mediation instead provided
only USD 15,000, which does not begin to cover basic
expenses. Asked about recent FNL criminal violence in
Burundi (Ref B),van Eck says the leadership has not directed
any attacks, but that he would not be surprised if individual

PRETORIA 00000154 002 OF 002


fighters had become desperate (or that others like John Bosco
were attacking, then blaming the FNL).

-- When the FNL leadership returns to Burundi and attempts to
register the party as "Palipehutu-FNL," van Eck said that the
GOB will likely reject the party name as "ethnically-based"
in violation of the Constitution. The FNL will not negotiate
the name of the party. Van Eck has recommended to the South
African Mediation that they deal with this issue now, before
it explodes into a full-fledged battle.

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South Africa Expanding Presence; Hoping for More AU Troops
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6. (C) SAG Great Lakes Envoy Mamabolo and SANDF staff briefed
European diplomats in Pretoria December 22 on their military
deployment plans for Burundi. According to a Pretoria-based
U.K. diplomat, South Africa plans to increase its commitment
to the Burundi AU force to 1,100 personnel by the end of
January 2007 (from the ONUB strength of 813),including a
special task force to protect FNL leaders and combatants, a
tactical planning element, a level-2 hospital, a battalion
for escort duty, a "static" company, a support element, and
two helicopters. South Africa hopes that other AU countries
will contribute troops to replace the SANDF contingent by
July 2007, but they acknowledge that this may not be
realistic. (COMMENT: The urgent competition for African
troops in Darfur, and now Somalia, make it even more unlikey
that there will be troops from many other African countries
to share South Africa's burden. END COMMENT.)


7. (C) According to the U.K. diplomat, SANDF officials are
grappling with a number of unknown factors in their
deployment plan, including which other countries might
contribute forces, the strength of the FNL, where the
assembly areas will be, and who will oversee the disarmament
and demobilization now that ONUB is defunct.


8. (C) The six-month operational cost of the operation is USD
26.8 million. South Africa specifically asked the United
Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and France to provide funds
for the operation, although Pretoria is prepared to fund the
operation itself if no donor comes forward. Post understands
that the European governments are evaluating the request for
funding -- and have requested more detail -- and the
Pretoria-based embassies are generally recommending funding.

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Comment
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9. (C) South Africa has devoted enormous energy to the
Burundi peace process, and it remains committed to seeing it
through to the end. However, SAG resources for the process
-- both diplomatic and military -- remain seriously
overstretched, as evidenced by van Eck's complaints about
coordination and communication. We share van Eck's hope that
Minister Nqakula will be able to devote more time to getting
the process back on track.
BOST