A/S FRIED IN PRAGUE: MISSILE DEFENSE, VISAS, AFGHANISTAN, KOSOVO, ENERGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ENRG EZ
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED IN PRAGUE: MISSILE DEFENSE, VISAS,
AFGHANISTAN, KOSOVO, ENERGY

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W Graber for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. (C) Summary: In discussions with senior Czech officials
in Prague on January 11, A/S Fried covered the following:
-- Missile Defense: the President is likely to reach a
decision soon that will initiate a period of negotiations
with the Czechs and/or Poles about terms for basing MD assets
in their countries;
-- Visas: prospects are uncertain in Congress for the
President's proposed revisions to the visa waiver program;
there is much work to be done on all sides; the Czechs
promised continued engagement;
-- Afghanistan: Fried urged the Czechs to make a credible
offer to increase their engagement in Afghanistan, welcomed a
Czech plan to run a PRT in 2008, and urged the GOCR to drop
their (limited) caveats on troops, which they appear likely
to do;
-- Kosovo: all Czechs expressed great concern about
near-term developments, including Serb reaction to the
Ahtisaari plan and difficulties winning a UNSCR vote; Fried
explained USG views, stressing that the status quo is not
sustainable;
-- Iraq: Fried briefed on the President's new proposals; the
Czechs pledged continued support and deployments;
-- Energy security: the Prime Minister expressed growing
Czech concern about Russian influence, and asked for USG
assistance in stopping the likely sale of Conoco's Czech
assets to a Russian firm;
-- Domestic and bilateral relations: government officials
expressed measured optimism about the January 19 vote of
confidence; government and opposition agreed that U.S.-Czech
relations are critical and will remain positive no matter
what the political situation. End summary.


2. (C) On January 11 EUR A/S Daniel Fried consulted
separately with PM Mirek Topolanek, FM Karel Schwarzenberg,
Deputy PM (and former FM) Alexandr Vondra, and head of the
opposition CSSD (and former PM) Jiri Paroubek. He also did
two press interviews. A/S Fried's visit to Prague took place
in the context of continued government transition:
Topolanek's second government was appointed on January 9;
Schwarzenberg was in only his second day as ForMin. It had
been announced the day previous that the government's vote of
confidence would take place on January 19.

--------------
Missile Defense
--------------


3. (C) In each of his meetings and with the press, Fried
stressed that he was not in Prague to make any announcements
on location of missile defense (MD) assets in Central Europe.
He predicted that the President would make the final
decision on a third MD site in the coming weeks. He pledged
USG efforts to limit leaks before the formal decision was
passed to the Czechs and/or Poles, but reminded his
interlocutors that leaks are common in Washington. With
government officials he recommended that the Czech embassy
maintain close contact with the NSC. Fried stressed that the
USG decision would only be the start of a negotiating
process. Asked by Vondra how quickly the USG expected the
Czechs to conclude an agreement on basing, Fried replied that
he wants to be sure that the Czechs and/or Poles have the
time necessary to have all of their questions answered. He
promised to remind USG officials involved of the need to
provide all necessary information to include, as necessary,
any information on possible Russian concerns. Fried urged
government leaders to let him know if there was any need for
a more "political discussion."


4. (C) All government officials expressed their continued
support for MD in the Czech Republic, but made clear their
strong desire for details on timing and the specifics of a
decision (i.e., which site). FM Schwarzenberg asked whether
the new Congress was likely to support the MD program (Fried
said yes, citing the broad acknowledgment of Iranian and
other threats). CSSD Chairman Paroubek complained that, when
he was Prime Minister, he had not been briefed on the MD
issue, and had been forced to respond to press inquiries when
the MD issue arose only "two weeks" before the June 2006
election. Given the timing, Paroubek said he had to reply
publicly in a manner that he thought his constituents wanted
to hear, i.e., by criticizing the proposal. He said that
within his party the issue remained sensitive and that even a
radar-only proposal would be controversial. Of importance
for CSSD voters will be the size of a facility: "one
thousand people would be a problem; dozens we can discuss."
Paroubek promised that CSSD, in opposition, would be a
"responsible" partner on MD, and urged the USG to let him
know as soon as any decision is reached so that he could
begin working within his party. (Note: although CSSD press
spokesman later claimed that the MD discussion encompassed

PRAGUE 00000044 002 OF 003


the question of a referendum, this issue was not raised
during the meeting.)

--------------
Visa Waiver
--------------


5. (C) Both Topolanek and Schwarzenberg began their meetings
by effusively thanking Fried for the President's November
announcement in Tallinn that he intended to seek
modifications in the visa waiver program. Fried responded
that it is too soon for thanks. He stressed that there is
much work to be done in Congress, and that the fate of the
USG proposals in Congress is far from certain. He urged
government officials to remain engaged and to continue to
work with the administration and Congress. CSSD Chairman
Paroubek also stressed the importance of the visa issue both
as a "psychological" issue for Czechs and because of the
benefits of travel to building bilateral ties. He criticized
the Topolanek government for being too optimistic. (Comment:
Unfortunately, a statement made by FM Schwarzenberg
following the Fried meeting -- in which he repeated the
months-old mantra of former FM Vondra that a change in VWP
was possible within two years -- gave some credence to
Paroubek's views. We will work with the GOCR to make sure
their rhetoric does not get in front of reality. The January
24 visit to Prague of DHS A/S Rosenzweig will help with this
effort.)

--------------
Iraq & Afghanistan
--------------


6. (C) Fried provided a summary of the President's new Iraq
proposals, which were made the evening before his meetings.
Czech officials promised to continue their engagement in
Iraq. Fried spent considerable time in all meetings
discussing Afghanistan. He promised that new U.S. engagement
in Iraq would not come at the expense of Afghanistan. He
thanked the Czechs for their current efforts there, but
explained the importance of preparing now for a multifaceted
spring offensive against the Taliban. Fried said we would be
coming to the Czechs with specific proposals in advance of
the January 26 NATO Ministerial. But he noted that the
Czechs had already made a good start by approving last month
(at the cabinet level, not yet parliament) plans to take over
the Hungarian PRT in 2008, plus a recent proposal to send a
field hospital to Afghanistan later this year. He strongly
urged the government to announce that it would give up two
relatively minor caveats on some of its troops in
Afghanistan, noting the strong precedent effect this could
have for other countries. PM Topolanek (who had been briefed
on the caveat issue following the earlier meeting with the
ForMin) said the caveats should not be a problem.

--------------
Kosovo
--------------


7. (C) All the Czech interlocutors wanted to discuss Kosovo
at length. Government officials stressed full official
support for the Contact Group positions and the proposals
that Ahtisaari is preparing for some form of limited
independence for Kosovo. However, they were concerned about
developments in the coming months. In response to questions
and concerns, Fried offered the following:
-- timing: Ahtisaari's report should be presented in early
February;
-- Russia/UN: the USG will draft a "veto-proof" UNSCR; we
expect difficult negotiations with the Russians, but expect
to ultimately prevail; we will not compromise on Georgia in
these talks;
-- UN/EU: USG acknowledges that a UNSCR is a requirement for
the EU; we are working on the assumption that there will be a
resolution, but Kosovo status is so critical that we are also
looking at what would be required if a UNSCR does not succeed;
-- KFOR: we believe that KFOR should remain after Kosovo
independence;
-- Serbia: we agree that a European future is important for
the Serbs; Partnership for Peace was a good step;
-- Czech role: important for Czechs to use their influence
with Belgrade to urge them to accept a settlement.


8. (C) Deputy PM Vondra, after lamenting the sorry state of
European foreign policy leadership today, explained that much
of the concern in Europe about Kosovo stems from a fear that
an independent Kosovo will become an Islamic fundamentalist
state within Europe.


9. (C) CSSD Chairman Paroubek, supported by CSSD Shadow FM
Zaoralek, took a different approach. Both said they feared a
"technocratic" solution (i.e., the independence proposal

PRAGUE 00000044 003 OF 003


Ahtisaari will offer) because it ignores the reality of both
Serbia's "proud history" and the fate of 200,000 Kosovar
Serbs who will never be able to live in an independent
Kosovo. While taking pains not to criticize USG policy (they
referred only to a "radical" assessment they had seen written
by Senator Biden),and making reference to meetings with Serb
PM Kostunica at recent European Socialist party conferences,
Paroubek and Zaoralek suggested that the U.S. needed to
consider the possibility of dividing Kosovo. Fried responded
with a detailed rebuttal of these points, explaining why the
status quo in Kosovo is not sustainable, and why existing
borders needed to be retained to avoid wider disruptions.

--------------
Energy security
--------------


10. (C) As he has in previous meetings, PM Topolanek devoted
considerable attention to energy security. As a general
point, he strongly agreed with Fried's assessment that Europe
needed to diversify energy supplies, noting that the
importance of supply routes via Turkey was one reason why his
party strongly supported EU membership for Turkey. He went
on to inform Fried of two specific energy security issues
involving U.S. firms in the Czech Republic: the potential
sale of ConocoPhillips share in the largest Czech refinery to
a Russian firm, and Westinghouse's loss of the contract to
supply fuel to the Temelin nuclear power plant to a Russian
firm (apparently for reasons related to quality of the fuel
supplied). Without making a specific request, Topolanek said
he wanted to "inform" Fried directly about these issues.
(Note: post has already had subsequent discussions about
these two cases, which included explicit GOCR requests for
USG engagement. These will be explained in detail septel).
Fried concluded by urging the Czechs and other Central
Europeans to put pressure on Germany to approach the energy
security question more strategically (Note: German
Chancellor Merkel will visit Prague January 26).

--------------
Domestic politics/bilateral relations
--------------


11. (C) Fried wished all his official interlocutors good luck
in resolving the political situation. Topolanek, who was in
very good spirits during the meeting, described the past
seven months without a confirmed government "interesting."
He noted that he hoped to begin thinking about a visit to
Washington "when the situation is stable." All officials
stressed that the political uncertainty had no impact on
Czech-American relations. CSSD Chairman Paroubek went to
great lengths to stress his party's devotion to transatlantic
relations and his personal desire to make sure that this
party and his country were both a reliable partner for the
United States. He also said he hoes to increase cooperation
with the Democratic prty.
GRABER