Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PRAGUE22
2007-01-08 15:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:
SCENESETTER FOR EUR A/S FRIED'S JANUARY 11 VISIT
VZCZCXRO2134 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHPG #0022/01 0081536 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 081536Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8429 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000022
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR A/S DAN FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR RICHARD GRABER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR A/S FRIED'S JANUARY 11 VISIT
TO PRAGUE
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Graber for Reasons 1.4 B&D
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000022
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR A/S DAN FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR RICHARD GRABER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR A/S FRIED'S JANUARY 11 VISIT
TO PRAGUE
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Graber for Reasons 1.4 B&D
1. (C) Dan, I'm looking forward to seeing you again. Your
visit will be our first opportunity to meet the "new" Czech
government that President Klaus will formally appoint
tomorrow (Tuesday) morning. You are set to call on new/old
Prime Minister Topolanek, new Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg,
and opposition leader (and former PM) Paroubek. You will
also have time with your old friend Sasha Vondra, who
tomorrow gets promoted from ForMin to Deputy PM for European
Affairs. Your visit is a great opportunity to demonstrate
U.S. interest in the Czech Republic, express our appreciation
for Czech support in the fight against terrorism and in
democracy promotion, and solicit GOCR commitment at the
highest levels in these on-going strategic arenas. Your stop
in Prague is particularly timely given that a decision on
missile defense is expected soon, and given the Czechs'
intense focus on possible revisions to the visa waiver
program. We also hope you will use the opportunity to remind
the government not to lose sight of the importance of foreign
policy issues as it sorts out its domestic political
situation. With the Czech Republic due to take over the EU
Presidency in the first half of 2009, the sooner the Czechs
can balance their domestic and external priorities the better
for both the EU and the USG.
== Political situation ==
2. (C) President Klaus will appoint the second Topolanek
government on the morning of January 9. PM Topolanek, whose
minority government has been in power since September,
despite losing its vote of confidence in October, will head a
three-party coalition of his center-right ODS with the Greens
and Christian Democrats. A vote of confidence is likely this
month, perhaps as early as next week. While chances for
success are only fifty-fifty at best, we expect that the
government appointed tomorrow, like its predecessor, will
govern the country for several months. If this government
also fails, we expect the third attempt to form a government
will be even more protracted than the first two. What is
noteworthy is that despite the absence of a confirmed
government since the June 2006 elections, Czech democratic
institutions continue to function, the private sector
continues to thrive, and the government remains committed to
key external commitments such as foreign deployments. Czech
foreign and security policies remain firmly transatlantic,
although the Czechs (with the notable exception of the
President) are also committed to the EU. Support for
democracy promotion and human rights is a hallmark of Czech
foreign policy, and incoming FM Schwarzenberg will only
strengthen this commitment. In particular, the Czechs have
been outspoken in support of democratic transition in Cuba
and staked out their strongest claim within the EU on Cuba.
As you know, with the exception of visas, we have excellent
bilateral relations with the Czechs.
== Visas ==
3. (SBU) Outgoing FM Vondra and Czech Ambassador in
Washington Kolar have been the two leading voices in the
Czech quest to enter the visa waiver program. When he took
office in the fall Vondra launched a coordinated effort of
new EU member states (the so-called Coalition for Visa
Equality) to lobby Congress for a political route to VWP
status. While convinced that the only path to VWP status
runs through a political solution, Vondra and the MFA have
agreed that we need to continue to work on the technical
aspects of border security, and that the Bilateral Consular
Working Group is therefore important to continue. Vondra and
I chaired the fall meeting of the BCWG in late November. The
Czechs were understandably pleased with the President's
announcement in Tallinn, and are looking forward to the visit
to Prague in late January of DHS Acting A/S Rosenzweig. The
Czechs are arranging a meeting in Prague with all VWP roadmap
countries during Rosenzweig's visit. The Czechs have high
hopes that the Democratic Congress will be more supportive of
new VWP requirements. It will be important during your
meetings and press statements to deliver a clear message that
does not inflate expectations.
== Missile Defense ==
4. (C) The Czech Republic remains keen on hosting a missile
defense facility. PM Topolanek and Vondra have been strong
proponents, while opposition leader Paroubek (CSSD) has given
explicit support for a radar site only, insisting that an
interceptor site would require a referendum. FM-designate
Schwarzenberg has not taken a firm stand on the topic, so
your meeting will be a chance to shape his views. The MFA
generally, and in particular Deputy FM Pojar, have been very
PRAGUE 00000022 002 OF 003
strong on MD, and very clear that they support a base because
they believe it to be in the Czechs' interests, not because
they expect anything in return (unfortunately Pojar will be
out of Prague during your visit, accompanying President Klaus
on a visit to Bratislava). In the months surrounding the
June 2006 general elections, there was significant noise from
a "No to Bases" campaign and from politicians seeking to turn
public discomfort with the possible presence of foreign
troops on Czech soil in to short term-political gains. More
recently, MD has not been a point of contention in the
government-formation process and public interest in the
issues appears to be waning. The most recent polling data
indicates growing, if modest, public support for hosting a
radar facility: 59% support hosting a radar facility while
28% support hosting interceptors. Topolanek and Vondra are
well aware that a split decision is likely, and they fully
support this (indeed, Vondra has said this is the best
outcome, since it will place U.S. installations in two
Central European states rather than one). You will find the
Czechs most interested in making sure that a decision is
properly handled, so that the government has time to inform
all the key players in Parliament before they read about it
in the press.
== Foreign Deployments ==
5. (C) IRAQ: The Czech Republic is an original member of
Operation Iraqi Freedom and was at one time the fourth
largest contributor of troops to Iraq. From December 2003 to
December 2006, the Czech Army deployed approximately 100
military police in Basra to train an estimated 12,000 Iraqi
police and security forces. In December 2006, in
coordination with the British, the Czech military police
concluded this mission and relocated to a base near the Basra
airport to assume new duties, which largely involve force
protection. The Czechs have also participated in the
Multinational Security Transition Command and NATO Training
Mission-Iraq to help create security infrastructures in Iraq.
They sent six military police trainers to the NATO facility
in Baghdad and contributed $200,000 to the Trust Fund to
support this mission. The Czech Parliament recently extended
the troop mandate for Iraq through 2007.
6. (C) AFGHANISTAN: The Czech cabinet approved on December 20
the plan for a Czech-led PRT in Afghanistan. They will take
over from Hungary, which plans to leave Pol-e-Khomri in
October 2008. The MFA has decided to wait until a needs
assessment is complete before seeking additional
international partners. The January 26 NATO Foreign
Ministers' meeting will be important in determining the level
of ISAF capabilities and flexibilities needed to accomplish
the Czech PRT mission (and since this will be FM
Schwarzenberg's first NATO meeting, your discussion this week
will be important in shaping the Czech stance at that
important ministerial). You should also know that Lt.
General Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces
Comand-Afghanistan, will be in Prague for consultations on
January 22-23.
7. (C) BALKANS: The Czech Republic strongly supports USG
policy in Kosovo and Serbia, and the Balkans are the Czech
Republic's most important security priority. There are
currently almost 600 Czech troops in Kosovo under NATO
command, and an additional 60 troops are serving with EU
forces in Bosnia. The Czechs support resolving Kosovo's
final status as soon as possible after the January 2007
Serbian elections, and will support Attisaari's
recommendations. The Czechs continue to urge the EU to keep
the prospects of EU membership alive for Serbia, while
emphasizing the importance of full ICTY compliance as a
precondition for restarting talks. Note that you may find
former PM Paroubek outspoken on needing to protect the rights
of Kosovar Serbs, but his personal views have not had any
particular impact on Czech policies, which have strongly
supported the Contact Group and the EU.
== Transformational Diplomacy ==
8. (SBU) The Czech Republic believes it has a moral
obligation to help those struggling to be free based on its
own peaceful transition to democracy. They also recognize
the security benefits of promoting democracy and human rights
in troubled regions. Consequently the GOCR's approach to
transformational diplomacy is three-pronged: (1) traditional
diplomatic efforts (bilateral and through the EU),usually in
close cooperation with the USG; (2) democracy capacity
building projects; (3) humanitarian aid. In 2004, the MFA
created the Transformation Cooperation Unit (TRANS) to fund
capacity building projects that complement Czech diplomatic
efforts to promote democracy. TRANS is modeled on the U.S.
PRAGUE 00000022 003 OF 003
National Endowment for Democracy. In 2006, TRANS funded
projects in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq, Burma, Bosnia, Serbia,
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. People in Need, the largest
NGO in Central Europe, is often TRANS' implementing partner
on the ground. U.S. public and private groups have worked
closely with People in Need and TRANS. Our bilateral
cooperation on transformational diplomacy extends as well to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which has called Prague its
home since 1995. The Czechs have paid a price for this,
including suffering a trade embargo by Iran in retaliation
for the Prague-based Radio Farda broadcasts. But the Czech
government remains committed to the Radios' mission, and last
year presented Secretary Rice with a $1 million donation to
assist with RFE/RL's move to a new, more secure, headquarters
in 2008.
GRABER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR A/S DAN FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR RICHARD GRABER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR A/S FRIED'S JANUARY 11 VISIT
TO PRAGUE
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Graber for Reasons 1.4 B&D
1. (C) Dan, I'm looking forward to seeing you again. Your
visit will be our first opportunity to meet the "new" Czech
government that President Klaus will formally appoint
tomorrow (Tuesday) morning. You are set to call on new/old
Prime Minister Topolanek, new Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg,
and opposition leader (and former PM) Paroubek. You will
also have time with your old friend Sasha Vondra, who
tomorrow gets promoted from ForMin to Deputy PM for European
Affairs. Your visit is a great opportunity to demonstrate
U.S. interest in the Czech Republic, express our appreciation
for Czech support in the fight against terrorism and in
democracy promotion, and solicit GOCR commitment at the
highest levels in these on-going strategic arenas. Your stop
in Prague is particularly timely given that a decision on
missile defense is expected soon, and given the Czechs'
intense focus on possible revisions to the visa waiver
program. We also hope you will use the opportunity to remind
the government not to lose sight of the importance of foreign
policy issues as it sorts out its domestic political
situation. With the Czech Republic due to take over the EU
Presidency in the first half of 2009, the sooner the Czechs
can balance their domestic and external priorities the better
for both the EU and the USG.
== Political situation ==
2. (C) President Klaus will appoint the second Topolanek
government on the morning of January 9. PM Topolanek, whose
minority government has been in power since September,
despite losing its vote of confidence in October, will head a
three-party coalition of his center-right ODS with the Greens
and Christian Democrats. A vote of confidence is likely this
month, perhaps as early as next week. While chances for
success are only fifty-fifty at best, we expect that the
government appointed tomorrow, like its predecessor, will
govern the country for several months. If this government
also fails, we expect the third attempt to form a government
will be even more protracted than the first two. What is
noteworthy is that despite the absence of a confirmed
government since the June 2006 elections, Czech democratic
institutions continue to function, the private sector
continues to thrive, and the government remains committed to
key external commitments such as foreign deployments. Czech
foreign and security policies remain firmly transatlantic,
although the Czechs (with the notable exception of the
President) are also committed to the EU. Support for
democracy promotion and human rights is a hallmark of Czech
foreign policy, and incoming FM Schwarzenberg will only
strengthen this commitment. In particular, the Czechs have
been outspoken in support of democratic transition in Cuba
and staked out their strongest claim within the EU on Cuba.
As you know, with the exception of visas, we have excellent
bilateral relations with the Czechs.
== Visas ==
3. (SBU) Outgoing FM Vondra and Czech Ambassador in
Washington Kolar have been the two leading voices in the
Czech quest to enter the visa waiver program. When he took
office in the fall Vondra launched a coordinated effort of
new EU member states (the so-called Coalition for Visa
Equality) to lobby Congress for a political route to VWP
status. While convinced that the only path to VWP status
runs through a political solution, Vondra and the MFA have
agreed that we need to continue to work on the technical
aspects of border security, and that the Bilateral Consular
Working Group is therefore important to continue. Vondra and
I chaired the fall meeting of the BCWG in late November. The
Czechs were understandably pleased with the President's
announcement in Tallinn, and are looking forward to the visit
to Prague in late January of DHS Acting A/S Rosenzweig. The
Czechs are arranging a meeting in Prague with all VWP roadmap
countries during Rosenzweig's visit. The Czechs have high
hopes that the Democratic Congress will be more supportive of
new VWP requirements. It will be important during your
meetings and press statements to deliver a clear message that
does not inflate expectations.
== Missile Defense ==
4. (C) The Czech Republic remains keen on hosting a missile
defense facility. PM Topolanek and Vondra have been strong
proponents, while opposition leader Paroubek (CSSD) has given
explicit support for a radar site only, insisting that an
interceptor site would require a referendum. FM-designate
Schwarzenberg has not taken a firm stand on the topic, so
your meeting will be a chance to shape his views. The MFA
generally, and in particular Deputy FM Pojar, have been very
PRAGUE 00000022 002 OF 003
strong on MD, and very clear that they support a base because
they believe it to be in the Czechs' interests, not because
they expect anything in return (unfortunately Pojar will be
out of Prague during your visit, accompanying President Klaus
on a visit to Bratislava). In the months surrounding the
June 2006 general elections, there was significant noise from
a "No to Bases" campaign and from politicians seeking to turn
public discomfort with the possible presence of foreign
troops on Czech soil in to short term-political gains. More
recently, MD has not been a point of contention in the
government-formation process and public interest in the
issues appears to be waning. The most recent polling data
indicates growing, if modest, public support for hosting a
radar facility: 59% support hosting a radar facility while
28% support hosting interceptors. Topolanek and Vondra are
well aware that a split decision is likely, and they fully
support this (indeed, Vondra has said this is the best
outcome, since it will place U.S. installations in two
Central European states rather than one). You will find the
Czechs most interested in making sure that a decision is
properly handled, so that the government has time to inform
all the key players in Parliament before they read about it
in the press.
== Foreign Deployments ==
5. (C) IRAQ: The Czech Republic is an original member of
Operation Iraqi Freedom and was at one time the fourth
largest contributor of troops to Iraq. From December 2003 to
December 2006, the Czech Army deployed approximately 100
military police in Basra to train an estimated 12,000 Iraqi
police and security forces. In December 2006, in
coordination with the British, the Czech military police
concluded this mission and relocated to a base near the Basra
airport to assume new duties, which largely involve force
protection. The Czechs have also participated in the
Multinational Security Transition Command and NATO Training
Mission-Iraq to help create security infrastructures in Iraq.
They sent six military police trainers to the NATO facility
in Baghdad and contributed $200,000 to the Trust Fund to
support this mission. The Czech Parliament recently extended
the troop mandate for Iraq through 2007.
6. (C) AFGHANISTAN: The Czech cabinet approved on December 20
the plan for a Czech-led PRT in Afghanistan. They will take
over from Hungary, which plans to leave Pol-e-Khomri in
October 2008. The MFA has decided to wait until a needs
assessment is complete before seeking additional
international partners. The January 26 NATO Foreign
Ministers' meeting will be important in determining the level
of ISAF capabilities and flexibilities needed to accomplish
the Czech PRT mission (and since this will be FM
Schwarzenberg's first NATO meeting, your discussion this week
will be important in shaping the Czech stance at that
important ministerial). You should also know that Lt.
General Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces
Comand-Afghanistan, will be in Prague for consultations on
January 22-23.
7. (C) BALKANS: The Czech Republic strongly supports USG
policy in Kosovo and Serbia, and the Balkans are the Czech
Republic's most important security priority. There are
currently almost 600 Czech troops in Kosovo under NATO
command, and an additional 60 troops are serving with EU
forces in Bosnia. The Czechs support resolving Kosovo's
final status as soon as possible after the January 2007
Serbian elections, and will support Attisaari's
recommendations. The Czechs continue to urge the EU to keep
the prospects of EU membership alive for Serbia, while
emphasizing the importance of full ICTY compliance as a
precondition for restarting talks. Note that you may find
former PM Paroubek outspoken on needing to protect the rights
of Kosovar Serbs, but his personal views have not had any
particular impact on Czech policies, which have strongly
supported the Contact Group and the EU.
== Transformational Diplomacy ==
8. (SBU) The Czech Republic believes it has a moral
obligation to help those struggling to be free based on its
own peaceful transition to democracy. They also recognize
the security benefits of promoting democracy and human rights
in troubled regions. Consequently the GOCR's approach to
transformational diplomacy is three-pronged: (1) traditional
diplomatic efforts (bilateral and through the EU),usually in
close cooperation with the USG; (2) democracy capacity
building projects; (3) humanitarian aid. In 2004, the MFA
created the Transformation Cooperation Unit (TRANS) to fund
capacity building projects that complement Czech diplomatic
efforts to promote democracy. TRANS is modeled on the U.S.
PRAGUE 00000022 003 OF 003
National Endowment for Democracy. In 2006, TRANS funded
projects in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq, Burma, Bosnia, Serbia,
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. People in Need, the largest
NGO in Central Europe, is often TRANS' implementing partner
on the ground. U.S. public and private groups have worked
closely with People in Need and TRANS. Our bilateral
cooperation on transformational diplomacy extends as well to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which has called Prague its
home since 1995. The Czechs have paid a price for this,
including suffering a trade embargo by Iran in retaliation
for the Prague-based Radio Farda broadcasts. But the Czech
government remains committed to the Radios' mission, and last
year presented Secretary Rice with a $1 million donation to
assist with RFE/RL's move to a new, more secure, headquarters
in 2008.
GRABER