KOSOVO: CZECH GOVERNMENT ON AHTISAARI PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000195 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS EUR/NCE FOR ERIC FICHTE, EUR/SCE FOR JOSHUA BLACK E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM YI ZL EZ SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CZECH GOVERNMENT ON AHTISAARI PROPOSAL REF: 2006 PRAGUE 0744 Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Czech government continues its firm support for the Ahtisaari plan. The Czechs are concerned about EU unity on Kosovo, particularly if a new UNSC resolution fails. The opposition CSSD, whose leader has expressed skepticism about Contact Group efforts, is not making it easy for the Czech government. The MFA believes that the CSSD may be expressing criticism of the Ahtisaari plan at the request of the Slovak Prime Minister (CSSD Chairman Paroubek and Slovak PM Fico are close). We will engage with the Czechs on Kosovo in the weeks ahead, and would strongly support possible consultations between the Czech government and EUR DAS DiCarlo. End summary. ¶2. (C) POLOFF met with MFA Director of South-East and East European Department Tomas Szunyog on February 21 to discuss the Czech position on Kosovo. Szunyog confirmed the Czechs continue to "fully support" the Ahtisaari proposal, including the recommended schedule and way forward. ¶3. (C) Szunyog expressed hope that the proposal will move quickly to the UNSC for consideration (ideally in early March) and that a resolution expressly superseding UNSCR 1244 and authorizing the continuing presence of NATO and EU troops will be approved. He said it is important to act quickly to keep the momentum. ¶4. (C) If the UN resolution were to fail, Szunyog feared that EU unity could splinter. He thought that Slovakia in particular may move to block consensus, thereby preventing the EU from recognizing an independent Kosovo. Other possible EU opponents of unilateral recognition include Cyprus, Greece, Spain, and Romania, he said. Szunyog also predicted that some of Kosovo's neighbors may refuse to accept Kosovo's independence without a UNSC resolution. For example, he thought Montenegro may not recognize Kosovo for fear of antagonizing Serbia. 5.(C) Regarding Serbia's prospects for EU accession, Szunyog noted the February 12-13 GAERC conclusions expressly state that Serbia "remains welcome" to join the EU. He added this position is not likely to change. Nevertheless, the EU member states continue to disagree on the extent to which ICTY compliance should be required prior to resuming SAA talks. Restarting SAA talks will encourage Serbs to focus on their future, thereby minimizing the rise of nationalism and/or the risk of conflict (although Szunyog was skeptical about the possibility of violence). Other member states, such as the UK, are sticklers on ICTY compliance. In the GAERC conclusions, the foreign ministers finally agreed on text that requires "concrete actions" towards ICTY compliance. ¶6. (C) In the Czech Republic, Szunyog foresaw increased debate about the Ahtisaari package. Szunyog noted that the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) have become more outspoken in their opposition to the Ahtisaari proposal. Specifically, the Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee Jan Hamacek (CSSD) recently stated that he believes final status should emerge from an agreement between the Serbs and the Kosovars, and should not be imposed on one or the other party. CSSD has called for further debate on the issue within Parliament. Szunyog believed the Slovaks had urged CSSD to state this position more openly than they had in the past. (Comment: CSSD Chairman Jiri Paroubek has long stated this view openly, including when he was prime minister. Despite this -- Paroubek's "personal opinions" on Kosovo -- his government, like the current one, supported the Contact Group position. End comment). ¶7. (C) Looking ahead, Szunyog was confident that Czech policy would not change in the immediate future. He hesitated, however, on the question of what happens if the UNSC fails to authorize a new resolution. Szunyog did not want to speculate, but did offer that the government could have to take into account the views of CSSD in such a situation. In a separate meeting on February 27, MFA Political Director Martin Povejsil told DCM that the GOCR hopes that the current "debate" in Slovakia on Kosovo will not "spill over" into the Czech Republic. ¶8. (SBU) Szunyog recalled the success of his bilateral consultations with DAS Rosemary DiCarlo and Kosovo Desk Officer Joshua Black last spring. He said these meetings helped the Czechs better align their Kosovo policy with U.S. policy, and he hoped that another meeting with DiCarlo might PRAGUE 00000195 002 OF 002 be arranged in Washington or during one of DiCarlo's visits to Europe. ¶9. (C) Comment. We will engage with the GOCR on the UNSC resolution and on Czech thoughts on leverage they or others may have with the Slovaks. The Czech government believes it has little chance of turning around Slovak PM Fico; the one person who could -- CSSD Chairman Paroubek -- firmly believes that the approach Ahtisaari has recommended is wrong. The MFA also appears to fear that Czech intervention in Bratislava could backfire domestically, giving greater voice to the CSSD and opponents of the deal and complicating the government's task of maintaining firm support for Ahtisaari. GRABER