MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: THE ROAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001160

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV NATO EZ
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: THE ROAD
AHEAD

REF: A. PRAGUE 0999

B. PRAGUE 1080

C. PRAGUE 1009

D. STATE 138417

Classified By: Ambassador Richard Graber for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary and Comment: We have seen a measurable
improvement in support for missile defense since our August
update (Ref A). US and Czech efforts since August have
started to positively influence the debate. Recent polls show
that only 49% of the Czech public is now against the radar,
down from 60% to 70% earlier this year. Codels, trips of
journalists and Czech health experts to Kwajelin, and the
Czech Government's sustained public diplomacy efforts have
all made important contributions to improving public support
for the radar.

2.(C) Over the summer, the likely timeline for ratification
slipped to spring 2008(Ref A). Upcoming budget debates and
the February 2008 Czech presidential elections make an
earlier ratification vote impossible. Getting the 101 votes
in Parliament to ratify the Ballistic Missile Defense
Agreement (BMDA) and the Supplemental Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) will continue to require a structured,
long-term public outreach effort with significant investments
from high-level State Department and Department of Defense
officials. Secretary Gates, visit later this month is a
significant first step. We also should seek ways to showcase
tangible economic benefits from hosting the radar. Action
requests are in paragraphs 3, 11-13, 17, and 19. End Summary
and Comment.

Successful Codels

3.(SBU) One of the major impediments identified in the summer
was the perceived lack of support in Congress for missile
defense. Every Congressional Committee or Sub-Committee vote
to cut funding was dissected in the Czech press. The press
saw each vote as a sign that Congressional support for
missile defense was waning. Likewise, the Czech public became
convinced that Congress was considering proceeding with the
radar in the Czech Republic, but not with the interceptors in
Poland. Codels led by Representative Franks and
Representative Tauscher reassured Czech politicians and the
public that MD does have significant bipartisan support and
that the radar and the interceptors are a package deal (Refs.
B and C). We request that the Bureau of Legislative Affairs
(H) encourage Senators and Representatives, especially
well-known foreign policy experts like Senator Lugar, to
visit Prague and further reinforce Representative Franks' and
Tauscher's messages.

Trips to Kwajelin

4.(SBU) The Embassy and the Czechs have countered the
anti-radar campaign of half truths and rumors by sending
groups of journalists and health experts to Kwajelin to see
the proposed radar in operation. In early September, a group
of Czech journalists visited the island. The journalists
filed many positive stories, particularly on the radio,
detailing daily life on the island and the radar's limited
impact. In September and October, two groups of Czech health
experts from the Ministry of Health and the Academy of
Sciences visited Kwajelin. The independent measurements and
conclusions contained in their reports supported US claims
that there are no health risks from the radar and that it
does not violate any Czech standards. Newspapers and
television stations widely covered the report's conclusions.

Czech Government Gets its Act Together

5.(C) Over the summer, the Czech Government was losing the
public debate (Ref A). 60% to 70% of Czechs were against the
proposed radar facility. Since then, public opinion has
started to shift. In September, STEM, the equivalent of the
Gallup organization in the US, released a poll showing only
49% of Czechs were against the proposed radar system. While
only 22% of those polled were in favor of hosting the
facility, 50% of those against the radar said they would be
open to changing their opinion if they were provided with
more information. This figure is a strong indication that we
have an opportunity to positively influence the debate.

6.(U) Despite a shaky start (Ref. A),the Czech Government's
"MD Communications Czar" or "Mr. Radar," Tomas Klvana, helped
to focus the Government's efforts on providing information to
the public. Working with a local public relations firm, the
Government is planning a multi-faceted information campaign.

The centerpiece of this campaign is two new websites. The
first site, www.protiraketovaobrana.cz, is run in
coordination with Klvana through a partially
government-funded NGO. The site contains information on the
radar, editorials and other opinion pieces from the Czech and
international press, and outlines why hosting this radar is
advantageous to the Czech Republic. The public can also
submit questions for experts to answer. A second website,
www.protiraketam.cz, offers similar content and will be up
and running by the end of October. However, heavy use of the
web will most likely only reach a younger, more pro-MD
audience. To reach voters over 35 who may not be as
well-informed on MD as younger internet users, officials are
also preparing information brochures, DVDs, and
advertisements for placement on public transport, in outdoor
areas, and in free daily newspapers distributed to commuters.

7.(SBU) The Czech Government has begun to listen to regional
concerns and discuss development projects for the Brdy
region. On October 8th, the Czech Government Commission for
the Development of the Brdy Region held its first meeting.
Headed by Deputy Minister of Finance Ivan Fuksa, a former
Mayor of Pribam, the Commission is charged with spending 1.2
billion Czech Koruna ($63.1 million) on projects in the Brdy
region. The Ministry of Finance will provide between 200 and
250 million Czech Koruna ($10.3 to $12.9 million) next year.
Additional grants are expected from the European Union.
Potential projects include rebuilding roads, extending
highway D-5, building or refurbishing military buildings, and
improving public water and electrical systems. The Commission
will next meet on October 25th to review a list of potential
projects. Although the Government officially says that the
work of this Commission is not dependent on the MD project
going forward, our hope is that, if the villages see some
real economic gains from this Commission, they may soften
their opposition to the proposed radar facility.

Negotiations

8.(C) The next round of negotiations on the Supplemental SOFA
is set for October 30-31. November 1 is a possible third day.
Our hope is that we will be able to make substantial progress
on the major outstanding issues, especially on the scope of
the agreement. Given their history, any broad agreement that
leaves open the possibility of hosting large numbers of US
troops will be deeply unpopular among the Czech public. The
next round of negotiations for the Ballistic Missile Defense
Agreement will be in Prague on November 5 and 6. Initial
indications from the Czechs are that we will be able to make
substantial progress on this agreement. Going forward, we
need to sure that our desire to conclude the agreements
quickly is matched by a quick turnaround of consolidated
texts to the Czechs, especially as we seek to resolve more
difficult issues like the scope of the SOFA.

Framework Agreement and Industrial Cooperation

9.(SBU) In his latest remarks to visiting Congressional and
USG delegations, Prime Minister Topolanek has played up the
potential for greater high-tech cooperation between our
respective defense industries. To facilitate this type of
cooperation, the Czech Government is keen to negotiate a
Framework Agreement on Missile Defense Cooperation (FA). The
proposed agreement would allow for MDA and the Czech MOD to
collaborate on MD-related technologies. In early October, DFM
Pojar gave us a non-paper in response to the MDA provided
draft agreement. The Czechs agreed with MDA,s basic
framework, preamble, and scope, but are clearly looking for
ways to ensure that some concrete cooperation develops.
Managing Czech expectations for this agreement will be
critical.

10.(SBU) In the non-paper, the Czechs outlined a number of
key questions they would like answered before moving forward.
These include: whether the agreement in any practical way
facilitates cooperation between Czech and US companies,
whether the procedures for Czech companies involved in the US
Ballistic Missile Defense System will be any easier after
signing the FA, and if the proposed cooperation envisioned in
the agreement extends beyond missile defense. They would also
like to know how the annexes will be negotiated and if we
have similar agreements with other allies. EUR/NCE is
currently working with interagency partners to find answers
to these questions. Per ref. D, we forwarded to DFM Pojar U/S
Rood,s letter on the FA subsequent to receiving the Czech
non-paper.

11.(SBU) The non-paper also outlined their desire to hold a
seminar on industrial cooperation tied to MD technology. In

September, DFM Pojar and General Obering agreed to hold in
November in Prague a so-called Missile Defense Business
Event. In subsequent conversations between DFM Pojar and MDA
Deputy Director for International Affairs Morgan, the time
frame for this event was moved to January 2008. The Czechs
are very keen on holding this event and are eagerly awaiting
MDA's proposal. Our recommendation is that Ms. Morgan visit
Prague in early November to review MDA's plans.

Defense Procurement

12.(C) Czech commercial interest is not limited to just the
potential MD Framework Agreement. We should also find ways to
increase the Department of Defense (DOD) purchases of Czech
goods and services. We recommend moving forward with a
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement. Such an agreement
promotes transparency and integrity in defense acquisitions
and allows Czech and US companies to compete equally for each
other's defense procurements by removing national purchase
requirements and customs duties. In 2002, we were negotiating
such an agreement with the Czechs. When it became clear that
the Czechs had several fundamental issues, including
significant corruption that would make it impossible to
conclude an agreement, we suspended negotiations. To join the
EU, we believe that they have made significant progress
addressing many of these issues. Although it could be up to a
two year process, re-opening these talks could help show the
Czechs that we are seeking ways to help them gain
economically from MD.

13.(SBU) We wish to highlight existing opportunities for
Czech companies to do business with DOD. We recommend that an
official from the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
visit Prague. Such a visit would allow for him or her to not
only talk with companies interested in selling to DOD, but
also to make sure that he or she sees what the Czechs have to
offer. We also want to take advantage of existing training in
Europe on DOD procurement policies and procedures for
commercial companies. Our hope is that, with the Czech firms
better knowing how to compete, DOD will purchase more Czech
goods and services and demonstrate that there are real
economic benefits from having a close military relationship
with the US. However, managing Czech expectations for
potential DOD acquisitions will be extremely important.

Embassy Outreach

14.(C) We have reinforced our own public outreach efforts. In
early October, we kicked off a comprehensive outreach
campaign targeting key members of the Czech Parliament,
regional governors, mayors, political advisors, defense
experts, and opinion leaders. Our goal is to try to influence
as many people as possible through one-on-one meetings or
small gatherings with the Ambassador or Embassy staff, press
events, and public debates with radar opponents. Through
these efforts, we hope to create an environment in Parliament
where ratification is more likely. We also want to try to
improve relations with the Brdy region and demonstrate that
we will be a positive addition to the region.

16.(C)We expect that Defense Secretary Gates, visit late
this month will be a major contribution to our outreach
efforts. He will hold talks with President Klaus, the Prime
Minister, the Defense Minister, and the opposition leader,
Jiri Paroubek. He is also scheduled to meet with 15-20
members of parliament and answer questions from the press.

The Road Ahead

17.(C) Many potential supporters from opposition parties and
the Government have told us that they will not be able to
vote for the SOFA or the BMDA without a clear declaration
from NATO that the radar and the interceptors will eventually
be part of an integrated NATO system. Everyone agrees that
the system needs to be "NATO-ized," but both we and the
Czechs have continued to talk abstractly about this issue. We
need to engage the Czechs and other like-minded allies on our
MD strategy for Bucharest. By taking a political decision at
Bucharest to move forward on medium and short range missile
defense, NATO will dramatically increase the chances that the
Czech Parliament will approve both treaties.

High-Level Visits to Prague

18.(SBU) With spring 2008 following the NATO summit in
Bucharest the likely time for ratification, we now face a
longer road ahead than we first thought. We now will require
a sustained in country public outreach effort that relies on
a number of high-level Defense and State Department visits.

Our goal is to have at least one visitor at the DAS level or
above every four to six weeks. Ref A outlines the major areas
where we still need to focus our public diplomacy efforts,
including: forging a consensus within NATO for comprehensive
missile defense, outlining the threat to Europe from
ballistic missiles, building upon the successful Tauscher and
Franks' visit to dispel the myth that Congressional support
for MD is in question, and outlining the economic benefits of
hosting the radar.


19. (C) We realize that this list of potential visitors is
very ambitious. However, regular visits from senior DOD and
State Department officials culminating in a visit from
Secretary Rice is the only way to win over skeptical members

SIPDIS
of parliament and to demonstrate to the Czechs that we value
them as a major transatlantic partners. Therefore, looking
ahead, we request Washington work on the following visits:

Date: November 2007.
Visitor: General O,Reilly, Deputy Director of the Missile
Defense Agency.
Purpose: Provide detailed briefings to parliamentarians on
the ballistic missile threat and give interviews to local
press.

Date: November 2007.
Visitor: Nancy Morgan, MDA Deputy Director for International
Affairs.
Purpose: Review with the Czechs MDA's plans for a Missile
Defense Business Event.

Date: November or December 2007.
Visitor: Ambassador Nuland, US Permanent Representative to
NATO.
Purpose: Update parliamentarians and the public on our plans
to "NATOize" the MD system.

Date: December 2007.
Visitor: EUR PDAS Kurt Volker.
Purpose: Lobby Czech officials on the threat from ballistic
missiles and how the radar could be integrated into a
comprehensive NATO missile defense system.

Date: January 2008.
Visitor: General Obering, Director of the Missile Defense
Agency.
Purpose: Update parliamentarians on recent MDA tests; outline
on a technical level how the proposed US bilateral system
could complement a future NATO system.
Visit the Brdy region to tour the site and talk with local
residents and officials.

Date: February or March 2008.
Visitor: Under Secretary Burns.
Purpose: Serve as a keynote speaker for a joint
US-Czech-Polish conference on missile defense. Approximately
40 influential politicians, commentators, and experts would
take part in this conference. Changing the minds of a few of
these very influential people could win greater public and
parliamentary support.

Date: March 2008.
Visitor: NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer.
Purpose: Provide well-timed, public statements indicating
NATO's willingness to support MD to give political cover for
members of parliament to vote for the two agreements.

Date: Spring 2008.
Visitor: The Secretary.
Purpose: Demonstrate shortly before the ratification vote the
importance of MD to the Administration and underscore that
the US values the Czechs as a major partner. Her visit could
also win a few additional votes in Parliament.

Visits to the US


19. (C) We will continue to need to host Czech officials and
parliamentarians at the highest possible levels. In several
cases, high-level meetings in Washington have helped to
increase support for MD. We request that Washington host the
following Czech politicians and delegations:

Date: November 2007.
Visit: CSSD Chair and Opposition Leader Jiri Paroubek to
Washington.
Purpose: Demonstrate to Paroubek that we value his opinions
and actively seek his party,s support for missile defense.
Date: November 2007.
Visit: Deputy Foreign Minister Tomas Pojar to Washington.

Purpose: To strategize and hear from the main Czech
negotiator how he believes negotiations are going and what he
sees as the prospects for Parliament ratifying both
agreements.

Date: Winter 2007/2008.
Visit: Prime Minister Topolanek to Washington.
Purpose: Demonstrate that we value the Czechs' help on MD and
increase his ability to keep his coalition partners in line.

Date: Winter 2007/2008.
Visit: Members of Czech Parliament to Kwajelin or California.
Purpose: Continue to help to calm the fears of many
parliamentarians that the radar will be health risk or
interfere with daily life in the Brdy region.
Graber