DASD CAGAN SEEKS CZECH HELP IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001144 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017 TAGS: IR AF MARR MASS PREL NATO SUBJECT: DASD CAGAN SEEKS CZECH HELP IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN Classified By: DCM Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 b+d ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: DOD DASD Cagan held talks with Czech First Deputy Minister of Defense Martin Bartak and Deputy Foreign Minister Tomas Pojar on October 4, 2007. DASD Cagan sought from the Czechs an additional 20 troops for Iraq, a company (100 to 120 troops) to help the Dutch in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, and the continued deployment of their special operational police with the British in Helmand, Afghanistan. The Czechs, while being non-committal on Cagan,s request to help the Dutch or increase the number of troops in Iraq to 120, asked DASD Cagan for vehicles and other equipment for their special forces and their upcoming PRT in Logar, Afghanistan. Ms. Cagan promised to try to obtain 26 1151 Humvees with IED jammers and provide lift and sustain funds. By giving them vehicles, the Czechs can use their $6 million dollars in Coalition Solidarity Funding (CSF) for other PRT-related expenses. ¶2. The Czechs were pleased with Cagan,s offer. Partially as a play for more budgetary resources, the MOD is keener than the MFA to support the Dutch and to deploy 20 more troops to Iraq. Citing difficulty in winning parliamentary approval, DFM Tomas Pojar, while remaining more positive about helping the Dutch, doubted that they could provide more troops to coalition efforts in Iraq. (On October 10th, the MFA Director of Security Policy told the Embassy that the troop deployment package the Government was considering had only 100 troops for Iraq. Later that same day, the MOD informed Post that the Government was still considering deploying 120 troops to Iraq.) To resolve this issue, the Government has delayed the final approval of 2008 deployments to allow further discussion on helping the Dutch and the Iraq deployment. End Summary and Comment. ¶3. (U) Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Josef Proks began the meeting with an overview of the MOD,s proposed deployments for 2008. They proposed 120 troops for Iraq, 335 for ISAF, and 450 for Kosovo. DFM Pojar was doubtful that the 120 figure for Iraq would survive a vote in Government. For ISAF, Proks proposed 180 military personnel for the new Czech PRT in Logar Province and ten soldiers for a new Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT). The OMLT will help train the Afghanistan National Army,s (ANA) helicopter corps. Under the current proposal, 35 special military police will continue to be deployed with British forces in Helmand, while 100 personal will remain with the field hospital at Kabul Airport. ¶4. (C) Major General Proks detailed the Czech equipment shortfalls for their PRT in Logar Province beginning in January 2008. The Czechs still need critical equipment, including: light-armored vehicles, crew-served weapons, vehicle-mounted radios, Blue Force tracking systems, symphony IED jammers, and night vision goggles. The Czechs plan to have the PRT fully functional by March 2008. The Czechs face similar equipment shortfalls for their Special Operations Group (SOG) military police unit in Helmand. ¶5. (C) Ms. Cagan offered to try to obtain under 1202 authority a loan of 20 1151 Humvees and would try to make available counter-IED jammers for the PRT deployment and for the special military police unit in Helmand Province, as well as lift and sustain funding for both deployments. She would also try to see if the SOG in Helmand could receive their 1151s by the end of the year, and the 1151s for the PRT by early 2008. Unfortunately, due to the US demands for equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, she was not able to help with their other requests. Since they will not have to purchase LAVs, she encouraged them to use their CSF funding for other PRT expenses and other MOD resources for their Special Operations Group in Helmand. Bartak mentioned that this loan of 1151s will free-up $4 million dollars of CSF funding for other uses. Cagan promised the Czechs a quick answer on any CSF funding restrictions. ¶6. (C) Outlining how one could not let NATO fail in Afghanistan, Ms. Cagan requested that the Czechs send special forces to Uruzgan Province to fight with the Dutch. The Czechs were cool to the idea of sending special forces, but subsequent discussions focused on sending an infantry company. In subsequent conversations, the MFA informed the Embassy that they would rather see their efforts in Afghanistan focused on the new PRT. On October 10th, the MFA told Post that the Dutch have already contacted them and will be in Prague on October 17th to discuss this possible deployment. The Czechs promised to keep the Embassy informed of their on-going discussions. ¶7. (C) On Iraq, Cagan agreed with Bartak that the Czechs would further discuss upping the number of troops in Iraq from 100 to 120. DFM Pojar subsequently informed the Embassy that he thinks that increasing the number going to Iraq in the 2008 deployment bill could jeopardize the entire package. However, MFA staff added that, if the Czechs were given a mission that focused on training or working with local forces instead of providing force protection for the British, chances for approval would be better. Embassy officers encouraged the Czechs to discuss this possibility with the British. ¶8. DASD Cagan cleared on this cable. Thompson-Jones