REPATRIATION OF CRIMINAL DEPORTEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 000076 SIPDIS SIPDIS SANTO DOMINGO FOR BICE DHS FOR ASHLY IVERY STATE FOR WHA/CAR S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL HA SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF CRIMINAL DEPORTEES REF: 02387 AND PREVIOUS PORT AU PR 00000076 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JANET A. SANDERSON, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. This message contains a request for guidance from BICE and the Department. Please see paragraphs 8 and 9. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Poloff On January 9 met with GOH officials to schedule the next transfer of criminal deportees and to resolve continued problems that have plagued the deportation program since it was reinstated in May 2006. The minister of interior's chief of staff, Lubraine Bien-Aime, agreed to steps intended to regularize the deportation process. However, he also requested that all future "non-criminal" deportees be included in Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation (JPATS) flights (such flights to Haiti and other countries have carried predominantly "criminal" deportees in the past),and that each JPATS flight contain no more than 10 deportees convicted of violent crimes. A total of 352 deportees have been repatriated to Haiti on JPATS flights since the USG and the GOH reinstated the deportation program in May 2006. The matter of criminal deportations continues to be a sensitive and controversial bilateral issue between the USG and the GOH, as the GOH publicly blames much of the country's current insecurity on the deportees ) a claim for which it has provided no concrete evidence. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) intends to repatriate 50-100 deportees per month in 2007. END SUMMARY. GOH Counterparts -------------- ¶3. (C) On January 9 Poloff met with the minister of interior,s chief of staff, Lubraine Bien-Aime to discuss the criminal deportee program. Also attending were Keteleen Martial, a member of the interior minister's cabinet and Jean Osselin Lambert, representing the ministry's immigration department. Bien-Aime became post's point of contact for repatriations in December: while our previous GOH counterpart had been reliable and cooperative, Bien-Aime and Martial have raised difficulties since taking over. Most notably, upon the arrival of the December 20 repatriation flight, Bien-Aime refused to accept two deportees ) one because the deportee claimed Cuban citizenship (based on a birth record that had been proven fraudulent by an earlier BICE investigation); and the other because the deportee claimed to be a French citizen (even though the GOH had granted him a Haitian passport from the Haitian consulate in Curacao). BICE reluctantly returned both deportees to the US. Again, on January 4, Martial refused to accept a deportee with a Haitian passport because he had been born in the Bahamas before it became independent. On other occasions, the GOH has rejected deportees who have had pending civil lawsuits against the USG or who claim to have unresolved medical problems. In all cases, GoH authorities have had the case files of each deportee in advance, and raised no prior objections to their repatriation. ¶4. (C) Bien-Aime has also maintained the GOH policy of attempting to renegotiate previously agreed terms in advance of each flight. The GOH asked to reduce the number of flights and the number of deportees per flight; to receive more notice in advance of flights; to have earlier flight arrival times; to delay previously scheduled flights; to receive the written dossiers of each deportee rather than personally interview the deportee in the US; and to receive funds to construct a receiving facility. In many cases, BICE and the embassy have been able to accommodate GOH requests, though it has resulted in additional cost and staff time. Agreement on the Next Flights -------------- ¶5. (C) At the meeting on January 9, Bien-Aime agreed that the next JPATS flight of 50 criminal deportees would arrive in Port-au-Prince on January 31 at 10:00am. In accordance with past practice, Poloff agreed to provide Bien-Aime with the dossiers for up to 70 prospective deportees three weeks PORT AU PR 00000076 002.2 OF 003 in advance of the flight (such dossiers were delivered on January 10). At Poloff's request, Bien-Aime agreed to advise Poloff five working days in advance of the flight's arrival if the GOH challenged the citizenship of any of the deportees. By agreement, those deportees would not be included on the flight and their citizenship would be resolved in the US via discussions between the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and the Haitian embassy or its consulates. From the remaining list of prospective deportees, DHS would select a maximum of 50 individuals for the upcoming JPATS flight (a few deportees are usually dropped from the list for medical or legal reasons). At Poloff's insistence, Bien-Aime agreed that the GOH would accept all deportees embarking on the JPATS flight upon their arrival in Haiti, without challenge. ¶6. (C) Bien-Aime further agreed that another JPATS flight of 50 deportees would tentatively take place on February 14. Also on that flight, BICE would send a team of representatives to examine how it could use its expertise and discretionary funds to assist the GOH is processing the returning deportees. Bien-Aime agreed to confirm the tentative date for that flight within 24 hours, which he has failed to do. (NOTE: BICE offered to send such a team over six months ago, but the GOH has failed to accept the offer or provide a date, despite frequent urging from Poloff. END NOTE) ¶7. (C) Poloff requested that Bien-Aime assist in referring more deportees into the reintegration program offered by the Office of International Migration (OIM),pointing out that only 40 out of 352 criminal deportees repatriated to Haiti have been placed in the program by the GOH. Bien-Aime responded that he would recommend a practice of referring all deportees into the program and withholding the issuance of a passport to any deportee who fails to complete the OIM program. (Comment: This was a welcome response from Bien-Aime, as both Poloff and OIM have repeatedly requested that the GOH refer all deportees into the program. The OIM program is funded via the UN Development Program (UNDP) with a $1 million contribution from the USG. End Comment.) More GOH Requests: Request for Guidance -------------- ¶8. (C) Bien-Aime expressed concern about the repatriation of non-criminal deportees, who are repatriated via commercial airline flights to Port-au-Prince. In order to more efficiently process those deportees, Bien-Aime requested that BICE advise him via E-mail at least 40 hours in advance with the names and flight numbers of all returning non-criminal deportees. (NOTE: The GOH just recently implemented a program to interview, photograph and fingerprint all deportees. END NOTE) To aid in processing, Bien-Aime additionally requested that BICE transfer all deportees (criminal and non-criminal alike) via JPATS flights. Finally, Bien-Aime requested that BICE transfer a maximum of 10 deportees convicted of violent crimes on each JPATS flight. He explained that such a practice would assist the GOH in processing the deportees. (COMMENT: The real reason for Bien-Aime,s last request is that, contrary to a Haitian court order issued in 2006, the GOH has resumed its policy of incarcerating most of the deportees upon their arrival in Haiti. The prison and jails in Port-au-Prince are too full to accommodate more than a few deportees at a time. Following the December 20 JPATS flight for example, the GOH unsuccessfully attempted to find jail space for several deportees and reluctantly had to release them. END COMMENT) ¶9. (C) Request for Guidance: Post expects that the above requests: 40 hour advance notification for returning non-criminal deportees, and return of all deportees by JPATS, and a maximum of 10 violent criminals (however defined) are unworkable, and communicated as much to the GOH in our initial response. Bien-Aime insisted that his request was a formal representation, however, and post requests BICE/Department guidance in providing a detailed explanation of the logistical and legal framework under which we may PORT AU PR 00000076 003.2 OF 003 return non-criminal deportees and to what extent we can accommodate his request to limit the number of deportees convicted of violent crimes on any given flight. Background -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The USG and the GOH reinstated the criminal deportee program in May of 2006, following the installation of Haiti's newly-elected government. The USG had previously suspended the deportation program for almost two years at the request of the preceding interim government while that government struggled to address security and election issues. The most recent JPATS flights on December 20 and January 4 repatriated 48 and 47 deportees, respectively. Since the reinstitution of the program, BICE has repatriated a total of 352 deportees to Haiti from the US aboard periodic JPATS flights in addition to several hundred non-criminal deportees on commercial flights. ¶11. (SBU) The suspension of JPATS flights for the interim government, combined with the GOH's foot-dragging in the resumption of the program, caused a significant backlog of incarcerated Haitian citizens awaiting deportation to Haiti. According to BICE, the latest JPATS flight eliminated the backlog that existed in May 2006, when the program resumed. Since then, more pending criminal deportees have entered the queue. At the present time, there are 60 criminal deportees awaiting repatriation to Haiti and more are being added to the list every month. Based on information provided by BICE, Post expects that JPATS flights will continue in 2007 at the rate of one or two a month, with a maximum of 50 deportees on each flight. ¶12. (C) The latest batch of deportees arrived amid continued controversy fanned by Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis and other GOH officials who maintain that criminal deportees from the US are a major cause of insecurity in Haiti. Specifically, Alexis expressed his opinion on many occasions (both publicly and to Emboffs) that the current wave of kidnappings and murders in Haiti is largely the work of criminals who the USG has deported to Haiti. Despite the embassy's requests, the GOH has failed to provide evidence to substantiate that claim. The PM's allegation has received widespread media coverage. The PM recently stated to parliament that the USG threatened to withdraw economic aid and to restrict the issuance of visas to the US if the GOH does not agree to accept the deportees (reftel),a charge the Embassy publicly denied. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: We trust that this meeting with Bien-Aime will help to resolve the problems that have required an inordinate amount of resources and staff time from BICE and the embassy in implementing the criminal deportation program. It is our goal to make the program operate in a routine and uneventful manner. Nevertheless, the ongoing public controversy, which we expect GOH officials will continue to stoke, combined with the questionable administrative capacity of the GOH will require extra diligence on our part to keep repatriations on track. TIGHE