Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PORTAUPRINCE252
2007-02-06 13:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:
MINUSTAH SLOWS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
how-toVZCZCXRO9433 PP RUEHQU DE RUEHPU #0252 0371343 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 061343Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5276 INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1404 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1227 RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 0708 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1121
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000252
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO EAID HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SLOWS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
REF: PORT AU PRINCE 2202
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000252
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO EAID HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SLOWS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
REF: PORT AU PRINCE 2202
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH has a habit of blaming
international aid agencies for moving too slowly to implement
projects in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of
Port-au-Prince. However, staff at the International
Organization for Migration (IOM),USAID's main implementing
partner in community development, maintain that it is in fact
MINUSTAH that is slowing the process. MINUSTAH staff report
that they have streamlined their own organization in order to
better integrate military/law enforcement and development
efforts. The U.S. and other donors should press MINUSTAH for
better results rather than allow them to pass blame to
others. End Summary.
2. (C) International assistance organizations like the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) have a
difficult time launching some of their development projects
due to the slow process of coordinating with MINUSTAH. IOM's
Matt Huber (strictly protect) told Poloff on February 1 that
IOM would like to start projects in certain parts of
Port-au-Prince but has had to postpone work because of
MINUSTAH's complicated bureaucracy. Huber cited the example
of a project in the Martissant neighborhood on the southern
end of Port-au-Prince. IOM wanted to start development
projects in the area to build up the credibility of civil
society and show the citizens that MINUSTAH can provide
positive services for them. MINUSTAH endorsed the program
but hemmed and hawed about the timing of the projects, citing
the prerequisites of coordinating with the troops in the area
as well as their civil affairs division. By the time IOM was
able to start the projects, a valuable opportunity to
underline the value of legitimate government as opposed to
gang rule had already been lost, in Huber's opinion.
3. (C) IOM also asked for UN equipment for the projects so
MINUSTAH would be credited with the development work, but
they were so slow in providing the equipment that IOM's local
contractor ended up using his own bulldozers. Huber cited
MINUSTAH's effort to set up a base of operations in the
center of Martissant as another example of the organization's
protracted decision-making process. MINUSTAH settled on a
location for the base in summer 2006 (ref A) but did not open
the center until February 1, 2007.
4. (C) Huber said he now faces a parallel challenge in Cite
Soleil. He would like to begin adding more development
projects as soon as possible to capitalize on MINUSTAH's
latest push into the neighborhood but he expressed concern
that because of MINUSTAH's sluggish reaction time, IOM may
not be able to start the projects before the void of gang
leadership is filled by new gangs. Huber's theory is that it
is necessary to build up civic leaders so people turn to them
for help instead of to the gangs, thereby undercutting the
power and authority of the gangs. (Note: IOM implements
USAID's Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI) program, initially
funded by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and
now funded and managed by USAID/Haiti. End Note.)
5. (C) Comment: Despite frequent complaints by MINUSTAH
elements - the Brazilians in particular - that the
international community needs to do more aid work in troubled
neighborhoods, they themselves are creating additional
hurdles to progress. This is not the first time Post has
heard criticism of MINUSTAH's sluggish decision-making
process. MINUSTAH risks losing valuable momentum if it
cannot move more quickly to coordinate with international aid
projects. The organization also loses face with the
community when Haitian contractors are exposed to
malfunctions within MINUSTAH programming. MINUSTAH's
political staff told Poloffs that with the most recent
arrivals of senior staff, their own coordination and decision
process has greatly improved. Time will tell, but in the
meantime we should not let the argument pass that donors are
to blame for slow implementation of social programs in the
slums.
SANDERSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO EAID HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SLOWS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
REF: PORT AU PRINCE 2202
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH has a habit of blaming
international aid agencies for moving too slowly to implement
projects in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of
Port-au-Prince. However, staff at the International
Organization for Migration (IOM),USAID's main implementing
partner in community development, maintain that it is in fact
MINUSTAH that is slowing the process. MINUSTAH staff report
that they have streamlined their own organization in order to
better integrate military/law enforcement and development
efforts. The U.S. and other donors should press MINUSTAH for
better results rather than allow them to pass blame to
others. End Summary.
2. (C) International assistance organizations like the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) have a
difficult time launching some of their development projects
due to the slow process of coordinating with MINUSTAH. IOM's
Matt Huber (strictly protect) told Poloff on February 1 that
IOM would like to start projects in certain parts of
Port-au-Prince but has had to postpone work because of
MINUSTAH's complicated bureaucracy. Huber cited the example
of a project in the Martissant neighborhood on the southern
end of Port-au-Prince. IOM wanted to start development
projects in the area to build up the credibility of civil
society and show the citizens that MINUSTAH can provide
positive services for them. MINUSTAH endorsed the program
but hemmed and hawed about the timing of the projects, citing
the prerequisites of coordinating with the troops in the area
as well as their civil affairs division. By the time IOM was
able to start the projects, a valuable opportunity to
underline the value of legitimate government as opposed to
gang rule had already been lost, in Huber's opinion.
3. (C) IOM also asked for UN equipment for the projects so
MINUSTAH would be credited with the development work, but
they were so slow in providing the equipment that IOM's local
contractor ended up using his own bulldozers. Huber cited
MINUSTAH's effort to set up a base of operations in the
center of Martissant as another example of the organization's
protracted decision-making process. MINUSTAH settled on a
location for the base in summer 2006 (ref A) but did not open
the center until February 1, 2007.
4. (C) Huber said he now faces a parallel challenge in Cite
Soleil. He would like to begin adding more development
projects as soon as possible to capitalize on MINUSTAH's
latest push into the neighborhood but he expressed concern
that because of MINUSTAH's sluggish reaction time, IOM may
not be able to start the projects before the void of gang
leadership is filled by new gangs. Huber's theory is that it
is necessary to build up civic leaders so people turn to them
for help instead of to the gangs, thereby undercutting the
power and authority of the gangs. (Note: IOM implements
USAID's Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI) program, initially
funded by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and
now funded and managed by USAID/Haiti. End Note.)
5. (C) Comment: Despite frequent complaints by MINUSTAH
elements - the Brazilians in particular - that the
international community needs to do more aid work in troubled
neighborhoods, they themselves are creating additional
hurdles to progress. This is not the first time Post has
heard criticism of MINUSTAH's sluggish decision-making
process. MINUSTAH risks losing valuable momentum if it
cannot move more quickly to coordinate with international aid
projects. The organization also loses face with the
community when Haitian contractors are exposed to
malfunctions within MINUSTAH programming. MINUSTAH's
political staff told Poloffs that with the most recent
arrivals of senior staff, their own coordination and decision
process has greatly improved. Time will tell, but in the
meantime we should not let the argument pass that donors are
to blame for slow implementation of social programs in the
slums.
SANDERSON