MINUSTAH SLOWS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000252 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO EAID HA SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SLOWS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REF: PORT AU PRINCE 2202 Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH has a habit of blaming international aid agencies for moving too slowly to implement projects in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. However, staff at the International Organization for Migration (IOM),USAID's main implementing partner in community development, maintain that it is in fact MINUSTAH that is slowing the process. MINUSTAH staff report that they have streamlined their own organization in order to better integrate military/law enforcement and development efforts. The U.S. and other donors should press MINUSTAH for better results rather than allow them to pass blame to others. End Summary. ¶2. (C) International assistance organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have a difficult time launching some of their development projects due to the slow process of coordinating with MINUSTAH. IOM's Matt Huber (strictly protect) told Poloff on February 1 that IOM would like to start projects in certain parts of Port-au-Prince but has had to postpone work because of MINUSTAH's complicated bureaucracy. Huber cited the example of a project in the Martissant neighborhood on the southern end of Port-au-Prince. IOM wanted to start development projects in the area to build up the credibility of civil society and show the citizens that MINUSTAH can provide positive services for them. MINUSTAH endorsed the program but hemmed and hawed about the timing of the projects, citing the prerequisites of coordinating with the troops in the area as well as their civil affairs division. By the time IOM was able to start the projects, a valuable opportunity to underline the value of legitimate government as opposed to gang rule had already been lost, in Huber's opinion. ¶3. (C) IOM also asked for UN equipment for the projects so MINUSTAH would be credited with the development work, but they were so slow in providing the equipment that IOM's local contractor ended up using his own bulldozers. Huber cited MINUSTAH's effort to set up a base of operations in the center of Martissant as another example of the organization's protracted decision-making process. MINUSTAH settled on a location for the base in summer 2006 (ref A) but did not open the center until February 1, 2007. ¶4. (C) Huber said he now faces a parallel challenge in Cite Soleil. He would like to begin adding more development projects as soon as possible to capitalize on MINUSTAH's latest push into the neighborhood but he expressed concern that because of MINUSTAH's sluggish reaction time, IOM may not be able to start the projects before the void of gang leadership is filled by new gangs. Huber's theory is that it is necessary to build up civic leaders so people turn to them for help instead of to the gangs, thereby undercutting the power and authority of the gangs. (Note: IOM implements USAID's Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI) program, initially funded by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and now funded and managed by USAID/Haiti. End Note.) ¶5. (C) Comment: Despite frequent complaints by MINUSTAH elements - the Brazilians in particular - that the international community needs to do more aid work in troubled neighborhoods, they themselves are creating additional hurdles to progress. This is not the first time Post has heard criticism of MINUSTAH's sluggish decision-making process. MINUSTAH risks losing valuable momentum if it cannot move more quickly to coordinate with international aid projects. The organization also loses face with the community when Haitian contractors are exposed to malfunctions within MINUSTAH programming. MINUSTAH's political staff told Poloffs that with the most recent arrivals of senior staff, their own coordination and decision process has greatly improved. Time will tell, but in the meantime we should not let the argument pass that donors are to blame for slow implementation of social programs in the slums. SANDERSON