TRILATERAL COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE IN CAMBODIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000535 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 TAGS: PTER PREL EAID CB AS JA SUBJECT: TRILATERAL COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE IN CAMBODIA REF: A. REFTEL A: PHNOM PENH 489 ¶B. REFTEL B: PHNOM PENH 455 Classified By: Acting DCM Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. At the Australian High Commission's invitation, representatives of the U.S., Japanese and Australian missions met on April 5 for a Cambodia-specific trilateral counterterrorism (CT) dialogue. Australia framed the dialogue as part of the follow-up to the October 2006 high-level meeting in Tokyo and preparation for the June 5-6 session in Sydney. Australia would like to move beyond the four focus countries (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) and the GOA reportedly sees Cambodia as a possible addition. The two-hour session was useful in highlighting some areas of mutual interest and/or programmatic overlap. However, the Japanese questioned whether CTAG, although moribund over the last 16 months, might be a more efficient format. The Australians want to maintain an informal U.S., UK, and Australian coordination on CT matters. All three countries fund CT-related programs in Cambodia, and promote basic English language training as the necessary first step. End Summary. Opening Remarks -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 5, the Australian High Commission invited representatives from the political/economic, defense, regional security, and law enforcement offices of the Japanese and U.S. embassies to join in a trilateral counterterrorism (CT) discussion. Australian Charge Ruediger opened the meeting, presenting it as an opportunity to exchange information about counterterrorism capacity building and operational activities, including priorities, training curricula, assessments, and lessons learned. He suggested the three countries could coordinate CT assistance to ensure activities undertaken or being planned do not conflict with or duplicate one another. He proposed that the trilateral format could generate ideas for future capacity building, either individually or collectively. ¶3. (C) More specifically, he suggested the group discuss perceptions of the threat both internally and in the broader region, the capacity/ability of domestic law enforcement/intelligence to deal effectively against terrorism, and CT programs already in place. He said we should identify overlap or gaps, including between training and other programs to enhance CT efforts. Ruediger noted that Australia is just starting to focus on what steps might be taken to assess the effect of Wahabi proselytizing of Cambodia,s Cham Muslim minority, and the High Commission has proposed that Canberra fund a poll of Cham opinions. Border and Transport Security -------------- ¶4. (C) Australia seeks to strengthen border control data collection by training border control staff in collection and data analysis. They have also performed capacity building with regard to detecting fraud, via interviewing techniques, and provided English language training. Their core focus is to develop a holistic government approach for Cambodia, including the establishment of the necessary structures, e.g., the National Committee on counterterrorism headed by the Prime Minister; under the Committee is the Secretariat comprised of senior members of the MOD, MOI, and other relevant ministries; as well as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),which acts as the operational arm of the Secretariat. SIPDIS ¶5. (C) Australia will conduct a workshop from April 26-27 to prepare for a June counterterrorism desktop exercise involving an airport scenario. The exercise will focus on Secretariat members' decision-making during three unfolding SIPDIS scenarios; starting with a fire, moving into another phase, and concluding with a terrorist incident. The intent is to expose the Secretariat to the kind of activities that they would have to perform in the event of a real world incident. The Cambodians hope to come out with a "plan of action." Australia does not currently see its role as being the primary drafter of such a plan, but will help. The U.S., Japan, Singapore, ROK and UK will be invited to observe. (Comment: This proposal was originally given by the Australians to the Cambodians in July 2005, with proposed PHNOM PENH 00000535 002 OF 003 execution dates of November 2005 for the seminar and February 2006 for the exercise. Also, the seminar had been intended to teach the Cambodians how to conduct such an exercise, with them then having the primary responsibility of organizing and executing it. The role of the Australians would have been merely shadowing and advising designated members of the Secretariat. The delays and scaling down of this clearly SIPDIS demonstrates the difficulty in getting the Cambodians to act on an idea that requires substantial work on their part for no clear material benefit. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) The U.S. reps briefed on Mission efforts to build Cambodian military (RCAF) capacity along designated border areas. We also noted efforts to bolster RCAF CT ability and reported that the RCAF's vision is to build sufficient forces to permanently base platoon-sized quick reaction forces at those locations determined by the RCAF to be the most likely for some kind of terrorist incident -- the three international airports and the Sihanoukville port. U.S. Mission elements also described assistance to Cambodia for border/airport controls (PISCES) and watchlisting. ¶7. (C) The Japanese representative said Japan's efforts on border controls are centered on building capacity. The GOJ has a program to assist the RGC with fraudulent documents, although that program is geared more towards immigration matters, and is not CT specific. Japan noted it is considering work at river border posts along the Tonle Bassac and the Mekong Rivers, due to the use of internal waterways for illicit trafficking of people and goods. The U.S. DAO representative said that the USG hopes to provide some river patrol assistance in the Stung Treng region, although under a counternarcotics program. Law Enforcement -------------- ¶8. (C) The Australian National Police (AFP) sponsors a team of eight Cambodian National Police (CNP) focused on transnational crime; mostly narcotics and trafficking in persons (TIP). They also provide some capacity building (e.g., funding English language training) moving towards sending Cambodians abroad for training. This fiscal year, the GOA plans to provide $100,000 for motorbikes, computers, and office furniture, as well as a needs analysis. The CNP have recruited some younger, more dynamic college graduates as recruits to CT responsibilities with a focus on information sharing. The U.S. noted the soft opening of the FBI Legatt office with the arrival of a TDY Legatt. Japan is considering more direct assistance: "Koban" village-level patrols and training for units at international airports. Legal and Justice Issues -------------- ¶9. (C) Draft CT legislation has been developed with support from Australia and the UK, and is with the National Assembly. The text has already been approved by the Council of Ministers. Australia will sponsor a workshop on April 25 to help lawmakers better understand the draft law and its implementation. The U.S. asked whether human rights NGOs had directly shared with Australia their concerns. Australia committed to providing us the latest draft of the text and the U.S. undertook to check with the NGOs on civil society reaction to the draft law. The U.S. briefed on the Embassy's regular update of all countries, status vis--vis the main international counterterrorism conventions and protocols and undertook to provide Australia and Japan a list of which instruments we believe Cambodia has ratified. Japan provides some technical assistance annually to help Asian countries better understand the legal implications of ratifying the various conventions, and how to practically implement them. Japan has conducted seminars in this regard (most recently March 27-28, 2007 in Kyoto) and includes a limited number of Cambodians as well other ASEAN officials in such programs. The U.S. briefed on our recent efforts with Russia on the Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism (reftel B). Australia later provided us with the names of three Cambodians traveling to Australia for a conference in June on nuclear terrorism. Maritime Security -------------- ¶10. (C) Australia is organizing a workshop in October 2007 PHNOM PENH 00000535 003 OF 003 to identify current and future threats, the resources needed to tackle these threats, and a plan forward. The RCAF is trying to strengthen cooperation with other elements within the Cambodian government. The U.S. referred to PACFLEET Commander Admiral Roughead,s visit earlier this year and said we have currently programmed funding for FY 09 to support maritime security efforts. These efforts would be contingent on Cambodia establishing the legal authority for multiple agencies to work together. The U.S. Coast Guard currently conducts inspections of Cambodian government/commercial maritime ports and reviews RGC procedures to ensure compliance with ISPS standards. The USCG has expressed an interest in conducting training with RCAF/maritime police forces as well. The U.S. noted that there is possible Singaporean interest in providing support, and China also is likely to provide patrol boats and radar in ¶2008. Japan discussed the need for legislative action to establish a single Cambodian maritime authority. Japan distributed a project description (emailed to desk) targeted at the civilian port and announced they will have groundbreaking ceremony May 1 for the project. Terrorist Financing -------------- ¶11. (C) The U.S. provided a readout of the Asia-Pacific Group (regional financial standards body similar to the G8's Financial Action Task Force),and the World Bank (WB) recent joint assessment of Cambodia's financial regulatory system, summarizing the vulnerabilities identified by those interviewed by the APG and the Bank. The U.S. also discussed the system for sharing terrorism financing information with the RGC. Japan noted that there are a number of North Korean-run restaurants in Cambodia and speculated about money laundering through these sources. Australia provides some assistance in this area to the police, but the lack of a Cambodian Financial Investigative Unit (FIU) hamstrings effective cooperation. Bioterrorism -------------- ¶12. (C) Australia has hosted a workshop on the Chemical Weapons Convention and bioterrorism, looking specifically at RGC regulations and airport controls. While the RGC has passed a ROYAL decree establishing a secretariat to manage its obligations under the CWC, there is no implementing legislation and no budget to set up such a body. Australia may provide additional assistance and CWC accession requirements. Australia noted that they have been providing some support to Cambodia to address a radiological orphan source. Ruediger later told the DCM that the Australian nuclear center (ANTSO) is in contact with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),and we anticipate a DOE visit in the near future. Japan previously invited four Cambodians to a CBRN capacity building seminar. MUSSOMELI