FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NICOLAS SARKOZY OR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000921 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV FR EUN NATO ETRD ECON UNO IR PHUM KDEM SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NICOLAS SARKOZY OR SEGOLENE ROYAL REF: A. PARIS 777 ¶B. PARIS POINTS OF 3/6 Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy has not and probably will not play a prominent role in the French presidential election campaign, and neither Nicolas Sarkozy nor Segolene Royal has enunciated a fleshed out foreign policy vision. (This message does not discuss emerging "third man" centrist Francois Bayrou, whose views fall somewhere between those of Sarkozy and Royal.) While it is likely that French policy overall under a Sarkozy or Royal presidency would be largely marked by continuity, signs are already emerging that the two candidates would -- initially at least -- adopt somewhat different approaches to the U.S., the Transatlantic relationship, and Europe. Sarkozy favors a relationship of confidence with the U.S. based on trust and with each side free to disagree (a position which is hurting him with voters),whereas Royal's natural reflex is to adopt a more distant and critical approach. If both worry that a NATO built on global partnerships risks undermining the UN, Sarkozy at least explicitly endorses a transatlantic alliance built on shared values and emphasizes the complementarity of NATO and the EU. If not inherently more pro-European than his counterpart, Sarkozy's prescription for moving Europe forward on the basis of a simplified treaty is generally considered as more realistic (i.e., attuned to European realities) than Royal's for a new treaty with an enhanced "social(ist)" dimension. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Both candidates favor restoring the place of human rights and democratization as a foreign policy standard, although it is not clear to what extent this would mean increased criticism of Russia or China in practice. Sarkozy is more openly supportive of Israel than Royal (which could make a difference with respect to current GOF consideration of contacts with a Palestinian NUG),but both see resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key to increased stability across the Middle East. Both candidates are committed to France's current policy on Lebanon, although without the intensive personal engagement of Chirac. Sarkozy is tough on Iran, and Royal was initially tougher -- but she has moderated her tone of late, perhaps under the influence of new advisors. Chirac's departure might open the way for either Sarkozy or Royal to engage more positively on Iraq reconstruction. We would expect both to remain serious about NATO's engagement in Afghanistan. On Africa, while Sarkozy and Royal alike would put an end to the Chirac model of personal diplomacy with his counterparts, it is not clear what this would mean in practice. Chirac's departure will offer a welcome opportunity to reevaluate French policy in Africa in particular, including current troop deployments. END SUMMARY. INTRODUCTION -- IT'S ABOUT THE DOMESTIC AGENDA -------------- - ¶3. (C) Foreign policy issues so far have not played a prominent role in the French presidential election campaign, and there is little chance this will change substantially in coming weeks. French voters are focused primarily on whether and to what extent France needs to reform in order better to adapt to globalization, particularly with respect to the price to be paid in lost jobs and social protections. From a U.S. perspective, of course, what counts most will be the foreign policy orientation of the new president. Both the leading candidates -- Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and Segolene Royal of the Socialist Party (PS) -- have in recent weeks outlined views on foreign policy and defense issues (refs A and B) and offer some clear indications of what can be expected. (This message does not discuss centrist Francois Bayrou, the "third man" neither-Sarkozy nor-Royal candidate whose views fall somewhere between those of Sarkozy and Royal, although he is widely regarded as the most pro-European of the three.) ¶4. (C) Sarkozy is above all a pragmatist (witness his recent reversal on Airbus, where he originally favored a business approach to the issue that he quickly dropped for more state intervention in response to popular pressures). In contrast, Royal leaves an impression of greater rigidity and ideological orthodoxy. This said, neither Sarkozy (although he came close in his recent press conference, ref A) nor Royal (despite her remarks on defense, ref B) has delivered a formal address on foreign and security policy, and it also bears repeating that what the candidates say in the heat of an election campaign may differ substantially from what they might actually do or not do once elected. It is likely that PARIS 00000921 002 OF 005 French policy under a Sarkozy or Royal administration would largely be marked by continuity. We believe nonetheless that it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions about each candidate's leanings or "reflexes," particularly with respect to the U.S. and the transatlantic relationship; market liberalization; Europe, human rights and democratization; and Africa. FRENCH-U.S. AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) As their public positioning makes clear, Sarkozy and Royal differ perhaps most in their approaches to the United States, primarily in tone if not substance, although the one invariably bleeds into the other. Beginning with his September 2006 visit to the U.S., Sarkozy has deliberately and systematically spoken in favor of putting the U.S.-France relationship on a new footing based on mutual confidence and trust. Not only in response to (demagogic) accusations from the left that this shift risked turning him into an American "poodle," Sarkozy at the same time has made clear that the relationship would have to be based on equality, with France also free to differ with the U.S. -- he cited his opposition to Turkey's EU accession as one salient example. Significant is not that Sarkozy has abandoned Gaullism -- he has not -- but that he has attempted to define it in a way that is more explicitly America-friendly or at least America-compatible. Above all, he has spelled out the need for active engagement with the U.S. at all times; the assumption is that France should be able to work together with the U.S. unless, in a given situation, our views are fundamentally incompatible. In cases of disagreement (e.g., Iraq),the clear implication is that France would stand aside rather than actively seek, as Chirac did in 2003, to marshal a coalition against the United States. Sarkozy's pro-Americanism is an electoral liability for him, and his opponents, Royal foremost among them, are using it as a campaign issue against him. ¶6. (C) Royal has yet to enunciate with anything approaching the same degree of clarity the kind of relationship she would seek with the U.S., owing at least partly to her relative inexperience. But she leaves the lingering impression of someone who reflexively wants to keep her distance from the U.S. In part this is the product of a lack of direct and personal experience with the United States. It also reflects the accumulated weight of traditional leftist preconceptions -- not to say prejudices -- of the U.S. as a hegemonic and unilateral power (leaving aside hot-button and publicly popular issues such as environmentalism, climate warming, globalization, and our more limited social safety net). Emblematic of this distancing has been the relatively greater difficulty we have had in setting up meetings with her and her staff, or her initial inclination -- before she abandoned the idea altogether -- to travel to the U.S. and meet only with certain members from the Democratic Party and none from the Administration. Moreover, in her public utterances, Royal has explicitly accused the U.S. for contributing to global instability. The clear implication is that the French role in international affairs, more than working with the U.S., should consist of presenting alternatives to our vision. NATO AND THE EU -------------- ¶7. (C) These differences of approach are well illustrated in the candidates' attitudes toward the NATO Alliance and European Security (ESDP). As Chirac before them, Sarkozy and Royal alike object to NATO's evolving global role, and both cite the argument that the U.S. vision for NATO, through global partnerships and assuming out-of-theatre missions that go beyond its traditional military role, could lead NATO to become a competitor for the UN. Both candidates also insist on the importance of increased EU autonomy and cooperation on defense (ESDP),as well as on the capability of taking independent action outside NATO. But they appear to differ significantly in their basic attitudes toward the Alliance. Sarkozy explicitly referred to the transatlantic relationship as indispensable for being based on common values; he also called for retiring old arguments over the pre-eminence of the one the other, calling them mutually complementary and noting that not all EU member states are NATO Allies and vice versa (which may also be convenient in the case of Turkey). Although committed to the idea of a political Europe as independent actor, Sarkozy's envisions Europe acting jointly with or in parallel with the U.S., but not as an alternative or counterweight to the U.S. Royal's departure point is that Europe needs to evolve and to reinforce its security capabilities in order to present an potential alternative to the U.S., although beyond her distaste for the use of PARIS 00000921 003 OF 005 military force, she has offered few prescriptions as to how that would occur. ¶8. (C) The two candidates also differ with respect to the importance of defense. While Royal and Sarkozy have voiced support for maintaining defense expenditures at two percent of GDP, Sarkozy insisted that it should be "at least" two percent. In public debates and discussions, Royal has moreover indicated a willingness to reassess France's defense budget and programs, most notably questioning the need for the construction of a second aircraft carrier. Sarkozy, for his part, has made it clear he supports a strong defense and that the planned construction of a second carrier must go forward. FRANCE AND EUROPE -------------- ¶9. (C) Sarkozy does not have a reputation as an avid pro-Europeanist, and he has not hesitated on occasion, like Chirac, to blame the EU for some of France's problems, mainly in connection with trying to prevent the migration of money and jobs to the newer member states with fewer social protections, or promoting a level of political control over European monetary policy. He has criticized "fiscal dumping" by newer member states with lower cost and other barriers to investment. Sarkozy has also advocated EU-wide coordination on domestically sensitive issues such as immigration. Royal represents a party that traditionally is viewed as more pro-European, although many of her positions do not differ dramatically from Sarkozy's on the surface (although Sarkozy has been much more strident in calling for a coordinated EU immigration policy). However, mainly to satisfy that part of her electorate which voted against the EU constitutional treaty despite its pro-European tradition, Royal has put more stress on promoting a more "social" Europe that would adopt EU-wide standards for social protections and labor rights. ¶10. (C) Indeed, where the candidates diverge most is in the remedies they would prescribe for overcoming the current impasse on the EU constitutional treaty. There is already evidence that Sarkozy's pragmatic proposal for a "simplified treaty" (formerly referred to as a mini-Treaty) that would focus on institutional reforms and not require ratification through popular referendum has made inroads even with the Germans, notwithstanding the official German position on retaining the existing draft constitutional treaty. By contrast, the Germans have privately expressed to us, and French press reports corroborate this view, considerable concern over Royal's calls for a new referendum on an improved treaty, which they see as a recipe for another French rejection. Royal has argued that a referendum could be successful if a revised treaty were to include additional social protections, but it seems likely that this would make the treaty unacceptable to a number of other European partners (in particular the UK),and would lengthen the negotiating process in any case. In sum, although Royal may be more pro-European in theory, in practice Sarkozy seems more likely to move the European project forward over the short term. FREE MARKET LIBERALISM -------------- ¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy is viewed by many French voters as a radical free-market "liberal," in fact his differences with Royal may be less significant than labels would indicate. As the Airbus controversy has shown, Sarkozy does not hesitate to shed his free-market rhetoric when he believes the market is not looking after France's interests. Both Sarkozy and Royal support "economic patriotism," even if Sarkozy rhetorically speaks more of European than strictly French champions. That said, partly out of necessity in order to help reduce France's high debt, Sarkozy would remain more interested than his Socialist counterpart in privatization of state-owned enterprises. Unlike Royal, he also supports cutting corporate tax rates, cutting all payroll taxes on overtime beyond the statutory limit of 35 hours, and ending France's two-tiered labor market as a means of tackling France's chronic unemployment. As noted earlier, however, Sarkozy's "liberalism" has often in the past been trumped by political expediency -- which would likely be the hallmark of a Sarkozy presidency. His demand for more European-wide coordination on fiscal policy as a means of reducing relocation of French jobs to other EU member countries is emblematic of bending liberal principle to accommodate French interests. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION PARIS 00000921 004 OF 005 -------------- ¶12. (C) Both Sarkozy and Royal have called for restoring more prominence to human rights and democratization as a means of remaining true to France's heritage and its universal mission. How far either candidate would be prepared to make transformational diplomacy a cornerstone of his or her foreign policy in reality remains an open question, however. It is likely that Royal would take a more principled approach to human rights questions than her counterpart, and it is telling that Sarkozy justified his criticism of Russia's human rights record in Chechnya primarily by arguing that, in the modern media age, it is no longer possible to hide human rights violations as before, which in turns creates public pressures that cannot be ignored. At this stage of the campaign, the jury is still out on whether human rights considerations would become a main driver of French foreign policy. What seems certain is that neither Sarkozy nor Royal will be driven by the sometimes sentimental approach of Chirac, whose admiration for countries with their own long histories and traditions (e.g., Russia and China) with a skepticism of the applicability of Western notions of democracy and human rights to other countries and civilizations. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶13. (C) Similar considerations also apply toward both candidates' likely approaches to the Middle East and Africa. Sarkozy differs dramatically from Royal in his insistent emphasis on the need to take Israeli security interests into account. This might eventually affect Sarkozy's policy on dealing with a Palestinian national unity government, where the GOF of late has argued that it would be a mistake to isolate Hamas completely if it fails to explicitly accept the Quartet conditions. Sarkozy has indirectly criticized Chirac for his overriding attachment to maintaining stability for its own sake, which encourages authoritarian rule. That said, both candidates accept the conventional wisdom that the key to resolving the range of conflicts and tensions in the Middle East is to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ¶14. (C) Both candidates are also committed to maintaining current French policy toward Lebanon, although neither will be driven by Chirac's loyalty to the memory of former PM Rafic Hariri -- both in terms of personal involvement, and Lebanon's centrality to French policy on the Middle East. Sarkozy and his foreign policy advisors are tough-minded on Iran. Royal initially was tougher, demanding that Iran be prevented from developing a civilian nuclear capacity, as permitted under the NPT. This demand was notably absent from her most recent foreign policy remarks. (This may reflect increasing influence of former Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, who is far more dovish with regard to an Iranian nuclear capability, including military.) We would expect Sarkozy or Royal to maintain France's commitment to NATO's engagement in Afghanistan. Finally, Chirac's departure from the scene should result in greater openness to opportunities to assist in Iraq's reconstruction. AFRICA -------------- ¶15. (C) On Africa, both candidates have indicated that they would like above all to change the manner in which France does business in Africa, with Sarkozy going so far as to stress France's desire to reduce its military footprint (except in coordination with the AU or under the authority of the UN). But this does not mean withdrawal, and France will continue to want to leverage its influence to the greatest extent possible -- perhaps through an increased EU role -- even as it competes with the growing influence of the U.S. and China. But both candidates understand they will no longer be able to rely (nor do they appear to want to) on the kinds of personal relationships that Chirac developed over many years with a number of African leaders. The departure of Chirac will allow the French foreign policy establishment a welcome opportunity to reevaluate French policy toward Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Inevitably, troop redeployments across Africa will come under consideration. NEITHER QUITE WHAT HE/SHE SEEMS -------------- ¶16. (C) Whoever is finally elected, we believe that the bilateral U.S.-France relationship will eventually settle PARIS 00000921 005 OF 005 into a kind of normal balance based on our enduring shared interests and values and the intertwined nature of our economies on the one hand, and the requirement of a distinct French voice and authentically independent positions in the international arena, on the other. In the case of Sarkozy, we believe it will be important not to set our expectations too high, since even his pragmatism will always be tempered by the Gaullist imperative of a French "difference," in particular vis-a-vis the U.S. As for Royal, although we would expect her, at least initially, to maintain more of a distanced approach to the U.S., there is no reason to believe that she would be anything but pragmatic over the longer term. In all likelihood, her personal comfort level would rise with increased contact and experience, and foreign policy under a Royal presidency would be characterized by the signature French mix of strategic convergence with the U.S., heavily marked by strategic differences and tactical disagreements. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON