ELECTION SNAPSHOT: SARKOZY'S "COMPETENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000904 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD, AND EB DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2012 TAGS: PGOV ELAB EUN FR PINR SOCI ECON SUBJECT: ELECTION SNAPSHOT: SARKOZY'S "COMPETENCY CANDIDACY" FIRMING UP AGAINST ROYAL'S "CARING CANDIDACY" AS BAYROU'S "NEITHER-NOR" CANDIDACY KEEPS CLIMBING IN POLLS Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Seven weeks from the first round of France's 2007 presidential election, the leading candidates -- Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and Poitou-Charentes region President Segolene Royal -- seem to be turning to accentuating their candidacies' respective electoral strengths. Sarkozy's "competency" seems to be firming up against Royal's "caring" -- with Sarkozy banking on voters' desire that a president be in command of the issues and able to exercise power effectively, and Royal on voters' contradictory desire that a president be close to the people and understand how they feel. Since Sarkozy's formal nomination in mid-January, all polls have shown Sarkozy beating Royal in a second round face-off, and all polls have shown that a Royal-Sarkozy second round still remains the most probable first-round result. (But, as all pollsters have learned the hard way, polls do not foretell the future.) The candidacy of centrist, Union for French Democracy (UDF) leader, Francois Bayrou, continues to draw support away from both Royal and Sarkozy, to the point that some observers now speak of "the three leading candidates." Bayrou's supporters are convinced that the high -- but very different -- negatives that hamstring the Sarkozy and Royal, along with widespread "neither-nor" rejection of the left/right partisanship of past decades, give Bayrou a real chance of getting into the second round. Right wing extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen, always a potential spoiler on the French electoral scene -- and whose actual vote totals have always been underestimated in opinion polling -- continues to stalk the leaders. END SUMMARY. COMPETENCY VERSUS CARING -------------- ¶2. (U) During past weeks, both the leading candidates -- Interior Minister and President of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party Nicolas Sarkozy and President of the Poitou-Charentes Regional Council and nominee of the Socialist party (PS) Segolene Royal -- have made considerable effort to try to "balance" their lopsided images. Sarkozy has engaged in a series of appearances and photo opportunities intended to show that he is attuned to citizens' pride in France's cultural and military heritage and that he is a regular guy who really does understand the problems of average people. Royal -- who took fierce criticism in the weeks after her November nomination for lacking an electoral program -- in early February began a series of major policy addresses intended to show that there was more to her candidacy than the just the search for an alternative relationship with voters and sympathy for the trails and tribulations of ordinary people's lives. ¶3. (U) But neither Sarkozy's nor Royal's "re-balancing" efforts has worked particularly well to date. Sarkozy's confident, articulate performances on TV shows featuring questions from everyday citizens and at press conferences, dedicated to policy areas such as foreign affairs and defense, have reinforced his image as an individual intent on achieving and prepared for exercising power. He comes across as a gifted statesperson impressively in command of the issues and backed by an organization that has invested a lot in fashioning a cogent and extensive platform. In sum, Sarkozy's "competency" candidacy is more salient that ever. ¶4. (U) Royal's efforts at launching her "Presidential Pact" in a major policy speech in early February, followed by a series of presentations of her proposed policies in different issue areas have not been nearly as effective in overcoming a lingering sense of amateurism. On the other hand, she has been convincing in her appearances on television and at rallies, where she has been able to project empathy and understanding in interacting with ordinary citizens. In sum, Royal's "caring" candidacy is more salient than ever. NOT A SATISFYING CHOICE -- TO BAYROU'S BENEFIT -------------- - ¶5. (U) The steady and continuing rise during past weeks in the poll numbers of centrist UDF leader Francois Bayrou is in large part driven by widespread dissatisfaction with this all-or-nothing choice between the hyper-active and ever unsettling, but clearly competent, Sarkozy, and the amateurish and untested, but clearly caring, Royal. Voters PARIS 00000904 002 OF 003 distrust Sarkozy's character, and Royal's inexperience. As one observer put it, "For all their strengths, neither Sarkozy nor Royal is particularly likable, and Bayrou -- who projects a paternal, country-boy-who-made-good figure -- is both familiar and reassuring." (Bayrou ran for president in 2002 and got nearly 7 percent of the first round vote; both Sarkozy and Royal are running for president for the first time.) ¶6. (U) In addition, Bayrou benefits from widespread, "neither-nor" dissatisfaction with what he calls the "left/right system." Bayrou's persistent assertion that the "sterility" of that partisan confrontation has, over the past three decades, produced "no progress for France" has found considerable resonance among young voters and managerial/professional voters in particular. There is an additional element in that voters fear the break with the past called for by Sarkozy, and yet also sense that the socialist-inspired policies would not work. It remains to be seen if support for Bayrou moves beyond its bastions in these relatively small tranches of the electorate. Among lower-income employees and among older voters (the two largest portions of the electorate),Bayrou significantly trails, respectively, Royal and Sarkozy. (Sarkozy and Royal -- untraditionally leftist and right-wing though they may personally be -- are still the candidates of the two major parties rooted in that long-standing left/right division of the French electorate, indeed, of French society.) ¶7. (U) And lastly, also not to be dismissed when considering why he has surged in popularity during recent weeks, Bayrou currently benefits from being the latest anti-establishment alternative. The French electorate remains in the sour and apprehensive mood that has led it to vote for the anti-establishment alternative in every election since the "non-election" second-round run-off between President Chirac and Le Pen in 2002. French voters opted to reject the proposed EU Constitution in May 2005, and they massively voted opposition candidates into office in the municipal and European elections of 2004. Indeed, in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, a full third of voters opted for marginal, "protest" candidates (including right-wing extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen). Bayrou, who in the most recent polls has pulled up nearly even with Sarkozy and Royal (all three are at between 20 and 25 percent of first-round voter intentions),is the latest beneficiary of this angry preference for the establishment-challenging alternative. HOW FAR CAN BAYROU GO? -------------- ¶8. (C) The UMP and the PS are crushingly larger and richer organizations than the UDF. (As Herve Morin, one of Bayrou's two top lieutenants, sheepishly admitted to poloffs over lunch on March 8, "We don't do any polling of our own; we can't afford it.") This disparity in electoral, organizational capability should become more important as election day draws nearer -- even though it will be partly offset by the way French election laws require that all candidates be given equal time on TV news and public affairs talk shows in the two weeks preceding election day. In addition, the UMP and the PS, and the Sarkozy and Royal campaigns, will be certain to mount determined counter-campaigns against Bayrou's ascendency in coming weeks. Bayrou, should he, somehow, manage to better either Sarkozy or Royal in the first round, would handily beat one and the other in a second round given the unwillingness of most center-right voters to vote for the center-left, and vice versa, according to current polls. ¶9. (C) Bayrou's supporters are not discouraged by this disparity in organizational strength, nor by the fire Bayrou is certain to draw in coming weeks. Indeed, Bayrou and his advisors are relishing the prospect of a battle they claim they have long been planning. As Morin put it, "You wait...nobody wants to vote for a loser, but once it's clear we can win, you'll see how unhappy people are with Sarkozy and Royal." (Indeed, Morin went on to unabashedly advise, "You should write in your diplomatic dispatch today, 'Francois Bayrou will be the next President of France'"). LE PEN STILL STALKS THE LEADERS -------------- ¶10. (U) Sarkozy himself, and major figures in his party PARIS 00000904 003 OF 003 such as former prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, have in recent days prominently called on elected officials associated with the UMP to provide nationalist extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen with the endorsements he still needs to qualify to run. (To qualify to appear on the ballot in the first round, candidates must present to the Constitutional Council signed endorsements from 500 (of about 37,000) elected officials who must be from 30 different Departments of France; because the endorsements are now made public, many officials have been reluctant to sign). Le Pen is still about 25 signatures short, and has until March 16 to garner them. Most observers believe that, with the weight of the UMP now behind the effort, Le Pen is nearly certain to qualify to run. (For Sarkozy, that a large part of Le Pen's sixth of the electorate might sit out the election in protest of their candidate's exclusion, would deny Sarkozy votes that he is counting on to beat Royal in a second round.) Le Pen got 16.9 percent of the vote the first round of the 2002 election. In current polls he trails the three leaders, coming in at around 12 percent of first-round voter intentions. Historically -- and 2007 will be Le Pen's fourth presidential contest -- Le Pen's vote totals on election day have been consistently underestimated in opinion polling during the run-up to the election. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON