PART III: AFRICA-FRANCE SUMMIT - AVOIDING A MUGABE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000849 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR KSUM XA ZI FR SUBJECT: PART III: AFRICA-FRANCE SUMMIT - AVOIDING A MUGABE MUCK-UP REF: A. PARIS 847 B. PARIS 848 C. PARIS 578 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas ons 1.4b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: For the 2007 Africa-France Summit at Cannes, President Chirac made a watershed policy choice to abide by the EU travel ban and exclude Zimbabwean pariah leader Robert Mugabe. Chirac had invited Mugabe four years earlier to the 2003 Paris Summit, amid concerns about the risk of a backlash among Africans, including a Summit boycott. In preparing for Cannes, the GoF pursued a quiet two-prong strategy, working to forestall a possible SADC boycott while coordinating overtures to Mugabe to defuse the issue and seek an alternate Zimbabwean representative. This is the last of three cables on the Africa-France Summit. End Summary. ¶2. (C) For the 2007 Africa-France Summit at Cannes, President Chirac made a watershed policy choice to abide by the EU travel ban and exclude Zimbabwean pariah leader Robert Mugabe, despite concerns about a backlash among Africans. The GoF caused an uproar in Europe in 2003 by inviting Mugabe to the 2003 Africa-France Summit in Paris despite the EU travel ban, arguing within the EU that Mugabe's presence afforded an opportunity for dialogue. The MFA maintains that the EU travel ban authorizes exemptions in order to advance peace efforts. However, Mugabe's failure to make reciprocal efforts toward reconciliation and the degraded situation in Zimbabwe made a repeat invitation to Mugabe untenable. Portugal, which will assume the EU Presidency in July and preside at an EU-Africa Summit, watched carefully how the French would address Mugabe. ¶3. (C) Jacques Champagne de Labriolle, Deputy Counselor in the Presidency Africa Cell, in a February 21 conversation with Africa Watcher, claimed credit for the decision to uphold the EU travel ban and block Mugabe's attendance of the Summit, stating he had presented his arguments forcefully in a September 2006 memorandum. Chirac's decision did not come naturally, according to Labriolle, for the French President customarily favors dialogue over confrontation, and Chirac worried that barring Mugabe, an iconic revolutionary figure, would exacerbate North-South tensions. Labriolle posited that the GoF had the influence to counter the threat of a possible SADC boycott of the Cannes Summit. Chirac took his decision early, Labriolle maintained, although the Elysee kept mum until late in the game so as not to foreclose all hope of a diplomatic compromise with Mugabe. ¶4. (C) The GoF advanced its Mugabe strategy on two tracks over several months. The GoF turned to former Mozambican President Chissano to try to coax and cajole Mugabe's concurrence in a diplomatic deal, according to Labriolle. The GoF hoped for a face-saving arrangement whereby Mugabe would decline an invitation from Chirac and dispatch a senior emissary in his stead. In parallel, the MFA reached out to lock down attendance by other SADC members at the Africa-France Summit. Botswana, Labriolle noted, had a history of bad blood with Mugabe, and was a prime candidate to break ranks if Zimbabwe tried to orchestrate a bloc SADC protest. Because Namibia, on the other hand, had long-standing links to Mugabe, the MFA offered to host Namibian President Pohamba for an official visit to France during the period of the Summit. Thanks to this official visit, Pohamba enjoyed the privilege of one of the only two formal bilateral meetings that Chirac held at Cannes, the other being with Ghanaian President Kufuor in the latter's capacity as AU Chairman. ¶5. (C) Although Mugabe rebuffed the overtures by Chissano and the GoF, initial signs did not presage a diplomatic uproar, according to Labriolle. Labriolle blamed diplomatic clumsiness by Egypt for wounding Zimbabwean pride. Egypt, intent on landing the hosting rights to the 2009 Africa-France Summit, had lobbied African delegations intensively during the 2006 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, an inappropriate venue, in Labriolle's view. The Zimbabwean delegation, smarting as the exclusion from Cannes hit home, struck back and began to complain vocally. ¶6. (C) However, no serious SADC protest developed, Labriolle noted. SADC members Mbeki of South Africa, Dos Santos of Angola, Kikwete of Tanzania, and Kabila of DRC did fail to show for the Cannes Summit; however, none officially invoked Mugabe's absence as the cause, Labriolle asserted. Dos Santos, he suggested, continues to bristle over "Angolagate" and the related judicial pursuits in France of French adviser Falcone, whom Dos Santos has protected with an Angolan PARIS 00000849 002 OF 002 diplomatic passport. Mbeki, who has an uneasy rapport with Chirac due to differences over Cote d'Ivoire, claimed a domestic political obligation; and Kikwete pleaded ill health. (Note: Labriolle revealed Kikwete was due shortly in Paris for medical check-ups, suggesting there may be some validity to his excuse.) Kabila, confronting a flare-up in DRC violence and laboring to install a new DRC government, expressed profuse apologies to Chirac's Presidential Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse and then dispatched the most senior representative available, President Kamerhe of the National Assembly. ¶7. (C) Labriolle remarked that the Elysee sensed mixed messages emanating from the UK about how to handle Mugabe. He speculated that Gordon Brown, as heir-apparent to Blair, might prove less committed to hard-line EU policies on Mugabe. Labriolle asserted that Blair in 2004 had privately complained to Chirac that conservative opportunists in Parliament had painted him into a corner over Mugabe. Labriolle lamented, with irony, the misunderstanding and disinformation within the EU over French African policy, noting the exaggerated disquiet at Brussels and in London that Paris would not vote to extend EU penalties on Mugabe, let alone adhere to the travel ban on Mugabe. Labriolle maintained that Bonnecorse had definitively told UK Minister for Africa Lord Triesman on October 20 that France would vote to renew the travel ban. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON