SECURITY OFFICIALS VIGILANT IN ADVANCE OF

S E C R E T PARIS 000711 SIPDIS SIPDIS S C/T FOR MARC NORMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL FR SUBJECT: SECURITY OFFICIALS VIGILANT IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REF: PARIS 308 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Christophe Chaboud, Director of the Ministry of Interior,s Coordination Unit for the Fight Against Terrorism (UCLAT),told us February 21 that the terrorism threat in France remains elevated, and that security officials are especially vigilant in the run up to the French presidential elections. Chaboud discussed the key terrorist threats facing France, including networks of jihadists destined for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; the growing threat from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); radicalization of French Muslim youth; recent arrests of Islamic radicals in France; and the detention of several high-profile PKK members. He also noted that authorities were actively investigating the French passport found in Somalia after the U.S. air strike, and now believed it to be forged. END SUMMARY TERRORISM THREAT HIGH IN PRE-ELECTION PERIOD -------------- ¶2. (S) Chaboud told us on February 21 that the terrorism threat in France remained elevated, particularly given the upcoming French presidential elections. At the same time, he said there was no credible evidence to suggest an attack was being planned. After Madrid and London, the possibility that terrorists might exploit the pre-election period in France worried some security experts and was enough to push security services to be more vigilant, but this had not led to an increase in the overall threat level. The threat level has been at red (the second highest level in a four-level system called VIGIPIRATE) since the London 2005 subway bombings. He added that VIGIPIRATE was a difficult system to manage for French authorities--no one wanted to be held responsible for failing to predict the signs of an attack. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE THREAT LEVEL -------------- ¶3. (S) Keeping the public vigilant and sensitizing them to possible attacks without excessively frightening them is a difficult task, Chaboud declared. The VIGIPIRATE system, is not particularly helpful for public awareness. Chaboud hoped that well placed leaks to the press about possible threats had been helpful, but he was uncertain how a terrorist attack at home would be perceived by the public. The Ministry of 
Interior was particularly impressed with British PM Blair,s reactions following the London bombings, in sharp contrast to the Spanish government,s response to the 2005 Madrid attacks. French officials, he said, hoped to mimic the British response in the event of an attack. Fortunately, Chaboud noted that a certain consensus between the left and right existed in France on counterterrorism strategy, and he hoped it would hold under the difficult circumstances of an attack. FEBRUARY 2007 ARRESTS OF ISLAMIC RADICALS -------------- ¶4. (S) Chaboud offered observations on the Islamic radicals arrested in France in February 2007. He confirmed press reports that the network appeared to have links to an al-Qaida cell in Saudi Arabia that assisted jihadists in their travels to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The investigation that led to their arrest, he said, stemmed from two jihadists expelled to France from Syria in December 2006, as well as from the December expulsion of French Muslims from Egypt. The two men expelled from Syria had originally attempted to go to a Pakistani training camp, but found the network to Iraq more easily navigated. ¶5. (S) Chaboud noted that several of the detainees are suspected of seeking to engage in suicide bombings. In addition to the "young" jihadists, police had arrested an older man, approximately age 60, who served as a religious figure for the group. He allegedly taught radical Islamic ideology, but may not have been directly involved in their jihad plans. In any case, he said, French law allowed prosecutors also to prosecute him on terrorism charges. With regards to the nine arrests made in Belgium in cooperation with the French case, Chaboud said they would not likely result in any prosecutions. He called the Belgium connection "far-fetched." RADICALIZATION -------------- ¶6. (S) Chaboud talked at length about the radicalization of Muslim youth in France. Fortunately, he noted, it appeared that only small handfuls of French Muslims were actively interested in pursuing radical Islamic ideology. The path to radicalization, he mused, was not something anyone would ever truly understand. He called it a "trans-generational" problem that would plague the West for another two or three decades; it was an unconventional trend that would run its course. Of course, he noted, somewhat apologetically for having said it, the situation in Iraq gave a heightened sense of "calling" to Muslim youth--something to rally around. ¶7. (S) French security officials, Chaboud said, were fully aware of the fact that radicalized young French Muslims could become terrorists at home and abroad. From his vantage point, Chaboud said that security officials were doing their best to infiltrate groups and use administrative and judicial actions to curb the rise of Islamic radicalization. If security officials could limit the influence of those preaching radical ideologies (whether in person or on the internet) then French youth, whose lives have nothing to do with "the kind of desperation one sees in Gaza or Iraq," might never go down such a path. Chaboud said another key problem was that even moderate Muslims in France did not denounce the actions of terrorists. Their silence, he said, was clearly interpreted as sympathy with the terrorists, cause. A more moderate Muslim clergy was important, but with the state,s limited role and the CFCM,s (French Council on the Muslim Religion, established in coordination within the Ministry of Interior) lack of street credibility, it was much easier said than done. Some Middle Eastern countries, he said, had proposed sending moderate Imams to France. Unfortunately, however, they don,t speak French. GSPC -------------- ¶8. (S) The increase of GSPC-linked attacks in the Maghreb was worrying French security officials, according to Chaboud. Attacks in Algeria and Tunisia and operations in Mali and Mauritania all appeared to support the theory that al-Qaida,s officially announced union with GSPC in 2006 had served to reinvigorate the group. Having already identified France as a key target, French officials were also extremely concerned about attacks on French soil and against French interests in the Maghreb region. For the moment, they had not detected any active cells in France, but Chaboud added that it might only be a matter of time. PKK ARRESTS -------------- ¶9. (S) French police, Chaboud said proudly, had basically arrested all of the major European PKK figures during the February 5-6 raids. All but two remained in pre-trial detention as of February 21, and all of them would face charges for connections to a terrorist group. When asked about the motivation for police action, he confirmed media reports that the investigation had originated in the summer of 2006, when two PKK members were arrested in France for money laundering. From there, the anti-terrorism judicial police (SDAT) had followed the investigation where it led, while prosecutors acted as enablers. SOMALIA: FRENCH PASSPORT UPDATE -------------- ¶10. (S) Chaboud apologized for the press leak of U.S. provided information on a French passport found in Somalia (see reftel). He attributed the leak to well-connected journalists, but said it was not intentional. He said French intelligence officials now believed that the passport was false, but were awaiting fingerprints from Kenyan authorities before they could have confirmation. They believe the false passport may have belonged to a Tunisian man (with the same name in the passport),well known by French authorities, and who had lived in France for a long period of time. Chaboud said that security officials hoped his case might lead them to conspirators in France who might have assisted him in his journey to Somalia, or could uncover other networks of Islamic radicals. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON