CHIRAC ADVISOR PROVIDES READOUT ON PA PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000710 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/26/2017 TAGS: FR IR IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: CHIRAC ADVISOR PROVIDES READOUT ON PA PRESIDENT ABBAS VISIT Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In his February 24 meeting with President Chirac, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas urged the French to support a resumption of international economic assistance to the PA, but also suggested a continued refusal to engage in political contact with the new government would help to put pressure on Hamas to accept the Quartet Principles. Dominique Boche, Chirac's Middle East advisor, said he was struck by the fact that Abbas refrained from any criticism of U.S. policy. To the contrary, the PA President lauded the Secretary's management of the first trilateral meeting between Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert. Boche also discussed Syria's latest tactics to block the UN tribunal on Lebanon and dismissed Iran's release of a French citizen as a transparent attempt to split the EU3. End summary. Abbas Asks Chirac for Support -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Dominique Boche, President Chirac's Middle East advisor, PA President Mahmoud Abbas delivered a surprisingly "ambiguous" message to President Chirac during their meeting in Paris on February 24. "On the one hand, Abbas appealed for Chirac to assist in lifting the embargo on economic assistance to the PA. On the other hand, he argued that a continued refusal to engage in political contact with the new government would keep the pressure on Hamas to accept the Quartet Principles," said Boche. Moreover, Abbas was vague about the modalities of international economic assistance to the PA, leaving Boche with the impression that the PA leader would not be averse to a scenario in which international economic assistance were channeled in such a way (e.g., through the PA President's Office, or through the auspices of an independent Finance Minister) as to remain outside of Hamas's control. "He said we should restart aid, but he didn't say exactly to whom," Boche summarized. (Comment: Abbas's message may have surprised the French, inasmuch as MFA officials seem to have envisioned a gradual restoration of political contacts with the unity government, followed by an eventual restoration of economic support. End comment.) ¶3. (C) Boche said he was struck by the fact that Abbas refrained from any criticism of U.S. policy -- something Boche said was "a first" in his experience of dealing with Palestinian politicians. To the contrary, Abbas praised President Bush's determination to move the peace process forward, and lauded the Secretary's management of the February 19 meeting between Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert. Abbas said that Olmert was quite negative at the outset of the meeting and that his conduct toward the Secretary pushed the limits of propriety, but he credited the Secretary with bringing the Israeli PM around to a more constructive position by the end of their discussion. ¶4. (C) Outlining next steps, Abbas told Chirac that he would focus on obtaining Gilad Shalit's release, preventing Qassam rocket attacks on Israel, and ending arms smuggling into Gaza. Boche said Abu Mazen "seemed confident" that Hamas would agree to release Shalit in conjunction with the creation of the National Unity Government. (According to Boche, Chirac revisited this theme during a February 25 phone call with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, in which Mubarak hoped that Fatah/Hamas would soon agree on the timing of Shalit's release, which Mubarak linked to Israel's release of a number of Hamas prisoners who might be tapped for cabinet positions in the national unity government. Boche said Marwan Bargouthi's name was not mentioned in either conversation.) ¶5. (C) Summing up Abu Mazen's visit, Boche said he came away with the impression that Abbas does not trust Hamas -- "why else would he say that his priorities are rebuilding the security services and Fatah?" -- but noted that Abbas apparently made far tougher comments about Hamas to Olmert and during a recent visit to the UK. "We've heard echoes of what he told Olmert and the British, and he was much tougher on Hamas . . . presumably because he thinks the UK is closer to the US approach whereas he thinks we are softer on Hamas," Boche sniffed. ¶6. (C) As for France's policy, Boche reiterated the somewhat ambiguous line the Elysee promulgated following the Chirac-Abbas meeting: France will try to persuade its EU partners (at a March 8-9 European Council meeting) that the Mecca agreement represents a step in the right direction and PARIS 00000710 002 OF 002 that Europe should support a unity government founded on that basis. However, Boche declined to specify what form such support might take, saying it was by no means certain that the Palestinians would succeed in forming a unity government. Lebanon/Syria/Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to the Levant, Boche said Syria has changed tactics, and is now using former Lebanese PM Salim Hoss as an intermediary to promote the idea of "amending" the GOL-UN agreement on the establishment of the international tribunal. Syria's strategy, however, remains the same: blocking the international tribunal at any cost. "Meanwhile, each day moves us closer to the opening of the new (Lebanese) parliamentary session," said Boche, who added that if the Lebanese Parliament fails to act on the tribunal documents then "we may need to discuss" the possibility of a Chapter VII solution. As for Iran, Boche interpreted the February 25 release of Stephane Lherbier (imprisoned in November 2005 for allegedly violating Iranian national waters) as a transparent attempt to split the EU-3 in advance of deliberations over a second UNSC sanctions resolution regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Boche noted that the Iranians failed to release Lherbier's German client, whose release they hope to trade for that of an Iranian serving a prison sentence in Germany for terrorism. Boche added that Lherbier's release has not earned the Iranians much gratitude at the Elysee, where the prevailing view is that he was a political hostage who never should have been sent to prison in the first place. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON