Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS661
2007-02-21 14:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRANCE READY TO PUSH FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BUT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM CH FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE READY TO PUSH FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BUT
SKEPTICAL ON FURTHER UN ACTION ON BURMA
REF: STATE 20000
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 b and d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM CH FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE READY TO PUSH FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BUT
SKEPTICAL ON FURTHER UN ACTION ON BURMA
REF: STATE 20000
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: The French MFA maintains its longstanding
position that the international community should pressure
Burma to move toward democracy and a respect for human
rights, but MFA desk officers Benoit Guidee and Jeremie Petit
were skeptical, following the UNSC resolution's failure, that
action in other UN venues could be anything more than
symbolic. However, the MFA shares the USG conviction that
the UN must appoint a strong Special Envoy, preferably from
ASEAN. End Summary.
2. (C) POLOFF delivered reftel demarche February 20 to Benoit
Guidee, MFA desk officer for the UNSC in the International
Organizations Bureau, and Jeremie Petit, MFA desk officer for
Burma. Guidee and Petit were surprised to discover that the
U.S. still hoped to keep Burma on the UNSC agenda, saying
that in the French view, the Chinese veto had "decisively
buried" the issue. That said, they assured us that the MFA
would entertain any concrete proposals from the U.S. to keep
the issue of Burma alive in the Security Council.
3. (C) The MFA believes that appointment of a Special Envoy
remains the last recourse of those countries that want to
push democracy and human rights within the UN, Guidee said.
Although the MFA does not have a particular candidate in
mind, Guidee portrayed the MFA's ideal hypothetical envoy: A
citizen of an ASEAN nation who elicits respect from the
Burmese regime -- perhaps for past military service or a
track record of independence toward Western powers. At the
same time, the envoy must have the tough-mindedness to press
for concrete results, moving beyond what Guidee characterized
as U/SYG Gambari's "disappointing" emphasis on dialogue as
the sole barometer of success.
4. (C) Guidee and Petit cautioned against viewing a special
envoy as a panacea, however, questioning whether a new envoy
could exert any leverage on the Burmese regime. In the
French view, Gambari's very modest accomplishments -- namely,
getting the Burmese to even speak to him at all -- should be
credited to Chinese pressure. Guidee said the MFA believes
the Chinese pushed Burma to cooperate nominally with Gambari
or face Chinese support for a resolution. Without the threat
of a resolution, Guidee was skeptical that Burma would
cooperate with a new special envoy.
5. (C) On the subject of pressing the Burma agenda in other
UN fora, Guidee worried that it would risk limiting the
discussion only to human rights or forced labor. That was
why the Security Council had been the ideal forum, he said,
characterizing Burma's abuses as too widespread to be limited
to any other UN venue. Further, he wondered if there was a
risk for like-minded countries of diluting their message or
support for their cause if they pressed simultaneously for a
good offices mission and for Human Rights Council action.
However, if the US planned to propose specific means to
advance shared security concerns about Burma in either the
HRC, or other UN venues, the MFA would be willing to consider
a new strategy.
6. (C) Guidee and Petit saluted the US effort to demarche
ASEAN nations and encourage them to pressure Burma. However,
Guidee said the MFA regards ASEAN as rather "hapless" --
either unable or unwilling to act alone to
credibly press Burma. Fellow members such as Vietnam and
Laos are not democratic role models, and they generally urge
ASEAN to overlook Burma's human rights abuses. ASEAN's most
promising activists, in the French view, would be Singapore
and the Phillipines, especially if their current exasperation
with Burma led them to curb economic cooperation with Burma.
PARIS 00000661 002 OF 002
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM CH FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE READY TO PUSH FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BUT
SKEPTICAL ON FURTHER UN ACTION ON BURMA
REF: STATE 20000
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: The French MFA maintains its longstanding
position that the international community should pressure
Burma to move toward democracy and a respect for human
rights, but MFA desk officers Benoit Guidee and Jeremie Petit
were skeptical, following the UNSC resolution's failure, that
action in other UN venues could be anything more than
symbolic. However, the MFA shares the USG conviction that
the UN must appoint a strong Special Envoy, preferably from
ASEAN. End Summary.
2. (C) POLOFF delivered reftel demarche February 20 to Benoit
Guidee, MFA desk officer for the UNSC in the International
Organizations Bureau, and Jeremie Petit, MFA desk officer for
Burma. Guidee and Petit were surprised to discover that the
U.S. still hoped to keep Burma on the UNSC agenda, saying
that in the French view, the Chinese veto had "decisively
buried" the issue. That said, they assured us that the MFA
would entertain any concrete proposals from the U.S. to keep
the issue of Burma alive in the Security Council.
3. (C) The MFA believes that appointment of a Special Envoy
remains the last recourse of those countries that want to
push democracy and human rights within the UN, Guidee said.
Although the MFA does not have a particular candidate in
mind, Guidee portrayed the MFA's ideal hypothetical envoy: A
citizen of an ASEAN nation who elicits respect from the
Burmese regime -- perhaps for past military service or a
track record of independence toward Western powers. At the
same time, the envoy must have the tough-mindedness to press
for concrete results, moving beyond what Guidee characterized
as U/SYG Gambari's "disappointing" emphasis on dialogue as
the sole barometer of success.
4. (C) Guidee and Petit cautioned against viewing a special
envoy as a panacea, however, questioning whether a new envoy
could exert any leverage on the Burmese regime. In the
French view, Gambari's very modest accomplishments -- namely,
getting the Burmese to even speak to him at all -- should be
credited to Chinese pressure. Guidee said the MFA believes
the Chinese pushed Burma to cooperate nominally with Gambari
or face Chinese support for a resolution. Without the threat
of a resolution, Guidee was skeptical that Burma would
cooperate with a new special envoy.
5. (C) On the subject of pressing the Burma agenda in other
UN fora, Guidee worried that it would risk limiting the
discussion only to human rights or forced labor. That was
why the Security Council had been the ideal forum, he said,
characterizing Burma's abuses as too widespread to be limited
to any other UN venue. Further, he wondered if there was a
risk for like-minded countries of diluting their message or
support for their cause if they pressed simultaneously for a
good offices mission and for Human Rights Council action.
However, if the US planned to propose specific means to
advance shared security concerns about Burma in either the
HRC, or other UN venues, the MFA would be willing to consider
a new strategy.
6. (C) Guidee and Petit saluted the US effort to demarche
ASEAN nations and encourage them to pressure Burma. However,
Guidee said the MFA regards ASEAN as rather "hapless" --
either unable or unwilling to act alone to
credibly press Burma. Fellow members such as Vietnam and
Laos are not democratic role models, and they generally urge
ASEAN to overlook Burma's human rights abuses. ASEAN's most
promising activists, in the French view, would be Singapore
and the Phillipines, especially if their current exasperation
with Burma led them to curb economic cooperation with Burma.
PARIS 00000661 002 OF 002
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON