FRENCH PRESIDENCY STRATEGIC ADVISER RICHIER

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004750 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM KNUP FR IR EU RU CH SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY STRATEGIC ADVISER RICHIER DISCUSSES IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, DECEMBER 13, 2007 REF: STATE 165967 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso ns 1.4. (b),(d). ¶1. (C) We passed reftel points to French MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf States Franck Gellet on December ¶13. PolMinCouns and poloff also passed these points on December 13 to French Presidency strategic affairs adviser Francois Richier. Richier commented that the points were good and he appreciated that the U.S. was following up our public release of the NIE,s key judgments with a general message underscoring that the essence of the U.S. position on Iran,s nuclear program had not changed. He worried, however, that the NIE,s release had complicated French efforts to persuade other UNSC members and the rest of the EU to toughen sanctions. ¶2. (C) In Richier,s opinion, too many people have only absorbed the key judgments related to Iran,s apparent suspension of its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and ignored the others about worrisome aspects of Iran,s ongoing program. This is especially true within the EU, where those governments resisting tougher sanctions -- Austria and Italy -- are weakening whatever EU resolve there was to move forward or even to issue a tough statement at the upcoming GAERC. China and Russia, Richier continued, were using the NIE to support their arguments to slow down or not proceed to the third sanctions resolution. They were using others, ignorance of the overall situation to throw up roadblocks. The Arabs, in the meantime, were interpreting the NIE,s release as likely to hasten a military operation to deal with Iran's program. This was partly based on the presumption that reservations predicated on some governments, reading of the NIE would prevent diplomatic progress within the UNSC and lead the U.S. and Israel to decide that military action was the only viable alternative to ensure Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. ¶3. (C) Richier argued that it was taking &too long8 to move to the third sanctions resolution. When we asked how long was too long, Richier noted the Russian discussions with the Iranians about providing nuclear fuel. (Comment: This conversation preceded the subsequent announcement that Russia had delivered fuel supplies to Iran,s reactor at Bushehr. End comment) He did not think a key decision point would present itself in December, but perhaps by the end of January. France would likely push then for explicit EU support to move ahead at the UNSC or adopt stronger EU sanctions. Richier repeated that those in the EU reluctant to take stronger EU action -- Austria and Italy -- will repeat their insistence that the UNSC first consider sanctions. If the Germans come around to accept tougher EU measures, "we may be able to bring along the others." ¶4. (C) One aspect of the timing, Richier asserted, was the Iranian domestic political calendar. He pointed to Iranian parliamentary elections set for March and maintained that a third UNSC sanctions resolution could have a positive impact on the internal situation in terms of putting hardliners on the defensive. By contrast, the UNSC,s failure to pass a third resolution could be presented to the Iranian people as a triumph for President Ahmadi Nejad,s intransigent position. ¶5. (C) Richier concluded by identifying two key issues/challenges facing us at this stage: countering the negative effects of the NIE and working as quickly as possible to bring a third sanctions resolution to the UNSC. We asked whether there was any countervailing pressure domestically to temper French determination to move ahead as quickly as Richier argued. He responded that there is no real domestic pressure on the GOF regarding Iran. The French public was mostly too distracted by immediate events. (Comment: Richier referred to the weeklong and highly controversial visit by Libyan leader Qadhafi, which was going on at the time of this meeting. End comment) He noted some questions raised about why President Sarkozy would "go along with the U.S." if either side knew better what the actual state of Iranian nuclear program was. Richier agreed, however, with our assessment that the French media,s prevailing editorial line on Iran agreed that Iran,s nuclear program remained a source of valid international concern and supported further UNSC sanctions absent Iranian agreement to international demands. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON