AF A/S FRAZER'S NOVEMBER 27 MEETINGS IN PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004693

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR EUN SU IV CD CT SG FR
SUBJECT: AF A/S FRAZER'S NOVEMBER 27 MEETINGS IN PARIS

REF: A. BEIJING 7270

B. KHARTOUM 1866

C. STATE 161267

D. PARIS 4603

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met with Darfur
rebel leader Abdul Wahid al Nur and, separately, with
Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and MFA
AF A/S Jean de Gliniasty on November 27. Abdul Wahid
requested a range of U.S. assistance, professed his support
for the U.S., and stressed the need to impose an end to
fighting in Darfur, which would then allow for broader
political reconciliation. A/S Frazer said that the
international community was addressing Darfur's issues but
that progress would take time. She agreed on the need to end
the fighting but said that there must be movement on the
political front at the same time, encouraging Abdul Wahid to
become more engaged politically. The French officials shared
many of A/S Frazer's views of Darfur and related issues,
although they seemed more willing to pursue UNSC sanctions
against Abdul Wahid, about which A/S Frazer was skeptical.
She also cautioned against a premature decision by the French
not to extend his French visa (which expires December 28) in
view of his possibly creating greater problems elsewhere.
While meeting with A/S Frazer, and consistent with a message
she had conveyed to Abdul Wahid, the French received
instructions from President Sarkozy in China to contact Abdul
Wahid and to ask him, on behalf of the PRC, to ensure that
Darfur rebels desist in attacking PRC units operating in
conjunction with UNAMID; the French succeeded in contacting
him and he said that he would so instruct his forces, having
earlier made the same promise to A/S Frazer upon learning
that the U.S. requested China to deploy engineers. The
French shared A/S Frazer's concern about Eritrea's harmful
regional influence, the future of Senegal post-Wade, and the
possibility that President Gbagbo would only allow elections
to go forward in Cote d'Ivoire if he was certain he would win
them. END SUMMARY.

Abdul Wahid
--------------

2. (C) AF A/S Frazer, AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh,
and acting Embassy AF-watcher met with Darfur rebel leader
Abdul Wahid al Nur and his associate Ahmed M. Abdalla on
November 27 in Paris. A/S Frazer and Abdul Wahid expressed
similar concerns about recent developments in Sudan/Darfur,
including very worrisome renewed North-South tensions, the
consequent threat to CPA implementation, First Vice President
Salva Kiir's decision to withdraw his ministers from the
government, and Abyei. A/S Frazer outlined the USG's
commitment to bringing peace and stability to Sudan, noting
that the effort involved a "brick-by-brick" approach on
several fronts -- security, political, humanitarian
assistance, and economic development. The process was
complex and would require time. With concerted effort on the
part of all concerned, favorable results were possible, and
she noted the DRC as an example of a country where progress
was made and elections held despite broad skepticism that
that could be accomplished.


3. (C) Abdul Wahid encouraged U.S. engagement and mentioned
repeatedly his support for U.S. efforts. When he asked about
new U.S. proposals, A/S Frazer noted that the U.S. wanted to
know what he wanted or was willing to do, and not to hear
further rejections of international proposals, which he had
voiced often in the past. Abdul Wahid, as he stated several
times, stressed the priority he placed on peace and security
and his desire to end the killing of his people. They would
need help achieving security, however, and he placed no trust
in the Khartoum government, which could not keep its promises
and blamed the rebels for everything. He stressed that
simply signing an agreement and going to Khartoum would not
stop the killing, pointing to Minni Minawi as proof. He laid
out a three stage process to peace: "conflict suspension"
(ending the killing of Darfuris),mediation towards a peace
agreement, and then a Darfur-Darfur reconciliation process.
He predicted if the south "goes" (i.e., ceases to be a part
of a greater Sudan),then so would eastern Sudan and Darfur,
followed by endless killing.


4. (C) Abdul Wahid firmly stated that he was the Darfur
leader with the most followers and most influence. He
expressed no confidence in Libya and said he could not
negotiate with the Libyan dictatorship. He supported AU
efforts generally but not Salim Salim personally. Abdul
Wahid reiterated that an end to the fighting must come first,
"and then we will be ready to negotiate." He said that the
newer factions and splinter groups should ally with his
movement. Asked gain for specifics, Abdul Wahid said that he
would like U.S. financial support to allow purchases of fuel,
food, and shelter, and then U.S. political support so that he
could more easily rally other Darfur elements to his
movement. "Try us; if we fail, you can blame us," he said.


5. (C) A/S Frazer said that his approach was generally
reasonable, but the timetable was too long. He would need to
engage in political negotiations as UNAMID deployed, but
before completion of the deployment of 26-27,000 forces on
the ground. She said the U.S. would consider possible
non-lethal forms of assistance, noting the legal prohibition
against supporting armed groups. She emphasized the
international community's efforts to bring security to the
region, in the form of UNAMID, but that deployment would take
time. However, she stressed that while forces on the ground
would increase security, similar progress should take place
in parallel on the political side to guarantee long-term
peace. Abdul Wahid approved but noted that earlier
agreements (e.g., Abuja) had not ended the fighting.


6. (C) Abdul Wahid's associate, Ahmed M. Abdalla (who is
apparently a doctor based in Canada and who had met with
AF/SPG Lauren Landis, among other U.S. officials during a
recent visit to the U.S.),reiterated that members of Abdul
Wahid's movement were first and foremost struggling to stop
the killing of their people and to ensure a positive future.
He described the members of the movement as "100 percent
pro-U.S." and in favor of democratic government. He
requested U.S. support and stressed his lack of trust in the
Khartoum government, with an end to the killing his top
priority: "Stop the killing, then we can talk."


7. (C) A/S Frazer expressed understanding with what they
had said, noting USG reservations about the Khartoum
government but also the need to work with it. She stressed
that the rebels should not/not put peacekeepers at risk. She
noted the case of China and the need to respect the
recently-arrived PRC engineer battalion, which would perform
vital work needed to underpin UNAMID's eventual deployment
(refs A and B). Abdul Wahid noted China's "arrangement" with
the Khartoum regime over oil, which A/S Frazer observed as
well, commenting that this could be used as leverage by the
Chinese if they so chose. Nevertheless, Abdul Wahid promised
A/S Frazer that he would instruct his people to accept the
Chinese contingent. A/S Frazer again encouraged him to work
with other factions and to accelerate the political process,
just as she hoped that DPKO would speed work on UNAMID's
deployment. Asked what he would do if he could no longer
stay in France, Abdul Wahid said that he would go
"elsewhere," but avoided specifics. A/S Frazer said that, in
her view, imposing sanctions against him was not the answer
and the U.S. would sanction rebels like Khalil Ibrahim who
were spoilers and who continued their attacks, especially
against peacekeepers.


8. (C) The meeting closed with A/S Frazer and Abdul Wahid
promising to stay in touch, to keep each other informed, and
to work together where possible.

Meeting with French Officials
--------------

9. (C) Directly after the meeting with Abdul Wahid, A/S
Frazer, S/A Sanneh, and Embassy acting AF-watcher met with
Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and MFA
AF A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty. Gliniasty, who had just
returned from New York where he attended a meeting on Sudan,
said that the situation remained fragile, with Abdul Wahid
and Khalil Ibrahim remaining outside the political process,
which remained quite bogged down. The North/South problem
was worsening. A/S Frazer reviewed her meeting with Abdul
Wahid, emphasizing her advice to him on the need to make
progress on political issues in tandem with improving
security, with which Joubert and Gliniasty expressed
agreement. Gliniasty noted that Abdul Wahid had sent a
letter to UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson on November 19, in
which he set forth only one condition for greater engagement
politically (as opposed to the number of conditions he had
previously stated),which called for the deployment of
UNAMID. Gliniasty regretted that Abdul Wahid continued to
posture grandiosely, occasionally referring to himself as
Darfur's "de Gaulle."


10. (C) At this point in the meeting, Joubert received a
call from the Presidency. He said that President Sarkozy,
then visiting China, was asked by the Chinese to use France's
influence with Abdul Wahid and request that Abdul Wahid's
forces in Darfur not attack the Chinese engineering battalion
deploying as part of UNAMID. The Presidency was asking
Joubert to contact Abdul Wahid immediately to pass on this
message. Gliniasty did so and reported that Abdul Wahid said
that he would do so, responding in a "sincere" manner,
Gliniasty reported. Frazer commented that it was Khalil
Ibrahim who was reported to threaten the Chinese to leave
Darfur.


11. (C) A/S Frazer said that the UNSC should consider
sanctioning Sudan President Bashir for his failure to honor
commitments he had made with respect to UNAMID. It was not
acceptable that he not cooperate fully, or believe he had a
say in the countries that could participate in UNAMID, which
only discouraged potential troop-contributing countries and
caused DPKO to proceed more cautiously. Joubert noted that
China was becoming more and more of an option in terms of
applying pressure on Bashir. A/S Frazer said that China was
showing more flexibility on a number of fronts because of PRC
concerns that the 2008 Olympics go smoothly, with an effort
to minimize PRC political vulnerabilities.


12. (C) A/S Frazer and Joubert regretted that Egypt had
been discouraged from playing a role in UNAMID, with
Gliniasty saying he had advised Egypt to offer helicopters if
troops were out of the question but that the Egyptians had
said they had none to provide. Joubert said that DPKO could
have done better by accepting troops from Arab countries but
stationing them only in parts of Darfur with Arab
populations. Joubert continued that Bashir had refused
offers from Thailand and Nepal. A/S Frazer commented that
when Bashir thought he could pick and choose, so too did the
rebels. She noted that DPKO's search for the optimal was
often counterproductive, refusing, for example Jordanian
helicopter that could not fly at night, even though they were
suitable for day use.


13. (C) The Abyei problem was a difficult issue as well.
A/S Frazer said a possible solution would be to ensure
certain access to oil by the North should the South secede --
"we can perhaps separate the oil from the land." Oil was one
of the key issues, even though the reserves might go dry by

2019. Some form of guaranteed access could ease the problem.
Gliniasty said that the Khartoum regime was becoming more
inflexible with the worsening of the CPA crisis. A/S Frazer
observed that Bashir had never really accepted an
international peacekeeping operation and was trying to buy
time. Joubert agreed and noted how the situation had changed
since the signing of the CPA, with the U.S. taking a
different approach now that the realities and impact of the
Iraq War and 9/11 had settled into place. A/S Frazer said it
was then clear that all options were on the table and that
U.S. actions in Afghanistan convinced the NCP to negotiate
genuinely the end of the North-South war.


14. (C) Turning to the Horn of Africa, both sides were
critical of Eritrea's role. A/S Frazer described Eritrea as
the region's "spoilers," seeking to provoke instability
region-wide and refusing cooperation in a number of areas.
She noted Eritrea's unhelpful stance and its move to a war
footing, and that Eritrea was not simply trying to cause
problems with respect to Ethiopia but to oppose practically
everyone, seeking to be a dominant regional player. She
thought that Eritreans had been inspired by Qadhafi and
wanted to emulate him. She noted that the threat from
Eritrea to Ethiopia seemed greater than the threat from
Ethiopia to Eritrea since Eritrea was arming and supporting
insurgency groups in Ethiopia. Eritrea, moreover, was
supporting and helping arm rebel groups across the region.
One reason peace in the region was difficult was the
dependence rebel groups had on funding from countries like
Libya and Eritrea. If the funding ended, peace would be more
within reach.


15. (C) On the need to finalize Eritrea-Ethiopia border
issues, Gliniasty said the French had floated an idea of a
possible successor mechanism to the EEBC (refs C and D),
should it cease to function, but had gained no traction.
Joubert thought that Ethiopia might be open to accepting the
EEBC's demarcation if it received something in return, such
as meaningful and global dialogue on the port of Assab. A/S
Frazer said that dialogue was necessary and Lynn Pascoe was
pursuing an initiative to facilitate dialogue -- Ethiopia
agreed but Eritrea had said no for now. If Ethiopia said no,
Eritrea would agree. The issue was not ripe for resolution.


16. (C) Joubert noted the renewal of fighting in Chad. He
wondered about the timing and the extent to which Chadian
rebels had been pushed out of Sudan, perhaps as a ploy by
Libya and Sudan to forestall deployment of the EU operation
intended for Chad and the C.A.R. In any case, the latest
round of fighting was apparently a defeat for the rebels.
Joubert noted, with some admiration, the way President Deby
had apparently appeared at the front and personally directed
operations. Joubert saw this as a larger effort by Sudan to
destabilize the region to its advantage, and another
indication that it did not want to implement commitments it
had already made. A/S Frazer said that this was consistent
with a point Abdul Wahid had earlier made.


17. (C) Returning to Abdul Wahid, A/S Frazer noted that in
some respect he was shown to be correct. She cautioned the
French against canceling his visa, commenting that he could
play a more negative role elsewhere. The French mentioned
Senegal as a possible new destination, observing that
President Wade wanted Abdul Wahid to go to Senegal.
Discussion turned briefly to Senegal, with Gliniasty saying
that Wade's son was a person to be avoided. Wade seemed to
be grooming his son, but the son lacked Wade's charisma and,
especially, his ability to speak eloquently in Wolof -- an
important skill in Senegal for a politician, which the son
did not possess. Gliniasty said that France unfortunately
did not have concrete evidence of any wrongdoing or
transgressions on the son's part. Of course Wade's
"political son" was Idrissa Seck, even despite the troubles
the two have had, including the latter's jailing.


18. (C) The French expressed concern about Senegal and
Wade's increasingly wayward leadership. Joubert recounted a
story of how the Senegalese had completely misinterpreted the
financial aspects of the voluntary tax on international air
travel. Wade somehow believed that Senegal (or he himself)
could profit from this if Senegal played an active role or
landed the headquarters administering the program, and had to
be convinced that the contemplated system did not include
cash but rather a system of credits, whereupon the Senegalese
lost interest. Joubert believed that this showed the bad
advice Wade was receiving.


19. (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, Joubert noted the meeting then
taking place in Ouagadougou intended to resolve voter
registration issues. So far, there were few reasons for
optimism. The French expressed the view that Gbagbo would
continue to stall the elections process until the point that
he believed he had comfortable control over them and was
confident that he would win an election. However, Joubert
said that Cote d'Ivoire could not lose another year, noting
that the elections had been postponed regularly for the last
couple of years. Concerning Operation Licorne, Joubert said
that France would continue to reduce its contingent but
would, despite these drawdowns, maintain the ability to
perform its support mission for UNOCI. A/S Frazer noted
DepSec Negroponte's visit to Cote d'Ivoire (in which she
participated) and the clear message the U.S. had sent
regarding the importance of elections and implementing the
Ouagadougou Accords, to which the Ivoirians had responded in
the positive manner one would expect on such an occasion,
although that did not guarantee there would be no backsliding.


20. (C) COMMENT: The meeting was a useful one for both
sides, and the French clearly profited from the opportunity
to consult broadly with A/S Frazer, Gliniasty saying that he
had cut short his visit to New York to be available during
her transit through Paris. The French indicated that they
would welcome further close and regular consultations of this
kind. END COMMENT.


21. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON