AF A/S FRAZER'S NOVEMBER 27 MEETINGS IN PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004693 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017 TAGS: PREL PINR EUN SU IV CD CT SG FR SUBJECT: AF A/S FRAZER'S NOVEMBER 27 MEETINGS IN PARIS REF: A. BEIJING 7270 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1866 ¶C. STATE 161267 ¶D. PARIS 4603 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met with Darfur rebel leader Abdul Wahid al Nur and, separately, with Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and MFA AF A/S Jean de Gliniasty on November 27. Abdul Wahid requested a range of U.S. assistance, professed his support for the U.S., and stressed the need to impose an end to fighting in Darfur, which would then allow for broader political reconciliation. A/S Frazer said that the international community was addressing Darfur's issues but that progress would take time. She agreed on the need to end the fighting but said that there must be movement on the political front at the same time, encouraging Abdul Wahid to become more engaged politically. The French officials shared many of A/S Frazer's views of Darfur and related issues, although they seemed more willing to pursue UNSC sanctions against Abdul Wahid, about which A/S Frazer was skeptical. She also cautioned against a premature decision by the French not to extend his French visa (which expires December 28) in view of his possibly creating greater problems elsewhere. While meeting with A/S Frazer, and consistent with a message she had conveyed to Abdul Wahid, the French received instructions from President Sarkozy in China to contact Abdul Wahid and to ask him, on behalf of the PRC, to ensure that Darfur rebels desist in attacking PRC units operating in conjunction with UNAMID; the French succeeded in contacting him and he said that he would so instruct his forces, having earlier made the same promise to A/S Frazer upon learning that the U.S. requested China to deploy engineers. The French shared A/S Frazer's concern about Eritrea's harmful regional influence, the future of Senegal post-Wade, and the possibility that President Gbagbo would only allow elections to go forward in Cote d'Ivoire if he was certain he would win them. END SUMMARY. Abdul Wahid -------------- ¶2. (C) AF A/S Frazer, AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh, and acting Embassy AF-watcher met with Darfur rebel leader Abdul Wahid al Nur and his associate Ahmed M. Abdalla on November 27 in Paris. A/S Frazer and Abdul Wahid expressed similar concerns about recent developments in Sudan/Darfur, including very worrisome renewed North-South tensions, the consequent threat to CPA implementation, First Vice President Salva Kiir's decision to withdraw his ministers from the government, and Abyei. A/S Frazer outlined the USG's commitment to bringing peace and stability to Sudan, noting that the effort involved a "brick-by-brick" approach on several fronts -- security, political, humanitarian assistance, and economic development. The process was complex and would require time. With concerted effort on the part of all concerned, favorable results were possible, and she noted the DRC as an example of a country where progress was made and elections held despite broad skepticism that that could be accomplished. ¶3. (C) Abdul Wahid encouraged U.S. engagement and mentioned repeatedly his support for U.S. efforts. When he asked about new U.S. proposals, A/S Frazer noted that the U.S. wanted to know what he wanted or was willing to do, and not to hear further rejections of international proposals, which he had voiced often in the past. Abdul Wahid, as he stated several times, stressed the priority he placed on peace and security and his desire to end the killing of his people. They would need help achieving security, however, and he placed no trust in the Khartoum government, which could not keep its promises and blamed the rebels for everything. He stressed that simply signing an agreement and going to Khartoum would not stop the killing, pointing to Minni Minawi as proof. He laid out a three stage process to peace: "conflict suspension" (ending the killing of Darfuris),mediation towards a peace agreement, and then a Darfur-Darfur reconciliation process. He predicted if the south "goes" (i.e., ceases to be a part of a greater Sudan),then so would eastern Sudan and Darfur, followed by endless killing. ¶4. (C) Abdul Wahid firmly stated that he was the Darfur leader with the most followers and most influence. He expressed no confidence in Libya and said he could not negotiate with the Libyan dictatorship. He supported AU efforts generally but not Salim Salim personally. Abdul Wahid reiterated that an end to the fighting must come first, "and then we will be ready to negotiate." He said that the newer factions and splinter groups should ally with his movement. Asked gain for specifics, Abdul Wahid said that he would like U.S. financial support to allow purchases of fuel, food, and shelter, and then U.S. political support so that he could more easily rally other Darfur elements to his movement. "Try us; if we fail, you can blame us," he said. ¶5. (C) A/S Frazer said that his approach was generally reasonable, but the timetable was too long. He would need to engage in political negotiations as UNAMID deployed, but before completion of the deployment of 26-27,000 forces on the ground. She said the U.S. would consider possible non-lethal forms of assistance, noting the legal prohibition against supporting armed groups. She emphasized the international community's efforts to bring security to the region, in the form of UNAMID, but that deployment would take time. However, she stressed that while forces on the ground would increase security, similar progress should take place in parallel on the political side to guarantee long-term peace. Abdul Wahid approved but noted that earlier agreements (e.g., Abuja) had not ended the fighting. ¶6. (C) Abdul Wahid's associate, Ahmed M. Abdalla (who is apparently a doctor based in Canada and who had met with AF/SPG Lauren Landis, among other U.S. officials during a recent visit to the U.S.),reiterated that members of Abdul Wahid's movement were first and foremost struggling to stop the killing of their people and to ensure a positive future. He described the members of the movement as "100 percent pro-U.S." and in favor of democratic government. He requested U.S. support and stressed his lack of trust in the Khartoum government, with an end to the killing his top priority: "Stop the killing, then we can talk." ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer expressed understanding with what they had said, noting USG reservations about the Khartoum government but also the need to work with it. She stressed that the rebels should not/not put peacekeepers at risk. She noted the case of China and the need to respect the recently-arrived PRC engineer battalion, which would perform vital work needed to underpin UNAMID's eventual deployment (refs A and B). Abdul Wahid noted China's "arrangement" with the Khartoum regime over oil, which A/S Frazer observed as well, commenting that this could be used as leverage by the Chinese if they so chose. Nevertheless, Abdul Wahid promised A/S Frazer that he would instruct his people to accept the Chinese contingent. A/S Frazer again encouraged him to work with other factions and to accelerate the political process, just as she hoped that DPKO would speed work on UNAMID's deployment. Asked what he would do if he could no longer stay in France, Abdul Wahid said that he would go "elsewhere," but avoided specifics. A/S Frazer said that, in her view, imposing sanctions against him was not the answer and the U.S. would sanction rebels like Khalil Ibrahim who were spoilers and who continued their attacks, especially against peacekeepers. ¶8. (C) The meeting closed with A/S Frazer and Abdul Wahid promising to stay in touch, to keep each other informed, and to work together where possible. Meeting with French Officials -------------- ¶9. (C) Directly after the meeting with Abdul Wahid, A/S Frazer, S/A Sanneh, and Embassy acting AF-watcher met with Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and MFA AF A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty. Gliniasty, who had just returned from New York where he attended a meeting on Sudan, said that the situation remained fragile, with Abdul Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim remaining outside the political process, which remained quite bogged down. The North/South problem was worsening. A/S Frazer reviewed her meeting with Abdul Wahid, emphasizing her advice to him on the need to make progress on political issues in tandem with improving security, with which Joubert and Gliniasty expressed agreement. Gliniasty noted that Abdul Wahid had sent a letter to UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson on November 19, in which he set forth only one condition for greater engagement politically (as opposed to the number of conditions he had previously stated),which called for the deployment of UNAMID. Gliniasty regretted that Abdul Wahid continued to posture grandiosely, occasionally referring to himself as Darfur's "de Gaulle." ¶10. (C) At this point in the meeting, Joubert received a call from the Presidency. He said that President Sarkozy, then visiting China, was asked by the Chinese to use France's influence with Abdul Wahid and request that Abdul Wahid's forces in Darfur not attack the Chinese engineering battalion deploying as part of UNAMID. The Presidency was asking Joubert to contact Abdul Wahid immediately to pass on this message. Gliniasty did so and reported that Abdul Wahid said that he would do so, responding in a "sincere" manner, Gliniasty reported. Frazer commented that it was Khalil Ibrahim who was reported to threaten the Chinese to leave Darfur. ¶11. (C) A/S Frazer said that the UNSC should consider sanctioning Sudan President Bashir for his failure to honor commitments he had made with respect to UNAMID. It was not acceptable that he not cooperate fully, or believe he had a say in the countries that could participate in UNAMID, which only discouraged potential troop-contributing countries and caused DPKO to proceed more cautiously. Joubert noted that China was becoming more and more of an option in terms of applying pressure on Bashir. A/S Frazer said that China was showing more flexibility on a number of fronts because of PRC concerns that the 2008 Olympics go smoothly, with an effort to minimize PRC political vulnerabilities. ¶12. (C) A/S Frazer and Joubert regretted that Egypt had been discouraged from playing a role in UNAMID, with Gliniasty saying he had advised Egypt to offer helicopters if troops were out of the question but that the Egyptians had said they had none to provide. Joubert said that DPKO could have done better by accepting troops from Arab countries but stationing them only in parts of Darfur with Arab populations. Joubert continued that Bashir had refused offers from Thailand and Nepal. A/S Frazer commented that when Bashir thought he could pick and choose, so too did the rebels. She noted that DPKO's search for the optimal was often counterproductive, refusing, for example Jordanian helicopter that could not fly at night, even though they were suitable for day use. ¶13. (C) The Abyei problem was a difficult issue as well. A/S Frazer said a possible solution would be to ensure certain access to oil by the North should the South secede -- "we can perhaps separate the oil from the land." Oil was one of the key issues, even though the reserves might go dry by ¶2019. Some form of guaranteed access could ease the problem. Gliniasty said that the Khartoum regime was becoming more inflexible with the worsening of the CPA crisis. A/S Frazer observed that Bashir had never really accepted an international peacekeeping operation and was trying to buy time. Joubert agreed and noted how the situation had changed since the signing of the CPA, with the U.S. taking a different approach now that the realities and impact of the Iraq War and 9/11 had settled into place. A/S Frazer said it was then clear that all options were on the table and that U.S. actions in Afghanistan convinced the NCP to negotiate genuinely the end of the North-South war. ¶14. (C) Turning to the Horn of Africa, both sides were critical of Eritrea's role. A/S Frazer described Eritrea as the region's "spoilers," seeking to provoke instability region-wide and refusing cooperation in a number of areas. She noted Eritrea's unhelpful stance and its move to a war footing, and that Eritrea was not simply trying to cause problems with respect to Ethiopia but to oppose practically everyone, seeking to be a dominant regional player. She thought that Eritreans had been inspired by Qadhafi and wanted to emulate him. She noted that the threat from Eritrea to Ethiopia seemed greater than the threat from Ethiopia to Eritrea since Eritrea was arming and supporting insurgency groups in Ethiopia. Eritrea, moreover, was supporting and helping arm rebel groups across the region. One reason peace in the region was difficult was the dependence rebel groups had on funding from countries like Libya and Eritrea. If the funding ended, peace would be more within reach. ¶15. (C) On the need to finalize Eritrea-Ethiopia border issues, Gliniasty said the French had floated an idea of a possible successor mechanism to the EEBC (refs C and D), should it cease to function, but had gained no traction. Joubert thought that Ethiopia might be open to accepting the EEBC's demarcation if it received something in return, such as meaningful and global dialogue on the port of Assab. A/S Frazer said that dialogue was necessary and Lynn Pascoe was pursuing an initiative to facilitate dialogue -- Ethiopia agreed but Eritrea had said no for now. If Ethiopia said no, Eritrea would agree. The issue was not ripe for resolution. ¶16. (C) Joubert noted the renewal of fighting in Chad. He wondered about the timing and the extent to which Chadian rebels had been pushed out of Sudan, perhaps as a ploy by Libya and Sudan to forestall deployment of the EU operation intended for Chad and the C.A.R. In any case, the latest round of fighting was apparently a defeat for the rebels. Joubert noted, with some admiration, the way President Deby had apparently appeared at the front and personally directed operations. Joubert saw this as a larger effort by Sudan to destabilize the region to its advantage, and another indication that it did not want to implement commitments it had already made. A/S Frazer said that this was consistent with a point Abdul Wahid had earlier made. ¶17. (C) Returning to Abdul Wahid, A/S Frazer noted that in some respect he was shown to be correct. She cautioned the French against canceling his visa, commenting that he could play a more negative role elsewhere. The French mentioned Senegal as a possible new destination, observing that President Wade wanted Abdul Wahid to go to Senegal. Discussion turned briefly to Senegal, with Gliniasty saying that Wade's son was a person to be avoided. Wade seemed to be grooming his son, but the son lacked Wade's charisma and, especially, his ability to speak eloquently in Wolof -- an important skill in Senegal for a politician, which the son did not possess. Gliniasty said that France unfortunately did not have concrete evidence of any wrongdoing or transgressions on the son's part. Of course Wade's "political son" was Idrissa Seck, even despite the troubles the two have had, including the latter's jailing. ¶18. (C) The French expressed concern about Senegal and Wade's increasingly wayward leadership. Joubert recounted a story of how the Senegalese had completely misinterpreted the financial aspects of the voluntary tax on international air travel. Wade somehow believed that Senegal (or he himself) could profit from this if Senegal played an active role or landed the headquarters administering the program, and had to be convinced that the contemplated system did not include cash but rather a system of credits, whereupon the Senegalese lost interest. Joubert believed that this showed the bad advice Wade was receiving. ¶19. (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, Joubert noted the meeting then taking place in Ouagadougou intended to resolve voter registration issues. So far, there were few reasons for optimism. The French expressed the view that Gbagbo would continue to stall the elections process until the point that he believed he had comfortable control over them and was confident that he would win an election. However, Joubert said that Cote d'Ivoire could not lose another year, noting that the elections had been postponed regularly for the last couple of years. Concerning Operation Licorne, Joubert said that France would continue to reduce its contingent but would, despite these drawdowns, maintain the ability to perform its support mission for UNOCI. A/S Frazer noted DepSec Negroponte's visit to Cote d'Ivoire (in which she participated) and the clear message the U.S. had sent regarding the importance of elections and implementing the Ouagadougou Accords, to which the Ivoirians had responded in the positive manner one would expect on such an occasion, although that did not guarantee there would be no backsliding. ¶20. (C) COMMENT: The meeting was a useful one for both sides, and the French clearly profited from the opportunity to consult broadly with A/S Frazer, Gliniasty saying that he had cut short his visit to New York to be available during her transit through Paris. The French indicated that they would welcome further close and regular consultations of this kind. END COMMENT. ¶21. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON