CHAD: AMBASSADOR NIGRO'S DECEMBER 10 MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004682 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EUN PINS CD CT FR SUBJECT: CHAD: AMBASSADOR NIGRO'S DECEMBER 10 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS REF: A. PARIS 4661 ¶B. N'DJAMENA 944 PARIS 00004682 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French MOD and MFA officials expressed both concern and optimism over force generation issues related to the EU's planned mission for Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) during December 10 meetings with U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro. The lack of helicopters remains the key missing ingredient. The French acknowledged the difficulty in determing the reason for the recent renewed fighting in eastern Chad, but agreed that it was not helping convince potential EU participants to contribute to the EU mission. MFA DAS-equivalent Christine Fages predicted that Chad President Deby would eventually reconcile with Zaghawa rebel elements and that he could come to support elections as the best way to remain in power. Ambassador Nigro expressed USG support for French efforts in Chad and pledged to work closely with French elements in Chad. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 10 held separate meetings at the French Defense and Foreign Ministries (at the MOD: Colonel Emmanuel Maurin and Elodie Riche of the Strategic Affairs Delegation; at the MFA: DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine Fages, her deputy Benoit Decamps, and Chad desk officer Loic Mizon). The main topic at both meetings was the problems France and the EU have had in obtaining commitments from EU members that would allow formation and deployment of the EU force in Chad and the CAR. ¶3. (C) At the MOD, Riche expressed concern about obtaining the most important missing element, the 20 helicopters deemed vital to the mission. She said that "this will be a big week," noting the December 10-11 GAERC meeting and, especially the December 14 European Council meeting (heads of state/government),where this matter, if not resolved by then, could be taken up at the highest level. ¶4. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Fages, in contrast, acknowledged difficulties in the force generation process but expressed optimism that a solution would be forthcoming. The MOD and MFA officials agreed that it would be a grave error for the Chad operation to be cancelled for want of 20 helicopters. The EU would suffer serious credibility problems if it failed to carry out a mission that it had voted to undertake and which was essential for the UN's companion mission, MINURCAT. This fact alone encouraged Ambassador Nigro's interlocutors to believe that a solution would be found. The French reminded that the issue was not finding 20 helicopters but determining who would pay for them. (NOTE: The French gave no indication that France would finance the helicopters if no other EU partner offered to do so. END NOTE.) Repeating what the French Presidency told Ambassador Nigro last week (ref A),the French indicated that they would focus their lobbying efforts on the UK and Germany. Maurin and Riche at the MOD said that they understood that President Sarkozy had set a limit on French participation in the mission -- no more than 2,000 French troops or, alternatively, no more than 50 percent of the mission. Maurin said that he did not think that Sarkozy would change these figures. ¶5. (C) On the renewed fighting in eastern Chad, the French acknowledged that it was hard to determine the reasons for the rebels' choosing to fight now. There were several potential reasons, including an assessment by the rebels that it was best to strike now before EUFOR and UNAMID deploy, which would hamper their ability to fight. The fighting might also represent Sudan's decision to mark the end of its support for the rebels, encouraging them to make one last attempt. The French said that the recent battles had been quite fierce, and costly for rebel forces, especially among the non-Zaghawa forces; it appeared that opposing Zaghawa forces were not fighting each other as much as other ethnic groups were doing. ¶6. (C) The French said that it appeared that Deby's forces had prevailed in this latest round of fighting, to the point where Deby could leave Chad and attend the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon this past weekend. On December 12, in fact, Deby was in Paris, transitting between Lisbon and N'Djamena. (NOTE: The French officials did not elaborate on what he might do in Paris. END NOTE.) His willingness to leave Chad PARIS 00004682 002.2 OF 002 during a crisis, especially given his penchant for leading his men into battle, demonstrated confidence that this latest rebel offensive had been contained. ¶7. (C) In any case, the fighting was doing much to build skepticism in Europe about participating in the Chad/C.A.R. mission, and this was no doubt one of its purposes, the French stated. They regretted also that the "Arche de Zoe" child smuggling case had occurred at the worst possible time and that it and the renewed fighting had drawn attention to Chad in the most negative way, which must have affected the thinking of potential EU contributors to the operation. Fages said, however, that it was fortunate that the fighting was taking place now, before EUFOR and MINURCAT were on the ground. If elements of the missions had been in place when the fighting began, EU and UN partners might be calling for an evactuation or a complete end to the missions. She hoped that this offensive was a last gasp one and that the rebels would be exhausted by the time EUFOR and MINURCAT were ready to deploy. ¶8. (C) On Chad politics more generally, Fages expressed the belief that Deby would reconcile with elements of the Zaghawa clan that were on the rebel side. She predicted as well that Deby would eventually agree to accept a democratic process based on free and fair elections as the best means for remaining in power. She said that as he aged and as going into battle pesonally became more difficult, Deby would understand that perpetual warfare was not in his interest and that an electoral process was his best recourse. ¶9. (C) At both the MOD and MFA (and at the Presidency during his ref A meeting),Ambassador Nigro expressed appreciation for French leadership concerning Chad. He noted the importance the U.S. placed on Chad and its key role in the larger set of regional problems, including Darfur. He said that the USG specifically supported France's efforts to mount a peacekeeping operation in Chad and the C.A.R. and that the U.S. was exploring ways it could support EUFOR and MINURCAT, either politically, in the case of EUFOR, or through other possible forms of contribution, in the case of MINURCAT. Ambassador Nigro expressed his keen interest in working with French elements in Chad, which his French interlocutors welcomed. ¶10. (U) Ambassador Nigro did not have a chance to clear this message before leaving Paris on December 10. ¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON