CHAD/C.A.R. PKO: "20 HELICOPTERS ARE HOLDING UP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004661 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EUN PINS CD CT FR SUBJECT: CHAD/C.A.R. PKO: "20 HELICOPTERS ARE HOLDING UP THE WORKS" REF: A. PARIS 4534 ¶B. N'DJAMENA 933 PARIS 00004661 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AF Presidential Advisor Romain Serman told U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 6 that the issue of financing 20 helicopters was holding up the establishment and deployment of EUFOR to Chad and the Central African Republic. Serman said that France would continue to lobby EU partners, especially the UK, to obtain a commitment to fund the helicopters. Serman was optimistic that the mission would eventually be deployed but he could not predict when the commitment to fund the helicopters would be secured. He indicated that France was no longer expecting EUFOR to operate at the 4,000 troop level and would accept a force level of 3,000. So far, EU members had committed to about 2,500, with France supplying 1,400-1,500 forces. The French would welcome any help the USG could provide in encouraging EU members to help finance EUFOR. He said that renewed fighting in Chad represented an effort by Chadian rebels, backed by Sudan and Libya, to impede deployment of EUFOR. Serman expressed concern about radical Islamic groups and criminal trafficking elements building continent-wide ties across the Sahel. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) AF Presidential Advisor Romain Serman met with U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 6, focusing on EUFOR and the problems France has had in securing commitments from EU partners. Serman said that the crucial impediment was the failure of EU partners to fund approximately 20 helicopters (which would include gunships, transportation, and surveillance aircraft) deemed necessary to support EUFOR. Serman expressed personal frustration and disappointment that, after having voted to engage in a peacekeeping mission in Chad and C.A.R., EU members were shying away from funding necessary components of the mission. ¶3. (C) Serman said that France would continue lobbying EU members for financial support for the helicopters. He identified the UK in particular, although France well recognized the constraints placed on the UK by its engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. France hoped not to turn this into a debate about ESDP and EU pol/mil theology but rather appeal to EU partners' need to respond to the crises in the region and not merely make statements about the urgency to do something about such crises. The French, he said, would emphasize that UNAMID and efforts in Darfur would be seriously compromised if EUFOR and MINURCAT were not deployed in parallel in Chad and C.A.R. Serman was optimistic that the necessary commitments would be made to allow EUFOR to deploy but he could not predict when that might be. ¶4. (C) When asked directly, Serman said that France was no longer thinking that reaching the former target of deploying EUFOR at the 4,000-4,300 level was feasible, and was now looking at a force of about 3,000 (ref A). He said that about 2,500 troop commitments had been made, including 1,400-1,500 French forces. Three deployable battalions, one French, were now available. Serman said that the issue of a military medical facility had been resolved, leaving only the helicopters as the key missing ingredient. Serman said that France would welcome efforts by the USG to encourage potential contributors to EUFOR to step forward and make commitments. ¶5. (C) Serman said that recent renewed fighting in Chad, which he said was quite heavy (ref B),represented an effort by Chadian rebel groups -- and their Libyan and Sudanese backers -- to scare off potential EUFOR contributors and to impeded its formation and deployment. Serman noted President Deby's personal engagement in the combat, directing Chadian forces at the front, remarking on his "true warrior spirit." The recent fighting, Serman said, had resulted in casualties to Deby's own family. Serman said that the rebels were exploiting the nature of the Zaghawa-against-Zaghawa fighting, imploring Zaghawa members on the government side to "stop killing your brothers and to turn against our real enemy, Deby." Serman said that this seemed to be having some effect, with the fighting against Erdimi's Zaghawa rebel forces less intense than the combat against rebel elements led by Mahamat Nouri composed of members of the Daza/Goran ethnic group. Serman said that a relatively large number of Goran had been "massacred" in the heavy fighting. Serman PARIS 00004661 002.2 OF 002 reported, consistent with ref B, that Mahamat Nour had taken refuge in the Libyan Embassy, leading Serman to comment on Qadhafi's continuing interest in dominating Chad. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Nigro said that his priorities would be humanitarian support for refugees and IDPs in Chad, democratization, anti-terrorism, and economic development, particularly concerning wise management of Chad's petroleum resources, which would eventually disappear. Serman agreed with these goals and encouraged close cooperation with France's Embassy and its Ambassador, Bruno Foucher, whom Serman praised highly. Serman said that Chad was important because it represented a target for radical Islam, which was operating to expand its influence westward across the Sahel. "If Chad falls, then the next target could be northern Nigeria," Serman said, noting that that would be disastrous. Serman and Ambassador Nigro agreed that another concern was the increased illicit trafficking of all kinds across the Sahel, and how trafficking groups were beginning to build ties among themselves and with Islamic groups. This was a dangerous development, they agreed, one that such things as the TSCTP was designed to address, Ambassador Nigro noted. ¶7. (U) Ambassador Nigro did not have an opportunity to clear this message before departing on December 6 for consultations in Germany. He returns to Paris for meetings at the MOD and MFA on Monday, December 10, after which he travels to N'Djamena. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON