FRENCH MFA OVERVIEW OF NORTH AFRICAN ISSUES

S E C R E T PARIS 004533 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ETRD PINR FR MO AG TU LY SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OVERVIEW OF NORTH AFRICAN ISSUES REF: RABAT 1657 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: We reviewed a number of North African issues with French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa Nathalie Loiseau earlier this month. She called President Sarkozy,s state visit to Morocco positive and, despite the failure to sell the Moroccans Rafale fighters, excellent for French commercial interests. The decision by a French investigating judge to sign arrest warrants for the head of the Moroccan gendarmerie and other former officials over the 1965 Ben Barka disappearance had not disrupted the visit but upset the French justice minister accompanying Sarkozy. There was no hidden agenda behind the action, according to Loiseau; just a zealous judge looking for publicity. Sarkozy,s forward-leaning public statement on Western Sahara had predictably pleased the Moroccans and displeased the Algerians, although their demarche had been more tepid than expected. Preparations were underway for Sarkozy,s early December state visit to Algeria, which will follow municipal elections in that country and occur amid ongoing French concern about the security situation. During an early 2008 visit to Tunisia (Action Request Paragraph 7),Loiseau expects Sarkozy to press President Ben Ali to improve what France considers to be an unsatisfactory relationship in terms of security cooperation and exchange of information on terrorism. Loiseau said no dates had been set for a much rumored visit by Libyan leader Qadhafi to Paris, although the Elyse,s NEA adviser said he is working on a program for a December visit. End summary Morocco: A Good State Visit Despite Ben Barka -------------- - ¶2. (C) Loiseau had little to add to the excellent summary of the highlights of French President Sarkozy,s late October visit to Morocco in reftel. The only sour note was the French loss of the Rafale fighter sale because of a better U.S. offer to sell used F-16s. Loiseau was philosophical about the missed opportunity and deflected French press claims that the episode had spurred creation of an interagency ""rapid reaction cell"" to coordinate France,s response to similar competition in the future. She claimed the Rafale debacle had been a shock but not the first or necessarily the last. France had long ago learned that it needed to work more effectively in the face of American competition and had set up the group some time ago. The feverish manner in which the French press reported the Moroccan decision not to buy the Rafale made it appear that it had caused the GOF to set up this working group. Overall, the French were comforted by the other commercial and construction contracts signed. ¶3. (C) Loiseau indicated that the decision by a French investigating judge during the visit to sign international arrest warrants for a number of former and current Moroccan officials (including Gendarmerie head Benslimane) over the 1965 disappearance of Moroccan oppositionist Ben Barka had not come up. Sarkozy,s Moroccan hosts said nothing, and the predictably angry Moroccan press treatment did not begin until after Sarkozy and his delegation had left the country. Even though the Moroccans had not raised the Ben Barka case, according to Loiseau, French Justice Minister Rachida Dati, who accompanied Sarkozy and is of half Moroccan origin, was furious over the judge,s action. As with the Rafale, Loiseau was more philosophical. The judge knew what he was doing by signing the warrants while Sarkozy was in Morocco and wanted both the publicity he would receive and the added pressure on the Moroccan government that it would generate. Loiseau observed that the Moroccans, as indicated in numerous articles, had ignored previous requests by the judge for assistance in his investigation or been otherwise uncooperative. She denied any suggestion that the GOF had somehow encouraged the judge to take the action in order to pressure the Moroccans over human rights in Morocco or Western Sahara. (Comment: As Loiseau noted, the current iteration of this longstanding ""cold case"" was brought by Ben Barka,s family several years ago and early in the reign of King Mohammed VI (""M6""). The move to reopen the case, in fact, initially triggered hope that M6 would underscore his desire to break with the human rights abuses his father tolerated by finally allowing access to security files and testimony by those still living who were implicated in the case. End comment) ¶4. (C) We asked whether Sarkozy raised any human rights issues with M6, including restrictions on the press as called for by a leading French NGO. Loiseau responded that Sarkozy may have raised the subject in his private meetings with M6 but claimed not to have any readout. She added that France has preferred to conduct its dialogue with Morocco on human rights and reform in a larger EU context. Loiseau was familiar with the range of concerns we tend to raise with Morocco, having previously served in Rabat, and generally agreed with them. However, France feels Morocco overall is doing more things right than wrong in terms of reform and respect for human rights. The recent elections may have been flawed but more because the parties were not able to generate enough enthusiasm among voters to turn out at the polls. While she acknowledged the lackluster nature of new government, the real problem for Morocco was the general apathy and lack of connection by most people to the country,s political class. Western Sahara -------------- ¶5. (C) Taking note of Sarkozy,s relatively strong public endorsement while in Morocco of the Moroccan position on the long-running dispute over the Western Sahara, we asked Loiseau whether this had generated any negative reaction in Algiers or from the Polisario. She replied that the Algerians had complained but in a remarkably mild, almost inert fashion. They had delivered their demarche at a lower level than one might have expected and were less strident or ideological than usual. Loiseau did not offer an explanation for the Algerian attitude but agreed that there seemed to be more inertia than energy at play. She expected that the Polisario would have more to say when she met with them later in the week. Loiseau agreed that the Moroccans were not eager to resume UN-sponsored negotiations under current circumstances but expected they would resume according to the timeframe UN envoy van Walsum outlines. On to Algeria -------------- ¶6. (C) Loiseau said her office was now working with the French Presidency on Sarkozy,s early December state visit to Algiers. She offered no insights into what the GOF expected from that visit, although the security situation and President Bouteflika,s health are on everyone,s mind. Loiseau was not happy about the visit occurring immediately after Algerian municipal elections, whose outcome would inevitably color perceptions. And Beyond that Tunisia -------------- ¶7. (S) Looking ahead to Sarkozy,s state visit to Tunisia early in 2008, Loiseau indicated that Sarkozy intended to raise with President Ben Ali French concerns about continuing Tunisian reticence in terms of sharing information about security threats. She said that Sarkozy, as a former interior minister, is extremely unhappy with the unsatisfactory state of cooperation and the exchange of intelligence information concerning terrorism. The memories of what happened late last year and early this year when the AQIM cell that went undetected for so long as well as Tunisian dissembling in the aftermath of its discovery still linger. Loiseau asked whether the USG could provide, in whatever appropriate channel, a summary of its own experience to help the GOF prepare Sarkozy for this conversation. (Action request: Please inform Embassy Paris if Washington takes action on this request). Libya and Rumors of a Qadhafi Christmas in Paris -------------- --- ¶8. (C) We inquired whether reports in the press about Libyan leader Qadhafi visiting Paris in December were accurate. Loiseau answered that Sarkozy had invited Qadhafi to visit France last July, when Sarkozy visited Libya, and repeated the invitation in subsequent phone calls. However, the press was not necessarily accurate because it was trying to link the visit to ongoing and tendentious coverage of the parliamentary investigation of the deal that led to the release of the Bulgarian ""medics."" We asked whether Libya,s past association with terrorism was an element in this coverage and how the GOF would treat Qadhafi, given his ambiguous title as ""guide"" of the revolution and not head of state, should he be the subject of calls for prosecution in connection with the bombing of UTA 772. Loiseau responded that the past association with terrorism was certainly part of the general interest in whether Qadhafi had truly been ""rehabilitated,"" but she said the resonance of protests by family members of UTA 772 was limited compared to that of Pan Am 103 in the U.S. As for Qadhafi,s legal status, France would grant him full legal immunity as de facto head of state. ¶9. (C) In a November 13 meeting with French Presidency adviser on NEA issues Boris Boillon, he indicated that he was actively working on a program for a December Qadhafi visit. He claimed no date had been set and implied that the fault lay with the Libyans. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON