SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: FRENCH PUSHING HARD ON ALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004271 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU CT CD FR SUBJECT: SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: FRENCH PUSHING HARD ON ALL FRONTS Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Romain Serman, an AF advisor at the French presidency, told us on October 16 that President Sarkozy remains personally engaged on Darfur-related issues and is pushing for rapid progress on UNAMID and, especially, MINURCAT. Force generation and financial issues regarding MINURCAT are slowly being resolved, and the French hope for deployment to begin in November with the full military complement in place by mid-January 2008. The French are concerned, however, that too many of the combat troops will be French. Sarkozy is reported not happy with South Africa President Mbeki's change of heart on September 24, which did not allow the MINURCAT UNSC resolution to be adopted by heads-of-state at the September 25 Security Council meeting. Mbeki, UK PM Gordon Brown, and Sarkozy are to meet this weekend, when Mbeki and Brown will be in Paris to attend the championship match of the Rugby World Cup. Serman reported that the French are becoming completely fed up with Darfur rebel leader Abdulwahid el-Nur's refusal to participate in the October 27 peace talks in Sirte, Libya, and are looking for ways to "punish" him, including cancellation of his present French visa, which is valid until December 28. END SUMMARY. MINURCAT/UNAMID ¶2. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting on October 16 (other elements of which we will report separately),French Presidency AF advisor Romain Serman provided an update on Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.). He first noted that President Sarkozy remained highly engaged in the region's issues, always prompting his staff "to keep moving and to move faster,' with a good but not overbearing attention to details -- "what's happening with the helicopters we talked about yesterday?" Serman said that France succeeded in accelerating EU action on MINURCAT, the EU-UN operation for Chad and C.A.R. France had hoped that the EU would take action by October 23; the October 15 EU decision was most welcome. France would like to keep deployment of MINURCAT and UNAMID roughly in parallel, so that the level of activity along the various borders mounts in step. ¶3. (C) Serman said that force generation and funding issues were slowly getting resolved. He said that MINURCAT's 
commander, Irish General Nash, had arrived in Paris this week and was beginning to function at MINURCAT's HQ near central Paris. The French were pleased that EU "neutrals" such as Ireland and Sweden were offering military personnel for MINURCAT. ¶4. (C) One problem, however, was that troop contributors were tending to offer support and rear-area units and not combat troops. Serman said that a larger percentage of MINURCAT's combat troops looked to be French. As they would be the most visible elements of MINURCAT, these French troop would give the impression that MINURCAT was a "French" operation, something the GOF did not want. However, Serman indicated that the French could accept this if it meant allowing the operation to go forward. ¶5. (C) Serman said that, if everything fell into place as planned, MINURCAT units could begin to deploy in November. French military planners have said that full deployment of the military component of the operation could be accomplished by mid-January 2008. Deploying the Chadian police/gendarmes would take place differently -- the UN planned to train the 800 Chadians in batches of 200 a month, with the first group to deploy in December and then periodically thereafter, with the full complement in place by March 2008. MBEKI BALKS ON MINURCAT RESOLUTION ¶6. (C) Serman said that the French, including President Sarkozy, were not very happy with South Africa President Mbeki's change of heart on September 24 concerning the MINURCAT UNSC resolution. The French had always hoped that the resolution would be adopted by the UNSC, sitting in heads-of-state format, on September 25, which would have sent a strong and clear message about the international community's commitment to Chad and C.A.R. within the context of the Darfur cluster of problems. Instead, according to Serman, Mbeki wavered, saying that he could not vote publicly for the installation of a "white" military force in Africa, even though Chad President Deby and C.A.R. President Bozize had indicated that they would accept, and even would welcome, PARIS 00004271 002 OF 002 such a force. Mbeki's change of position meant that the resolution had to be adopted by the UNSC at ambassador-level on the morning of September 25, rather than by heads-of-state later that day, robbing it of much of its force. Serman said that the French had not expressed their displeasure to Mbeki -- "he knows we're not happy about this, and we didn't need to tell him." Serman noted that Sarkozy, Mbeki, and UK PM Gordon Brown would meet together this weekend, when Mbeki and Brown will be in Paris to attend the final match of the Rugby World Cup, with South Africa and England contesting the grand prize. ABDULWAHID EL-NUR ¶7. (C) In contrast to the PKO military angle, political aspects related to Sudan and its neighbors were not going well at all, Serman remarked, noting the escalation of North-South violence, the risks to the CPA, and the prospect that the October 27 peace talks in Sirte, Libya, would amount to little because of the boycott of rebel leaders such as Abdulwahid el-Nur. Serman said that the French government was reaching the limits of its patience with him, and that even Sarkozy had said that "if he doesn't cooperate, he must be punished." Serman had little faith in Abdulwahid, branding him an opportunist more interested in preserving his self-anointed position as "leader" of the Darfur rebels rather than in doing anything constructive for his people or in terms of Sudan's and Darfur's many problems. In Serman's view, Abdulwahid had become an opportunist, seeking money and the patronage of NGOs. Not only was he personally not cooperating but he was using his influence to prohibit members of his Fur ethnic group in Darfur from sending representatives to Libya. Serman said that only the Zaghawa in Darfur seemed to be preparing to attend the Sirte talks. Serman regretted that Abdulwahid was now wasting yet another opportunity to play a positive role. ¶8. (C) Serman noted (with a tone of regret) that the GOF had recently extended Abdulwahid's visa, allowing him to remain legally in France until December 28. Serman confided that the French were looking for ways to cancel his visa, but he admitted that there were certain legal problems stemming from the fact that the visa had just been extended. His idea was that Jan Eliasson would declare, on the eve of the October 27 Sirte talks, that certain individuals (among them Abdulwahid) were not cooperating and were impeding the political dialogue. On this basis, the UNSC could, perhaps in the form of a Presidential Statement, condemn Abdulwahid and the other recalcitrants, which could strengthen any action the French might take to cancel his visa. Serman acknowledged that Abdulwahid was very crafty, as were his NGO supporters in France, and that being able to expel him in the short term might not be easy. "But December 28 is a long ways off, and he can do a lot of harm between then and now," Serman mused. COMMENT ¶9. (C) Serman gave the impression that Sarkozy himself has ensured that momentum within the GOF to get MINURCAT and UNAMID up and running has continued these past few weeks. Developments have been less than ideal (e.g., the disproportionately large number of French combat troops) but the French appear ready to accept them and to keep moving forward. We sense that French concern now is less focused on the two PKOs, which seem to be proceeding apace, but rather on the worsening state of the other issues in play -- the North-South/CPA problem and the increasingly fragile October 27 peace talks in Libya. END COMMENT. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton