SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: UPDATE ON FRENCH VIEWS TOWARDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004183 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO SU CT CD FR SUBJECT: SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: UPDATE ON FRENCH VIEWS TOWARDS UNAMID AND MINURCAT REF: A. STATE 136068 (NOTAL) ¶B. PARIS 4084 (NOTAL) ¶C. USEU TODAY (OCTOBER 4) Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: France now agrees to carry out joint demarches with the U.S. and the UK regarding contributions to the UNAMID mission for Darfur (refs A and B),but only/only with respect to non-EU potential donors. The French will demarche EU members separately, taking into account the need for contributions to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic. The French have extended Darfur rebel leader Abdulwahid el-Nur's visa through the end of the year but are becoming increasingly exasperated with his refusal to compromise on any issue, even after several meetings with Foreign Minister Kouchner. DAS-equivalent Christine Fages told us on October 4 that progress on MINURCAT was proceeding steadily within the EU, although she was not able to say when it would deploy and did not offer many details. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) We met separately on October 4 with MFA AF DAS-equivalents Helene Le Gal and Christine Fages. Le Gal is responsible for East and Central Africa, which includes Sudan, and Fages is responsible for West Africa, which includes Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.), consistent with long-standing MFA practice. Le Gal and Fages provided updates on their respective sectors. UNAMID/SUDAN -------------- ¶3. (C) Le Gal said that France had modified its position with respect to the U.S. request (ref A) that the U.S., UK, and France jointly demarche a number of countries to seek contributions for the UNAMID mission in Sudan. We had previously reported (ref B) that the French had declined to join in this effort, preferring separate demarches in consideration of the priority France has placed on building the MINURCAT mission in Chad/C.A.R. Le Gal said on October 4, however, that France now agreed to carry out the joint demarche with the U.S. and UK, but only with respect to the non-EU countries listed in ref A. She said that French Embassies in the non-EU countries had been instructed to work with U.S. and UK counterparts to make the joint demarche on host governments. She said that it was possible that some French Embassies had already contacted U.S. and UK Embassies in the countries involved and had begun the process. ¶4. (C) Le Gal said that France would work with EU potential donors separately, as part of the GOF's efforts to obtain contributions not only for UNAMID but also for the MINURCAT mission in Chad and C.A.R. She indicated that France's leadership role in MINURCAT and its needs required a balancing between it and UNAMID in terms of French treatment with EU partners. ¶5. (C) Le Gal said that the French were becoming increasingly frustrated with Darfur rebel leader Abdulwahid el-Nur's refusal to cooperate or to show any willingness to compromise on any issue. "If anything, he's getting worse," Le Gal observed. She said that Abdulwahid had meet several times in recent weeks directly with Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, with the latter trying without success to obtain Abdulwahid's agreement to attend the upcoming Libya peace talks, among other things. Le Gal reported that Abdulwahid continued to view himself as the key to resolving the Darfur crisis and, as such, expected everyone else to bow to his will. ¶6. (C) Le Gal said that there was some regret on the French side for having allowed Abdulwahid to come to France about a year ago. The purpose then was simply to allow him to consult with the French. Now, he has ensconced himself well in Paris and has become "a bit of a darling" for NGOs interested in Darfur, notably the "Urgence Darfour" PARIS 00004183 002 OF 003 organization, which has adopted him as Darfur's true leader and which injected itself into French domestic politics when it held well-publicized Darfur-related rallies during the French presidential campaign this past spring. All of this had contributed to Abdulwahid's considerable ego, Le Gal commented, and exacerbated his more negative tendencies. Le Gal said that Abdulwahid seemed now to think that he was not only the sole leader capable of resolving the Darfur crisis but also the only person who could deal with all of Sudan's many other problems. She said he was kidding himself if he thought that he could assume power in Khartoum -- "the 'Arab' Sudanese will never let that happen." John Garang might have been able to do so, but not Abdulwahid, Le Gal noted. ¶7. (C) When asked about Abdulwahid's residency status in France and to what degree France viewed this as leverage over him, Le Gal said that his visa was being renewed on a three-month basis and that it had just been renewed for a period extending to the end of 2007. She said that there had been discussion about whether to renew it but that the GOF concluded that it might be better to have him in France, where the French could exercise some control over him and continue to urge him to be more accommodating, rather than have him leave France for "who knows where to do who knows what." Le Gal indicated that the French were willing to put up with him despite his increasingly erratic ways. MINURCAT/CHAD/C.A.R. -------------- ¶8. (C) Our initial introductory courtesy call on October 4 with newly-arrived DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine Fages provided an opportunity for an update on MINURCAT. Exhibiting a very brisk and to-the-point manner, Fages said that the process of establishing MINURCAT was going well. She declined to go into much detail but said that EU partners were fully on board politically and that she expected the EU to adopt an "action commune" in short order, a requirement before the EU could engage in an activity such as MINURCAT. The "action commune" would allow for more detailed planning and the development of a CONOPS, along with more technical EU-required aspects of the operation. Force generation ("always complex") was the other immediate concern. Fages said that several countries had committed troops and support services, although she declined to specify the countries or what they had agreed to provide. (See ref C for details derived from EU sources.) ¶9. (C) Fages confirmed press reports (e.g., Paris daily Le Monde, October 4) stating that MINURCAT's general HQ would be located at Mont Valerien, near Paris. (Le Monde also reported that Irish General Patrick Nash would likely head the operation from Mont Valerien, with French General Jean-Philippe Ganascia commanding in theater.) ¶10. (C) Throughout the discussion, Fages (whose previous assignment had been at France's mission to NATO),praised the "excellent cooperation and support" the U.S. had provided concerning MINURCAT. She brushed over earlier differences on the funding of the Chadian gendarmes who are to participate in the operation and said that money would eventually be found to fund their activities. Fage said that the Chadian gendarmes were one of the key elements of MINURCAT, for without them, Chad President Deby would have never accepted MINURCAT. Fages said that Deby was thinking ahead -- after the mission he would have a cadre of relatively well-trained and well-equipped gendarmes that would be a valuable asset. ¶11. (C) Fages said that the French had had no problems with C.A.R. regarding MINURCAT, and observed that C.A.R. President Bozize undoubtedly welcomed an international presence in northeastern C.A.R., given his problems in the northwestern part of his country. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm PARIS 00004183 003 OF 003 Stapleton